Thеre are seven exceptions appearing in the record. The first exсeption is to the following question and answer: “How *320 soon after be was arrested?” (wben State’s witness identified defendant) A. “Next morning.”
This exception is without merit, becausе the identity of defendant was one of the main questions in the case, and the faсt that the officer testified that the “State’s witness identified the defendant soon aftеr he was arrested was corroborative of the evidence of the State’s witness, Mrs. Griffin, who testified that she did identify the defendant at the jail the next morning after he was arrested.
The second exception was to the following question and answer in rеference to the physical condition of prosecutrix immediately aftеr the assault: “Did she complain?” .A. “Yes; she said she could hardly sit up.”
This evidence was сompetent to prove that an assault had actually been committed. Cеrtainly, if the State’s witness had not been assaulted, there was no crime, and the prоof of a crime was an essential part of the State’s case.
Therefоre, the bodily condition of Mrs. Griffin was competent. “Whenever the bodily or mental fеelings or condition of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expression of such feelings are admissible as original evidence.”
S. v. Hargrave,
The third and fifth exceptions are taken because of the refusal of the trial judge to nonsuit the сase. These exceptions cannot be sustained. The defendant was positively identified by the prosecutrix, who also testified that he was the man who had assаulted her. It was, therefore, necessary to submit the case to the jury.
The fourth exception is to the following question asked the defendant on cross-examination: “Why didn’t you ask that man out at Mordecai what he wanted you for and what did they arrest you on Hills-boro street one time for?” This exception cannot be sustained. The question was for the purpose of impeaching the witness and was therefore competent.
S. v. Lawhorn,
The sixth exception is to the refusal of the trial judge to give the fоllowing instruction: “That evidence of the good character of a witness for dеfendant, introduced to establish an alibi, shall be not only considered as affeсting the credibility of such witness, but as substantive evidence of the truth of the alibi relied upon by the defendant.”
The
court properly declined to give this instruction. In no aspect of the law could evidence as to the good character of a witness tend to prove that a defendant or some other person was not at а particular place at a particular time. The purpose of сharacter evidence is to enable
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tbe jury to place tbe proper estimate upon tbe testimony of a witness.
S. v. Cloninger,
Tbe seventh exception is as fоllows: “That it was tbe duty of tbe court to charge tbe jury that, defendant having relied upоn an alibi, tbe burden was upon tbe State to show conclusively and decisively that tbe defendant was tbe person that committed tbe offense, and that be was present at tbe time and place when said offense was committed. And tbe court еrred in charging the jury that upon tbe evidence in tbe case tbe jury would be justified in finding that sоme other than defendant committed tbe offense. There was no admission on рart of defendant or bis counsel that would give weight to this charge by bis Honor.” This is a broadside exception to tbe charge of tbe court without specifying any particular error. •
We have examined tbe charge of tbe court with great care, and this examination discloses that tbe charge presented every phase of defendant’s defense, fully and impartially, and is free from legal error.
Tbe аlibi of the defendant was strong and supported by witnesses of good character, and, upon tbe evidence offered in bis behalf, if believed, be was not guilty. But tbe weight оf tbe evidence is for tbe jury and not for tbe court. Tbe jury, upon competent evidence, has convicted tbe defendant of a capital offense, and tbe judgment as a matter of law must be upheld.
No error.