State v. Javaris BrownState v. Javaris Brown
Lead Opinion
Thе Superior Court of Fulton County entered directed verdicts of acquittal in favor of Javaris Brown, Meyetta King, and Kevin Rouse on charges of trafficking in cocaine,
Case No. A15A0457
1. The trial court directed verdicts of acquittal on all counts. As a threshold matter, therefore, we must determine whether the State has any right to appeal. Ordinarily, the State
may not appeal a trial court’s grant to a criminal defendant of a directed verdict of acquittal based on an insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, in that a new trial would be barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The government cannot appeal such a directed verdict of acquittal, even if it is erroneously granted.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Williams,
The record shows the following proceedings. The defendants were arrested and indicted in April 2014. On July 3, 2014, the State filed pursuant to
The trial court conducted a hearing on the evidentiary issues on August 7, September 9, and September 10, 2014. On September 11, 2014, the trial judge signed an order excluding certain evidence as a sanction for discovery violations and excluding the other-acts evidence, and the clerk of court stamped the order “filed” on September 12, 2014. The court placed the case on a trial calendar for September 17, 2014.
On September 12, 2014, the State filed a notice of appeal in the trial court pursuant to
The trial court called the case for trial on September 17, 2014. The State notified the court that it had filed a notice of appeal from the September 12, 2014 rulings and argued that its notice of appeal had divested the trial court of jurisdiction to try the case. The defendants disputed this, arguing that the State failed to comply with the procedural requirements of
Thе defendants all announced ready for trial. The State declined to participate, on the basis that the pending appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction. The trial court then impaneled a jury. The State having failed to adduce any evidence, the defendants each moved for a directed verdict, and the trial court entered a directed verdict of acquittal as to each defendant.
If, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the State’s September 12, 2014 notice of appeal was effective under
In this case, it is undisputed that the State filed its notice of appeal from the trial court’s evidentiary ruling within two days after the ruling was entered, that is, the date a written judgment was received and stamped “filed” by the clerk of the trial court. See
Case No. A15A0456
2. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to exclude certain evidence, which was seized when investigators executed a search warrant, based on the court’s finding that the State violated its reciprocal discovery obligations.
When a criminal defendant elects to engage in reciprocal discovery under Georgia’s Criminal Procedure Discovery Aсt, the State and the defendant are required to produce certain types of evidence and information. See
The record shows the following. In early 2014, the Atlanta Police Department received information that illegal drugs were being sold out of 1808 Brewer Boulevard, a single-family house. An investigator arranged for a confidential source to buy cocaine and marijuana there, on April 7 and April 16. After the second controlled buy, the investigator obtained a search warrant for the premises. A team executed the search warrant on April 23, 2014. When the team arrived, Rouse was beside his car in the driveway, and Brown and King were inside the house. Brown jumped out of a window and was immediately cаptured. Officers found a total of over 50 grams of cocaine, 9.72 grams of marijuana, and three scales in the kitchen and 10.27 grams of cocaine in one of the bedrooms. Officers arrested Brown and King. In a search incident to that arrest, officers found 11.51 grams of a Schedule I controlled substance
In their motions to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the search, the defendants argued that the issuance of the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, that they were merely present in the house at the execution of the warrant, and that there was not probable cause to arrest them. Before the hearing on the motions to suppress, the State represented to the trial
The hearing resumed on September 9, 2014. During the State’s direct examination of the investigator who obtained the search warrant, the prosecutor asked whether the investigator had conducted surveillance on 1808 Brewer Boulevard before arranging for controlled purchases by her confidential source. The investigаtor replied that she had gone to the house twice in the weeks before the controlled buys. She saw some people going in and out of the house but could not determine what they were doing there. When asked whether she included information about the surveillance in her affidavit in support of her application for a warrant, the investigator responded, “I think I just have it in my . . . personal notes,” but testified that she had discussed the surveillance with the magistrate who handled the warrant application. Defense counsel cross-examined the investigator about her surveillance and whether she had written down information about the surveillance and turned it over to the State. The investigator responded that she had written it down but had not turned it over to the State. At this point, the trial court asked where the investigator “maintain[ed] a log about the surveillance [,]” and the investigator replied, “on the computer. We just type our own notes.” The trial court asked whether defense counsel wanted “time with [those] notes” before proceeding with the hearing and, when they said they did, suspended the hearing to allow the State to “get the notes off the computer” and produce them to the defendants.
When the hearing reconvened the following day, the prosecuting attorney reported that the investigator had searched her computer and her files and had prepared a narrative summary of everything she could remember about the surveillance. The investigator testified that she had used the wrong terminology in referring to a “log” or “personal notes” and that the only thing that she had typed on the computer was her investigative summary, which she created and then added to as her investigation progressed. She had рrovided that document to the State, and the prosecuting attorney had previously produced it to the defendants. According to the investigator, the only notes that she had ever created in connection with the case that she had not provided to the State were handwritten on scraps of paper and were limited to a description of the house and “what [she] saw that day,” which was information she needed to include in her warrant application and affidavit. After she had transcribed this information verbatim into her warrant application, the investigator had discarded those scraps of paper; they were not part of the State’s discovery production.
The trial court stated to the prosecuting attorney, “the State is responsible for everything that law enforcement has. So it is the State’s obligation to get it, determine whеther it is discoverable, determine whether it is Brady material, and produce it____When law enforcement has [information], the State has it.”
when a case gets indicted... everything counts [.] Your scrap notes, your personal notes, everything associated with that case ... is subject to discovery[.] And[,] when you don’t produce it, it puts everyone, including the State, because they’re responsible for producing it, in a position where folks start [wondering], [“]well, what are they hiding..., what got covered up, what else don’t we know[?”] ... It puts me in a position where I have to decide whether there’s been intentional misconduct [.] And if there’s been intentional misconduct, [evidence] gets thrown out[,] because the Constitution pretty much says that’s what happens when there’s intentional misconduct[:] it gets held against the State. So when yоu testify under oath there are notes on the computer and then[,] the next day,there are no notes on the computer, that’s a problem.
The court found that “the failure to preserve notes pertinent to the case ... raise [d] an issue of spoliation.” Taking this together with the delayed production of the recording of the execution of the search, the trial court found a “pattern of failure [of the State] to provide full discovery.” The court found that this pattern of behavior was “grossly unfair” and “violate[d] these folks’ rights.” On this basis, the trial court granted the motions to suppress everything seized in executing the search warrant. The trial court expressly found, however, that the warrant was supported by probable cause and was properly executed and ruled that the suppression was “for reasons independent of the validity of the warrant itself.”
Although, as posited by the trial court, when law enforcement hаs information, the State is deemed to have it for purposes of the Reciprocal Discovery Act,
3. The State contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the State’s intended evidence of other crimes was not relevant for a proper purpose and abused its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to exclude the evidence on that basis.
Georgia’s new Evidence Code governs this contention.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . . .
This section tracks
Even when a trial court determines that all three prongs of the test for admissibility under
Atrial court’s decision under
In this case, the record shows that the State filed its notice of intent to introduce evidence of other acts pursuant to
As to the 2005 incident, a police officer testified that he received information from a concerned citizen that drugs were being “bagged” at a house in Fulton County. Upon arriving at the house, the officer observed through one of the windows three men, including Brown and Rouse, cutting and packaging crack cocaine and marijuana in the kitchen of the house. The team of officers forced entry and found the men hiding in a bedroom closet. The house, which was in an area where most of the houses were vacant, had little furniture, but there was a TV with some cameras hooked to it. The officers sеized 137 grams of crack cocaine and 11 grams of marijuana.
As to the 2009 incident, a patrol officer testified that he received a call that several men were selling and using drugs at a food mart in Fulton County. The officer went to that location, where he saw six men including Brown. The officer and his partner obtained the men’s consent to search their persons. Brown had on his person 11 bags of marijuana, collectively weighing 8.1 grams.
After hearing this evidence, the trial court noted that the State intended to adduce proof at trial that, when officers arrived to execute a warrant to search the house where the cocaine and marijuana were found, Rouse was in the driveway getting into a car and Brown was jumping out of a window. The trial court found that evidence of the 2005 incident, when Rouse was seen cutting and packaging cocaine and marijuana in a nearly vacant house, “would absolutely be nothing
cutting drugs in a house, is, unfortunately, in this community and in this society, a common occurrence. It does not purport anything other than that one does that sort of thing. Insofar as that is the case, the court finds that admission of the evidence would be more prejudicial than probative. Insofar as [the evidence] might be offered for purposes of establishing that there was no mistake, that there was a plan or scheme, those purposes are actually in the court’s view more consistent with [rebutting] a potential defense which might be raised,
and the evidenсe would therefore not be admitted during the State’s case-in-chief. As to the 2009 incident, the trial court found that evidence that Brown had packets of drugs on his person was “not pertinent in terms of proving mistake, intent, plan, or scheme, and it will not be admitted for any purpose.”
With regard to intent, the Supreme Court of Georgia recently explained that
a defendant who enters a not guilty plea makes intent a material issue which imposes a substantial burden on the government to prove intent, which it may prove by qualifying [OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) ] evidence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent as an issue. Where the extrinsic offense is offered to prove intent, its relevance is determined by comparing the defendant’s state of mind in perpetrating both the extrinsic and charged offenses. Thus, where the state of mind required for the charged and extrinsic offenses is the same, the first prong of the [OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) ] test is satisfied.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bradshaw v. State,
In this case, we cannot discern from the existing record whether the trial court considered whether Brown and Rouse, having entered pleas of not guilty to the charged offenses, had taken affirmative steps to withdraw intent as an element to be proved by the State.
caution[ed] that the potential for prejudice caused by the introduction of other acts evidence is great and the often subtle distinctions between the permissible purposes of intent and knowledge and the impermissible purpose of proving character may sometimes be difficult to discern. The danger of the subtlety of this distinction is that a jury could consider prior acts evidence for an impermissible purpose, thus elevating the importance of [OCGA § 24-4-403 ’s] balancing of the need for other acts evidence agаinst the dangers of its introduction. Unfortunately, there is no mechanical solution for this balancing test. Instead, a trial court must undertake in each case a considered evaluation of the proffered justification for the admission of such evidence and make an independent determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 163 (3). As an appellate court, we afford great deference to a trial court’s decision in this regard,
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling that the other-acts evidence will not be admitted is vacated, and we remand this case for the trial court to reconsider the appellees’ motion to exclude such evidence
Judgment reversed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded in Case No. A1SA0456. Judgment vacated in Case No. A1SA04S7.
Notes
See Tolbert v. Toole,
See Division 3, infra.
See Division 2, infra.
See also Styles v. State,
See also Christopher J. McFadden et al., Ga. Appellate Practice, § 10:3 (updated November 2014).
See
See
See
See Divisions 2 and 3, infra.
See
See Brady v. Maryland,
See
State v. Dickerson,
Cf.
To the extent the appellees suggest that the notes may have been exculpatory, they have not articulated how the investigator’s description of the activity she observed during her surveillance could have been exculpatory. A finding of a Brady violation, that is, that the State failed to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or to punishment, Brady v. Maryland,
See Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, §§ 2, 101 (Georgia’s new Evidence Code,
Our new Evidence Code was based in large part on the Federal Rules of Evidence. And where the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance. Thus, the uncodified first section of the statute enacting the new Evidence Code explains: It is the intent of the General Assembly in enacting this Act to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interprеted by the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States circuit courts of appeal as of January 1,2013, to the extent that such interpretation is consistent with the Constitution of Georgia. Where conflicts were found to exist among the decisions of the various circuit courts of appeal interpreting the federal rules of evidence, the General Assembly considered the decisions of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. It is the intent of the General Assembly to revise, modernize, and reenact the general laws of this state relating to evidence while adopting, in large measure, the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State,
As the United States Supreme Court explained more than half a century ago:
The [S]tate may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically he persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
(Footnotes omitted.) Michelson v. United. States,
See
See Curry v. State,
Bradshaw v. State,
See also State v. Jones,
Our review is complicated by the unique procedural posture presented, where, as noted above, the trial court acquitted the defendants after the State declined to present its evidence or otherwise participate in the trial, and where our decision to vacate the judgments of acquittal in Division 1, supra, effectively returns the prosecution to a pretrial status.
See State v. Jones,
Harris v. State,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring fully and specially.
I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately to lament the ease with which this spectacle — an unauthorized criminal trial that the prosecutor was compelled to boycott leading to ineffective acquittals that an appellate court must unwind — could have been avoided.
When this case was called for trial, the state told the trial court that it had appealed her suppression order. The trial court erroneously replied that the state’s notice of appeal was ineffective. At noon that same day, the state filed an emergency motion with this court. Less than four-and-a-half hours later, we granted the emergency motion and stayed the trial. But by that time, the purported trial had taken place and the purported acquittals had been entered.