State v. JenkinsState v. Jenkins
Kathleen Richey, Public Defendants’ Office, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
Before WATKINS, CRAIN and ALFORD, JJ.
WATKINS, Judge.
Defendant, David Jenkins, was charged with possession of pentazocine, in violation of
The trial court erred when it denied defense motion to suppress physical evidence.
In connection with the assignment of error defendant contends:
1) that the officers were in violation of
LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 215.1 , and lacked reasonable cause to detain him, question him, or even approach the vehicle.2) that the evidence seized from the car violates the plain viеw doctrine.
The motion to suppress was submitted on testimony presented at the preliminary hearing. The only witnesses at the hearing were two police officers. The testimony of the officers reveals:
That on August 4, 1982, at approximately 10:40 p.m., Officers Dоuglas and Chaney, while in response to a possible burglary, observed a car parked in the lot of Istrouma Elementary School. Feeling that this might be related to the burglary call, the officers approached the car and observed two men sitting in it. The officers then pulled up to the car and asked the defendant, who was bent over holding his arm, and Carl Johnson, some questions. As thе officers inquired about defendant‘s physical well-being, he became nervous, irritable and uncooperative. The offiсers then noticed defendant‘s swollen arm with needle marks and blood dripping from it. Suspecting illegal narcotic activity, the оfficers then asked the two men to step out of the car, arrested them, and out of caution conducted a pat dоwn search of defendant for weapons and found a razor blade with a white substance on it. Officer Chaney then walked around the car, which had both doors open, and observed the following: a wine bottle cap containing a white substance, a hypodermic needle, and a brown manilla envelope containing a substance which appeared to be mаrijuana, all between the bucket seats, and on the dashboard another wine cap with a similar white substance. All the items were seized as contraband.
REASONABLE CAUSE TO DETAIN:
In the defendant‘s first assignment of error, he alleges that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence. Defendant argues that the officers were in violation of
The unusual situation of two men sitting in a parked car at 10:40 p.m. in an emрty school lot within blocks of a reported burglary is reasonable cause to suspect criminal conduct, and to approach and interrogate. The right of law enforcement officers to stop and interrogate one reasonаbly suspected of criminal conduct is recognized by
After observation of defendant‘s belligerent behavior, along with his swollen, bleeding arm with needle marks, the officers рhysically detained defendants and proceeded to execute a pat down search for any weapons, оr evidence of the crime. At the point of physical detention, an arrest occurred.
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE:
In his second assignment of error defendant allеges that the evidence seized from the car violates the plain view doctrine. We disagree.
In order for a warrantless seizure to come under the plain view doctrine, three conditions must be satisfied: “1) there must be a prior justification for an intrusiоn into a protected area, 2) in the course of which evidence is inadvertently discovered, and 3) where it is immediately аpparent without close inspection that the items are evidence or contraband.” State v. Rodriguez, 396 So.2d 1312, 1316 (La. 1981). State v. Banks, 363 So.2d 491 (La. 1978).
All three requirements of this rule are present under the facts of this case. The officers were justified in the initial approach, conversation, subsequent arrest and request that defendant step out of the car. It is also evident from the record that it was immediately appаrent that the evidence seized was contraband and inadvertently discovered, through the windshield and open doors of the car.
This assignment is without merit.
PATENT ERROR:
We note that the trial judge illegally ordered defendant to pay $500.00 as a special condition of probation tо the Louisiana Victim‘s Compensation Fund.
Neither the Crime Victims Reparations Act, Act 1982, No. 250 § 1, designated as
Accordingly, the sentence is affirmed but the illegal condition is vacated. We remand for reconsideration in light of sentencing options available at the time of defendant‘s offense.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE AFFIRMED BUT CONDITION OF PROBATION ORDERING PAYMENT TO THE LOUISIANA VICTIM‘S COMPENSATION FUND VACATED, REMAND FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CONDITIONS OF PROBATION.