STATE of Louisiana v. Caroline JEFFERSON.
No. 97-KA-2949.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
April 21, 1999.
735 So. 2d 769 (1999)
Judgе WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge CHARLES R. JONES, and Judge Pro Tempore JAMES A. GRAY, II.
Pamela S. Moran, Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, Counsel for Defendant.
Court composed of Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge CHARLES R. JONES, and Judge Pro Tempore JAMES A. GRAY, II.
BYRNES, Judge.
Caroline Jefferson appeals her conviction of an unauthorized use of a motor vehicle for which she was sentenced to serve six years at hard labor. We affirm.
Statement of the Case
On June 5, 1996, defendant, Caroline Jefferson, Donald Stevenson and Patrick Stevenson were charged by bill of information with illegal рossession of stolen things in violation of
Statement of the Facts
After midnight on April 25, 1996, Sergeant David Klegin observed a vehicle going southbound in the Jesuit Bend area of Plaquemines Parish. The vehicle, a white Nissan Altima, had a Tennessee license plate. As the officer passed the vehicle, the vehicle slowed down. The officer slowed down from fifty-five miles per hour to thirty-five miles per hour. The white vehicle never passed him. The officer then pulled off the road. When thе vehicle passed the officer, the officer got behind the vehicle and checked the vehicle‘s license plate through the police dispatcher. The officer learned that the vehicle was stolen. Sergeant Klegin requested assistance and state troopers, who were in thе area, stopped the white vehicle. There were three occupants in the vehicle: Donald Stevenson was the driver; Caroline Jefferson was in the front passenger seat; and Patrick Stevenson was in the back seat. A rental agreement was found in the glove compartment. However, nоne of the occupants’ names was on the rental agreement or any of the documentation found in the vehicle.
The three subjects were arrested and the vehicle was impounded. Sergeant Klegin spoke with defendant Jefferson at the lockup to determine the ownership of the vehiсle. Jefferson told him that she did not own the vehicle. She told the officer that she borrowed the vehicle from a woman who lived in New Orleans East. Jefferson only knew the woman‘s first name but not her last name, address or telephone number. Sergeant Klegin testified that the vehicle‘s steering wheel was not defeаted, and the occupants had the vehicle‘s ignition key.
State Trooper Byron Sims testified that he and Trooper Robert Vittitoe were on routine patrol in Plaquemines Parish when they received a request for assistance from Sergeant Klegin. As the troopers passed Sergeant Klegin on Belle Chаse Highway, Sergeant Klegin informed them that the vehicle in front of him had been reported stolen. The troopers initiated a traffic stop. They asked the driver of the vehicle to step out of the vehicle and produce his driver‘s license and vehicle registration. The vehicle was a 1995 Nissan Altima with a Tеnnessee license plate. The driver produced his driver‘s license but did not have a vehicle registration. The troopers ran the license plate number through the NCIC and learned that the vehicle was stolen. The driver and two passengers were arrested for possession of stolen property, and the vehicle was impounded.
John Hosty, regional security manager for Budget Rent-A-Car, was notified that the vehicle in question was recovered in Louisiana. He was told to contact the Plaquemines Parish Sheriff‘s Office to retrieve the vehicle. The vehicle had been leased to a Janet W. Naff on June 29, 1995 at the Nashville, Tennessee airport. The vehicle was to be returned on July 5, 1995. Budget Rent-A-Car reported the vehicle stolen on July 28, 1995, when the vehicle was not returned. The theft was reported to the Nashville Metro Police Department.
Errors Patent
A review of the record for errors patent reveals that the trial court sentenced Jefferson immediately after denying her motion for new trial. Jefferson did not waive her right to a twenty-four delay betwеen the denial of her motion for new trial and sentencing.
However, there are instances where the failure to observe the 24-hour delay is determined not to be reversible error although the sentence is challenged on appeal. In State v. Seals, 95-0305 (La.11/25/96), 684 So.2d 368, certiorari denied by Seals v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1199, 117 S.Ct. 1558, 137 L.Ed.2d 705 (1997), the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the mandatory nature of the sentence distinguished the cаse from Augustine, supra, and found that the reversal of the sentence for failure to wait 24 hours between the denial of the motion and imposition of sentence was not warranted in the absence of prejudice. See also State v. Allen, 94-1895 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/15/95), 661 So.2d 1078, writs denied 95-2557 & 95-2475 (La.2/2/96), 666 So.2d 1087; State v. Diaz, 93-1309 (La.App. 3 Cir.4/6/94), 635 So.2d 499, writ denied 94-1189 (La.9/16/94), 642 So.2d 191; State v. Williams, 97-970 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/98), 708 So.2d 1086.
In State v. Bentley, 97-1552 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/21/98), 1998 WL 790691, 728 So.2d 405, this court held that any error in failing to observe the 24-hour delay in sentencing after the denial of a motion for new trial did not prejudice a defendant whose original sentence was vacated and he was then found to be a habitual offender. See also State v. Brown, 95-124 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/95), 656 So.2d 1070.
Further, a defendant may implicitly waive the 24-hour waiting period for imposing sentence by announcing his readiness for thе sentencing hearing. State v. Steward, 95 1693 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So.2d 1007; State v. George, 570 So.2d 46 (La.App. 5 Cir.1990); State v. Ferrell, 94-702 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/30/95), 656 So.2d 739, writ denied 95-2360 (La. 4/18/97), 692 So.2d 433. The defendant impliedly waived the required 24-hour delay when defense counsel responded in the affirmative when the trial court inquired whether he was ready for sentencing in State v. Francis, 93-953 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/16/94), 635 So.2d 305.
In State v. Dickerson, 579 So.2d 472 (La.App. 3 Cir.1991), writ granted in part, 584 So.2d 1140 (La.1991), the defendant challenged his sentence on appeal. The appellate court held that failure to observe the 24-hour delay was not reversible error where over a month passed between conviction and sentence, and a presentence investigation report had been ordered, so that there were no indications that the defendant‘s sentence was hurriedly imposed without due consideration, and the defendant did not argue or in any way show that he was actually prejudiced. See also State v. Robinson, 463 So.2d 50 (La. App. 5 Cir.1985).
In the present case the minute entry of the November 20, 1996 trial shows that at the same time that Jefferson was convicted, the trial court ordered a presentence investigation that was duе on January 20, 1997. Jefferson was convicted on November 20, 1996. Jefferson filed a motion for new trial on February 5, 1997. The trial court denied Jefferson‘s motion for new trial and sentenced Jefferson on June 2, 1997. Over three months passed between conviction and sentence. There is no indication that the defendаnt‘s sentence was hurriedly imposed, and the defendant did not argue or in any way show that she was
Assignment of Error No.1
Caroline Jefferson argues that thе trial court erred when it denied her motion for new trial. In her motion, she contends that the state failed to produce sufficient evidence to support her conviction.
However, the present case involves a very different factual situation. In O.B., the defendant was simply a passenger in the vehicle. In the present case Jefferson was not simply a passenger. Jefferson is the person who obtained the vehicle from an unknown person for her own personal use. Jefferson told Sergeant Klegin that she borrowed the vehicle from some woman who lived in New Orleans East. Jefferson only knew the woman‘s first name, but did not know the woman‘s last name, address or telephone number. The trier of fact cоuld conclude that such a story was suspicious and indicative of criminal knowledge and/or intent. Further, Jefferson also knew or should have known that the vehicle did not belong to her friend from whom she allegedly borrowed the vehicle. The rental agreement was in the vehicle. The rental agreement revealed that the vehicle was owned by Budget Rent-A-Car and leased to a Janet Naff. In addition, the state produced evidence to show that the vehicle had in fact been stolen. Mr. Hosty stated that the vehicle was owned by Budget Rent-A-Car and had been leased to a Janet Naff in June of 1995. When the vehicle was not returned in July of 1995, the vehicle was reported as stolen.
This assignment is without merit.
Assignment of Error No.2
Jefferson contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court is unconstitutionally excessive. Although a sentence is within the statutory limits, the sentence may still violate a defendant‘s constitutional right against excessive punishment. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering, and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739 (La.1992). The trial court has great discretion in sentencing within the statutory limits. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983).
In the present case the defendant argues that the trial court failed to take into account the mitigating circumstance that Jefferson was pregnant, although appellate counsel quoted the trial court as saying the defendant was “due any day.” The record shows that the trial court was aware of the defendant‘s pregnancy and took it into account. The trial court stаted: “The court notes that she is currently pregnant and is due any day.”
The trial court carefully reviewed Jefferson‘s presentence investigation report and referred to the fact that Jefferson‘s parole was revoked in a previous matter. The trial court noted that Jefferson had a lengthy juvеnile arrest record which did not show the dispositions of the cases because of the juvenile‘s age.
The trial court reviewed Jefferson‘s prior adult convictions. In 1988 in Gretna, Jefferson was convicted of theft between $100 and $500 with a sentence of one year. In May 1988 in New Orleans, Jefferson pleadеd guilty to another theft between $100 and $500, and she was sentenced to six months. In September 1988 in New Orleans, Jefferson was also sentenced to seven months for another theft between $100 and $500. In November 1990 in New Orleans, Jefferson was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and was sentenced to eight years in the Department of Corrections. The trial court referred to other arrests and a conviction for possession of stolen property. The trial court stated that “because of the lengthy arrest record that spans from 1977 to 1996, ... a substantial sentence is called for.”
The defendаnt has not proved and the record does not show that under the facts of this case, the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in sentencing the defendant to six years at hard labor running concurrent with the case in which her parole was revoked, and with credit for time served.
This assignment of error is without merit.
Accordingly, the defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.