State v. Jason Wayne Eide

Sep 1, 2026
2024AP001900-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jason Eide appeals from a judgment of conviction for various drug-related crimes. On appeal, he argues that law enforcement lacked probable cause for his arrest and that the circuit court therefore erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found on his person during a search following the arrest. Regardless of whether law enforcement had probable cause to arrest, we conclude that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and we therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Eide with possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, as a party to the crime and as a repeater; felony possession of THC (second or subsequent offense), as a party to the crime and as a repeater; possession of drug paraphernalia, as a party to the crime and as a repeater; possession of narcotic drugs (second or subsequent offense); obstructing an officer, as a repeater; and possession of an illegally obtained prescription, as a repeater. The charges were based on allegations that Eide and Rebecca Brusoe traveled to a casino by vehicle and that, while Eide was inside the casino, an officer spoke with Brusoe and searched her person and the vehicle. After finding drug paraphernalia associated with methamphetamine and marijuana use in the vehicle and on Brusoe‘s person, officers confronted Eide in the casino. Eide, like Brusoe, denied that the paraphernalia was his. The officers detected an odor of marijuana coming from Eide and sought to place him under arrest. Eventually Eide complied, and officers searched his person, finding evidence underlying the charges.

¶3 Eide filed a motion to suppress “all evidence of any contraband found on or near [his] person during his unlawful arrest.” Eide argued that the officers “had no reasonable suspicion to approach” him in the casino. In addition, Eide argued that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him because “the officers could not reasonably link the alleged odor of marijuana” to him, given that “he was standing on a casino floor in the open” and that other patrons were smoking cigarettes on the casino floor.

¶4 The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Eide‘s motion to suppress.1 Deputy Adam Boney testified regarding his investigation on the night of Eide‘s arrest. Boney stated that he was performing his routine patrols when he observed a vehicle with its headlights on that was parked in the casino parking lot. According to Boney, he made contact with Brusoe, who was sitting in the vehicle‘s passenger seat, and she informed Boney that “she was with a male subject but didn‘t know his name and that he went into the casino to gamble.” Boney testified that he ultimately located a marijuana pipe in the vehicle‘s center console. Brusoe “stated that [the marijuana pipe] was not hers,” and Boney placed her under arrest.

¶5 Deputy Boney testified that after Brusoe‘s arrest, he and another officer entered the casino and, with the help of casino security staff, located the unidentified male. Boney stated that the man, later identified as Eide, informed Boney that he knew Brusoe, that Brusoe had driven them to the casino, and that “they had been together in that vehicle for approximately two days.” Boney testified that he could smell the odor of marijuana “coming off Mr. Eide‘s person” and that he placed Eide under arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia. Following Eide‘s arrest, Boney searched Eide‘s person and found methamphetamine, marijuana, oxycodone pills, and gabapentin pills.

¶6 Deputy Boney testified that while he did not know Eide‘s name at the time of his arrest, he did determine his name “at some point” after the arrest. Boney testified that he submitted Eide‘s name to dispatch and discovered that Eide had a warrant for his arrest from Outagamie County. In addition, Boney stated that had he not arrested Eide, he would have nevertheless continued the investigation and obtained Eide‘s name in order to run his name through dispatch.

¶7 During oral argument, Eide clarified that his argument in support of his motion to suppress was that Deputy Boney lacked probable cause to arrest him for possession of drug paraphernalia because there was not enough evidence to suggest that Eide knew that the paraphernalia was in the vehicle or that he had access to the paraphernalia.

¶8 The circuit court denied Eide‘s motion to suppress, concluding that Deputy Boney had probable cause to arrest Eide based on Boney finding the drug paraphernalia in the center console of the vehicle that Eide was recently inside and the odor of marijuana coming from Eide‘s person. The court also briefly referenced the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, stating, “If he had a warrant for his arrest, it may have been that they would have arrested him on that as well” and that the evidence obtained from the search of Eide‘s person “may be admissible under an inevitable discovery in any event.”

¶9 The circuit court later accepted Eide‘s guilty pleas, made pursuant to a plea agreement, and imposed a global sentence of five years of initial confinement followed by five years of extended supervision. Eide now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶10 On appeal, the parties dispute whether at the time of Eide‘s arrest, Deputy Boney had the requisite probable cause to arrest Eide and, if he did not, whether the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule prevents the evidence from being suppressed. We conclude that regardless of whether Boney had probable cause to arrest Eide when he did, the inevitable discovery exception applies. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (explaining that this court need not address all issues raised by the parties if one is dispositive).

¶11 We review a circuit court‘s decision on a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment using a two-part standard. State v. Wilson, 2022 WI 77, ¶17, 404 Wis. 2d 623, 982 N.W.2d 67. “First, we will uphold a circuit court‘s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id., ¶18. Second, the application of constitutional principles to those facts presents a question of law that we review independently. Id.

¶12 The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “Exclusion is a judicial remedy that can apply when the government obtains evidence as a result of a constitutional violation.” State v. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, ¶46, 369 Wis. 2d 673, 882 N.W.2d 422. However, under the inevitable discovery

doctrine, “evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means.” Id., ¶47 (citation omitted). For the exception to apply, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that law enforcement inevitably would have discovered the evidence sought to be suppressed.3 Id., ¶66. “[P]roving that discovery of evidence was truly inevitable ‘involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.‘” Id., ¶54 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 n.5 (1984)). Stated differently, “[p]roof of inevitable discovery turns upon demonstrated historical facts, not conjecture.” Id., ¶72. Our state supreme court has cautioned that “[i]nevitable discovery is not an exception to be invoked casually, and if it is to be prevented from swallowing the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, courts must take care to hold the government to its burden of proof.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶13 The demonstrated historical facts here leave us reasonably certain that the officers would inevitably have discovered the physical evidence on Eide‘s person regardless of the initial search following his arrest. See id., ¶75. As the State contends,

[b]ut for the premature arrest of Eide, the deputy would have obtained Eide‘s name and other information and provided it to the dispatcher to run a routine check. Such a check would have uncovered (and ultimately did uncover) Outagamie County‘s outstanding warrant for Eide‘s arrest. The warrant would have authorized the deputy to arrest Eide, and the contraband would have been uncovered at that time during the search incident to arrest.

The State‘s analysis is not based on conjecture but historical fact. Deputy Boney testified that had he not arrested Eide when he did, he would have continued the investigation and obtained Eide‘s name in order to run his name through dispatch. This result would have, as it did after the arrest, shown that Eide had an active arrest warrant.

¶14 Eide disputes this conclusion, arguing that “there is no reason to believe that [he] would [have] necessarily h[u]ng around the casino waiting for Deputy Boney to run his name with dispatch.” He further contends that “[a]bsent his being under arrest, Eide was free to leave the casino, and it is entirely speculative that he would still have contraband on his person when the Sheriff‘s Department got around to arresting him on the warrant from Outagamie County.”

¶15 The State correctly notes, however, that Eide was not free to leave because he was subject to a seizure, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), prior to his arrest. Deputy Boney testified that he would not have permitted Eide to terminate the interaction, and Boney agreed with defense counsel that he was “making it clear to [Eide] that he c[ould not] leave the area during [the] investigation.”4

¶16 Given the foregoing, the State has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that law enforcement would have inevitably discovered the tainted evidence through lawful means absent the allegedly illegal arrest. We therefore affirm. See State v. Earl, 2009 WI App 99, ¶18 n.8, 320 Wis. 2d 639, 770 N.W.2d 755 (“On appeal, we may affirm on different grounds than those relied on by the trial court.“).

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(1)(b)5. (2023-24).

Notes

1
At the hearing, Eide‘s counsel agreed that the defense was not contesting the legality of the vehicle search.
2
Generally, we interpret article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution to provide the same constitutional protections as the Fourth Amendment. State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ¶14, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 N.W.2d 97. Eide does not argue that this principle should not apply here.
3

Citing State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992), the State incorrectly contends that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies only where the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there exists a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means but for the police misconduct; (2) the leads making discovery inevitable were possessed by the government at the time of the misconduct; and (3) prior to the unlawful search the government also was actively pursuing some alternate line of investigation. See id. at 500.

Our state supreme court overruled this portion of Schwegler in State v. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, 369 Wis. 2d 673, 882 N.W.2d 422, and held that the factors listed in Schwegler “should be regarded as important indicia of inevitability rather than indispensable elements of proof.” See Jackson, 369 Wis. 2d 673, ¶66.

4
Eide does not dispute that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain and question him prior to making the arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Nor does Eide dispute that the officers could lawfully conduct a warrant check during his seizure. Instead, Eide argues that his interaction with the officers was entirely voluntary, that he was not subject to a seizure, and that he could have terminated the interaction at any point. However, given the circumstances present—including the presence of two uniformed law enforcement officers and additional casino security personnel—a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave and terminate the interaction. See State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶21, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834 (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” (citation omitted)).