STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. KENNETH JEFFERSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
No. 95950
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
September 15, 2011
[Cite as State v. Jefferson, 2011-Ohio-4637.]
BEFORE: Cooney, J., Stewart, P.J., and Rocco, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED; Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-533590; RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 15, 2011
Joseph Vincent Pagano
P.O. Box 16869
Rocky River, Ohio 44116
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Lauren Bell
Norman Schroth
Assistant County Prosecutors
9th Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Kenneth Jefferson (“Jefferson“), appeals his convictions for breaking and entering, theft, vandalism, and possession of criminal tools. We find merit to the appeal and reverse.
{¶ 2} Jefferson was charged with breaking and entering, theft, vandalism, and possession of criminal tools for breaking into a retail store in
{¶ 3} In July 2009, the Geauga County Sheriff‘s office received several reports of break-ins throughout the county. The sheriff‘s office communicated the reports to local police agencies so they could work together in the investigation. On August 2, 2009, patrol officer Sean Day (“Day“), of the Chester Township police, stopped Jefferson for suspected driving under the influence. Day determined that Jefferson was not intoxicated but noted that he appeared nervous. Day also observed loose coins in the front passenger seat and a four-way tire iron with a pry bar behind the driver‘s seat. Based on these facts, Day notified the Sheriff‘s office that Jefferson may be a suspect, and provided them with Jefferson‘s license plate number.
{¶ 4} The next day, Detectives Jonathan Bilicic and Matthew Bosworth placed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of Jefferson‘s car while it was parked in a public parking lot at a restaurant in Cleveland Heights. The GPS device transmitted both cellular and satellite signals of the vehicle‘s location to a computer in the Sheriff‘s office in real time. Using a GPS-tracking software program, the computer generated “stop reports” that were produced every time Jefferson‘s car stopped for more than four minutes
{¶ 5} Officer John Paulin (“Paulin“), of the Walton Hills police, testified that he was on basic patrol on the evening of August 7, 2009 when he noticed a number of unusual vehicles. Upon investigation, Day discovered they were unmarked police vehicles. Geauga County detectives showed Paulin the computer in their car that was tracking Jefferson‘s vehicle. The GPS indicated that Jefferson‘s vehicle traveled south on Northfield Road, turned onto Krick Road in Walton Hills, and drove around to the back of the Gas House. According to the stop report, Jefferson‘s vehicle was stopped at the Gas House for nine minutes and 24 seconds, shortly after midnight. The computer generated another stop report at 12:44 a.m. showing that Jefferson‘s car had stopped again for five minutes and 44 seconds at another business called ADI.
{¶ 6} After Jefferson left the Gas House, Paulin retraced Jefferson‘s path and discovered that a break-in had occurred at the Gas House. Paulin explained that he had been in the area 15 minutes before Jefferson‘s vehicle and there were no signs of a break-in at that time. When he returned, however, a glass door was shattered and several drawers, including the cash drawer, were open.
{¶ 7} Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Niehus of the Geauga County Sheriff‘s office arrested Jefferson. Jefferson was the sole occupant in the car and had a hat, gloves, cash, rolled coins, and a black, metal cash drawer that belonged to ADI. Although there was no direct evidence such as fingerprints or video surveillance linking Jefferson to the crimes, the stop reports placed Jefferson at the two businesses at the time of the break-ins.
{¶ 8} The court‘s jury instructions did not include a limiting instruction on “other acts” evidence the State had introduced, and the jury found Jefferson guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to one year in prison, to be served consecutively to a sentence imposed in another case. This appeal followed.
{¶ 9} Although Jefferson raises five assignments of error, the second assigned error is dispositive. In his second assignment of error, Jefferson argues he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel: (1) did not file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless installation and use of a GPS tracking device on his car, and (2) failed to request a limiting instruction on substantial “other acts” evidence.
{¶ 10} To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that (1) the performance of
Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained From GPS
{¶ 11} Failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, per se. State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, 854 N.E.2d 1038, ¶208. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress, a defendant must prove that there was a basis to suppress the evidence in question. State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶65.
{¶ 12} The State argues there was no basis to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless installation of a GPS device on Jefferson‘s car because no warrant was required under the
{¶ 13} In support of its argument, the State relies on State v. Johnson, 190 Ohio App.3d 750, 2010-Ohio-5808, 944 N.E.2d 270, which recently held that GPS surveillance of a suspect during a criminal investigation is not a “search” or “seizure” that would trigger the
{¶ 14} In Knotts, police planted a “beeper” (a radio transmitter) inside a chloroform container that was sold to a suspected drug dealer. The police followed the car in which the chloroform was placed, maintaining contact by using both visual surveillance and a monitor that received beeper signals. The police followed the container across state lines, a trip of almost 100 miles, to Knotts‘s secluded cabin where he was eventually arrested. Id. at 277. The Knotts court concluded that Knotts did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that would trigger the
“The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways. We have commented more than once on the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile:
“‘One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one‘s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.‘” (Citations omitted.)
{¶ 15} Although the Knotts court found that the beeper-inside-the-container surveillance did not require a warrant, it expressly noted its concern that the power to conduct public surveillance using beepers might allow “dragnet-type law enforcement.” Id. at 284. It also reserved the specific question of whether a warrant would be required in a case involving more intense surveillance techniques and stated that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices * * * should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.” Id. Thus, the Supreme Court left open the possibility of an alternative approach, if warranted under different circumstances.
{¶ 16} In United States v. Maynard (C.A.D.C. 2010), 615 F.3d 544, the court found GPS surveillance distinguishable from the beeper-assisted surveillance at issue in Knotts and found that GPS surveillance requires a warrant. In Maynard, Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard were charged with conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, cocaine and cocaine base. Id. at 548-549. At trial, the government used tracking information obtained from a GPS device placed on Jones‘s vehicle to establish a pattern in his activity. When compared with Jones‘s cell phone records, the data “paint[ed] a picture of Jones‘s movements that made the allegation
{¶ 17} Jones argued that the court erred in admitting evidence acquired from the warrantless use of the GPS device for a period of four weeks. Id. at 549, 555. The court agreed with Jones that the prolonged use of GPS surveillance violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and constituted a search under the
{¶ 18} In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the standard reasonable expectation of privacy analysis set forth in U.S. v. Katz (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 360-361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (describing a two-part test for defendant‘s reasonable expectation of privacy as, first, whether the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy and, second, whether or not the expectation was reasonable). Maynard at 555. The court found that although each trip, viewed in isolation, was exposed to the public, the entirety of Jones‘s movements was not, since “[a] reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor or retain a record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each place he stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those movements to remain ‘disconnected
{¶ 19} Finding that, because GPS surveillance reveals more detailed information of one‘s personal life and affairs than any one person would be expected to have, the court concluded that an expectation of privacy in the aggregate of one‘s public movements is reasonable. Maynard at 558.1 The court explained:
“As with the ‘mosaic theory’ often invoked by the Government in cases involving national security information, ‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.’ * * * Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does one‘s not visiting any of these places over the course of a month. The sequence of a person‘s movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist‘s office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of another‘s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups — and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.”
{¶ 21} The
Limiting Instruction
{¶ 22} Jefferson also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction to address the “other acts” evidence that was admitted during the trial. Pursuant to
{¶ 23} The State introduced a substantial amount of “other acts” evidence to prove that Jefferson must have been the same person who
{¶ 24} There was no forensic evidence placing Jefferson at the crime scene. Without forensic evidence linking Jefferson to the crime, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Jefferson if there had been a limiting instruction.
{¶ 25} Therefore, the second assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 26} Judgement reversed and case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶ 27} It is ordered that appellant recover of said appellee costs herein taxed.
{¶ 28} The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
{¶ 29} It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
{¶ 30} A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
{¶ 31} ______________________________________________
{¶ 32} COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, JUDGE
{¶ 33} KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCURS;
{¶ 34} MELODY J. STEWART, P.J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION ATTACHED).
STATE OF OHIO vs. KENNETH JEFFERSON
No. 95950
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
{¶ 36} I agree that defense counsel had a duty to seek suppression of any evidence garnered from the warrantless placement of a GPS tracking device under the first prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. But I cannot agree with the majority‘s conclusion that such a motion, if filed, would have satisfied the second prong of the Strickland test: that there is a reasonable probability that a motion to suppress evidence would have been granted. The only Ohio case on point, State v. Johnson, 190 Ohio App.3d 750, 2010-Ohio-5808, 944 N.E.2d 270, holds that the placement of a GPS
{¶ 37} In addition, United States v. Maynard (C.A.D.C. 2010), 615 F.3d 544, which the majority relies upon on exclusively in support of its conclusion, is something of an outlier among federal appellate courts. All other circuit courts to consider the issue have upheld the warrantless use of GPS tracking devices. See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas–Perez (C.A.7, 2011), 640 F.3d 272; United States v. Pineda-Moreno (C.A.9, 2010), 591 F.3d 1212; United States v. Hernandez (C.A.5, 2011), ___ F.3d ___; United States v. Marquez (C.A.8, 2010), 605 F.3d 604.
{¶ 38} The weight of authority contrary to Maynard both in Ohio and the federal circuit courts suggests not only that Jefferson failed to show a reasonable probability that a motion to suppress evidence based on the warrantless placement of the GPS device would have been granted, but, in fact, that it was highly unlikely that a motion to suppress would have been granted. Jefferson thus cannot meet the second prong of the Strickland test and fails to show that counsel was ineffective. I therefore dissent.