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State v. Jarzab
599 P.2d 761
Ariz.
1979
Check Treatment

*1 and the fact weapon murder alleged

fired during struggle twice be-

tween defendant victim.

It long been the law in Arizona that

on appeal Court will not sub- judgment

stitute its for that of the jury only

and will if complete reverse there is a

lack probative support facts to the ver- Pittman,

dict. 71, 75, (1978); Childs, supra; Barnett,

(1975). Considering evidence, all the

find that there was substantial evidence to

support thoroughly verdict. have

reviewed pursuant the record to A.R.S. 13-4035

§ and find no fundamental error.

The judgment of conviction and the sen-

tence are affirmed.

CAMERON, J., STRUCKMEYER, C. V. J., GORDON, JJ.,

C. and HOLOHAN and

concur. Arizona, Appellee,

STATE of

Eugene JARZAB, Jr., Appellant. F. 4571-PR.

No. Arizona,

In Banc.

July

Rehearing Sept. Denied Jr., Gen., LaSota, Atty. former

John A. J. Corbin, Atty. Gen. William Robert K. Ellexson, Schafer, R. III, B. Gerald Georgia Gen., Phoenix, Grant, ap- Attys. Asst. pellee. *2 Penrod, Lane, “Q. by usually people & Are there in that

Lane Ltd. Clair W. Penrod, Craig Tempe, appellant. W. for area? No,

A. sir. STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice. Q. strange to then it would be So have a vehicle in the area? Appellant, Eugene Francis Robert Jar- correct, A. That’s sir. zab, Jr., was possession convicted of of mar- ijuana, a misdemeanor. The Ap- Court of Q. know whether or You didn’t peals, in decision, a memorandum reversed. you went truck was stolen when accepted review. Opinion of the Court you? it. Did of Appeals, 1 (filed CA-CR January No, it was why A. no sir. I had idea 11, 1979), vacated. Judgment Supe- of the time. rior Court affirmed. Q. just wanted what was You to see At 18,1977, about 1:40 a. m. on June near going on? Phoenix, Arizona, deputy sheriff’s Russell Yes, A. sir.” driving Pearce while saw overpass over an investigation It is palpably clear new Chevrolet Blazer four-wheel-drive which was rea- Pearce then entered stopped truck approximately on desert Therefore, ques- sonable and lawful. one-quarter mile off of 10. Interstate disposition tion of this governing the case Pearce headlights turned his on the truck deprived events subsequent and, when it unoccupied, vestigation continuing legality. drove over investigate. After he left his im- approached truck, Appellant argue car and it was does not appellant ap- peared proper investigate the from behind for the officer to nearby bushes. He told the position officer that status His is that the vehicle was his of the truck. and that he had abandoned2 to relieve himself. the vehicle was Appellant had a “quickly dispelled noticeable odor of alcohol should have been on his breath. defendant, Pearce virtually contemporaneously asked for identifica- tion appellant arrival, to determine whether with approached the officer’s he was of legal drinking age. Appellant belonging to the vehicle as him.” identified produced a valid Arizona driver’s license on urges operating He the officer age. which showed his Pearce then asked vague, “a hunch” or “a sus- unsubstantiated appellant for the truck’s card.1 picion” that his Fourth Amendment appellant When opened the door of the conducting rights3 by were violated a fur- get card, truck to lights the interior investigation ther because the came on and deputy plastic observed a detention did not the test for reasona- meet bag containing marijuana on the console. ble v. Hook- action set forth in State er, a suppression At hearing, Pearce testi- Hocker,

fied: we said: 28-305(D) provides part: you give judge description A.R.S. § Would Q. vehicle? “The abandoned card motor [of vehicle] occupants. shall at all times be carried within the A. A vehicle without driv- compartment occupant er’s of the vehicle an vehicle without SoQ. issued, inspection and shall be vehicle? abandoned * ” * * * highway patrol members of the Temporarily it A. is. any peace officer.” the Constitution Amendment 2. Officer Pearce testified: provides: of the Now, you say you “Q. observed an aban- people be secure “The of the you you say doned you observed effects, houses, papers, persons, their overpass? came over this seizures, against unreasonable searches my lights A. As I came over the other side * * * hit it. be violated shall not posi- test of recently ingredient “This Court its essential elucidated tion reasonableness standard action. adopted the California v. For- test. State into the inquiry “Terry requires a dual tier, (Filed investigatory stop. reasonableness of an Aug. 1976), citing Irwin ‘(1) determine: reviewing court must *3 Angeles Court of Los 1 County, Cal.3d the intru- warranted whether the facts 423, 484, Cal.Rptr. (1969). 82 462 P.2d 12 Amend- the sion on individual’s temporary While it is true that investí- scope the of rights, (2) and ment gative detention is certain allowed under reasonably related “to the intrusion was circumstances, these circumstances must justified the the circumstances which ’ activity be ‘such as to of distinguish the place.” Carpen- terference the first the detained from that (8th 169, 171 Cir. Sigler, ter v. F.2d 419 other citizen’ and based on an must be Stevie, 578 F.2d 1969).” v. United States ‘objective perception of events rather 204, 1977). (8th 207 Cir. subjective than the feelings of the detain- base his ac police A cannot justify officer.’ In order intru- the hunches”; he “must tions on “inarticulate sion, point the state must able to and articulable point specific be able to facts, specific may articulable which, with together rational facts taken be combined with rational inferences facts, inferences from those Thus, from those facts. the ab- even in Ohio, Terry v. warrant intrusion.” faith, sence of bad on a detention based 1880, 21-22, 20 88 supra, 392 U.S. S.Ct. illegal. ‘mere hunch’ There must be a omitted.) (Footnote L.Ed.2d at suspicion by reasonable the law enforce- “Whether an conduct ‘rea- officer’s ment officer that out of ‘some depends the ‘appropriate’ sonable’ or occurred, ordinary’ the is or had particular the facts and suggestion to connect the detained case, in one case so that the decision the activity, with unusual and some indi- in another pat seldom furnishes a answer the activity cation that is related to omitted.) (Cites principle A to be case. 332, 553 Fortier, crime. State v. judg- applied generally is that however 456-57, P.2d at 1208.” 113 556 Ariz. at ing the of the actions reasonableness P.2d at 790-791. before him the officer the circumstances determining The federal test for the va- singly; and viewed are not to be dissected lidity is differ- detention they considered as rather must be ent from California’s.4 United States See are they whole. So considered Contreras-Diaz, (9th Cir.), v. 575 F.2d 740 a reasonable through eyes viewed denied, 167, 855, cert. 439 U.S. 99 58 S.Ct. scene, guided on the and cautious officer (1978); 161 Wall- L.Ed.2d United States v. training. experience by his (9th ing, 1973), F.2d 229 486 Cir. cert. de- Davis, U.S.App.D.C. v. 147 United States 923, nied, 1427, 94 415 39 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. 400, (1972).” 458 F.2d 819 (1974). perimeters

479 Constitutional are 13, 15, 525 F.2d Hall, U.S.App.D.C. v. 174 Ohio, 1, spelled Terry out in v. 392 88 U.S. 857, (1976). 859 1868, There, (1968). S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d 889 investigative stop will be deemed An Court of the United States demonstrates where the officer police that a limit- held effect a can deter the court individual, some basis from which ed detention of not amount- arbitrary arrest, mine that were ing to an if the were officer’s actions Walling, supra; v. harassing. reasonable under the United circumstances. States 412, (9th Porter, 415 Cir. Court did not hold “some indication Wilson v. 361 F.2d 1966). was an related to crime” 888, Tony C., 366, Cal.Rptr. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 148 4. See In re detailed exposition test. of the current California

311 all Our examination of v. Ohio ableness in the circumstances of subsequent particular governmental federal it in a cit- cases invasion of Ohio, security.’ Terry facts of this us v. personal case leads izen’s 1868, disapprove the standard in Ir enunciated U.S. S.Ct. course, Reasonableness,

win supra, adopted v. Hocker, supra, depends public a balance and State ‘on between Fortier, interest, per- individual’s because inter- unduly restrictive of lawful sonal free from police activities. When with law confronted ference officers.’ strange activities, or unusual Brignoni-Ponce, offi cer, public’s (1975).” representative delegated as the L.Ed.2d with responsibility maintaining opinion Brown v. recent order, satisfy should as to - himself -, U.S. *4 activity by reasonable, innocence of the all (1979), Supreme said L.Ed.2d 357 Court lawful means. We do not believe that an these balancing that a central concern in officer, investiga when he commences an competing “has been to as- considerations tion, need convinced that “criminal activ expec- sure that an individual’s reasonable ity is afoot.” arbitrary privacy tation of is not to “The Fourth not re- Amendment does solely at discretion invasions the unfettered * quire policeman precise who lacks the of officers level proba- necessary information standard applying federal ble cause to simply shrug arrest his case, do not the facts of find shoulders and allow a or a crime to occur The were unreasonable. Pearce’s actions criminal to escape. contrary, On the Ter- began the officer’s at investigation when ry recognizes that it be the essence parked off to a vehicle tention was directed good police work to adopt an interme- desert 1:40 a. m. Since the road in the at response. id., diate 23, at [392 U.S.] abandoned, there the vehicle A brief suspi- [88 1868]. could was a reasonable individual, cious in order to determine his investigation, During have been stolen. identity or to maintain quo the status appellant out of the brush. appeared from momentarily obtaining while more infor- produce appellant identifi request The mation, may be most drink enough to he was old cation to show of the facts known to the by the request clearly was reasonable. Id., 21-22, time. 1868]; see [88 card officer to see Craven, Gaines v. (CA9 448 F.2d 1236 appel response to was in Chevrolet Blazer 1971); United Unverzagt, States v. Officer Pearce ownership. lant’s claim of (CA8 1970).” F.2d 396 Adams Wil- was his investi compelled to terminate liams, 143, 145-46, 1921, 407 U.S. 92 S.Ct. gation apparently of the abandoned 612, (1972). 32 L.Ed.2d 616-17 ownership. appellant’s because of asserted The Supreme Court the United States scope fleeting was intrusion Mimms, in Pennsylvania v. cir minimal related to the 108-09, 98 S.Ct. justifying Balancing cumstances it. (1977), 335-36 set forth the test for Fourth public’s against in law enforcement interest Amendment violations this fashion: appellant’s right from be free officers, by

“The such an inves analysis touchstone of under the interference our constitutionally tigation warranted.5 always Amendment ‘the reason- Appellant py” vehicle, urges Appeals and decided to make the Court of car, occupants Rosenberg, Ariz.App. decision in State check. He awoke the registration. P.2d and car here. asked for a driver’s license should control There, bags marijuana plastic inapposite. find that a Con- He observed two case County compartment opened. Deputy glove conino it was Sheriff a road- entered m., “hip- singled side motion rest area at The trial court denied the defendant’s 3:00 a. out though probable Where even suppress a motion to behavior is no has been denied, an arrest.” the lower court will reversed cause to make not be at 1880. unless the 88 S.Ct. denial constitutes clear and man- ifest error or is an abuse of discretion. See Therefore, test, the Federal even under Mosley, State v. conduct that an offi- suspicious unusual or (1978); Boyer, unusual or stops cer must be P.2d 439 Considering all the circum- possible suspicious, because it relates stances appro- and our conclusions as to the crime. law, priate sup- denial of the motion to The recent press was not error. 77-6673, opinion in Brown v. No. 25, 1979), (U.S.

To the extent reiter- that State v. Hocker and June incompatible requirement Fortier are or incon ates this the unusual decision, an inves- suspicious activity prompts sistent with this they are over detention, possible tigative ruled. relate to must case, Brown was crime. In that defendant Judgment affirmed. officers, because he two high incidence was in an area known for its HOLOHAN, JJ., concurring. HAYS and traffic, suspi- drug because he looked GORDON, (dissenting): Justice cious, never the officers had and because majority opinion. dissent Ini- When Mr. seen in the area before. him tially, perceive I do not the distinction that name, his Brown refused to tell the officers *5 the majority makes between the Federal violating a Texas law he was arrested for and Arizona determining tests for valid- the give your not name that made it a crime to ity of an investigative detention. The ma- lawfully who and address to officer jority opinion seems Terry to assert that v. requested the information. and Ohio, 88 S.Ct. application held that The (1968), 889 only requires per- an officer to to the defendant violated the Texas statute ceive unusual before he because the rights, his Fourth Amendment makes an The ma- detention. suspicion to officers lacked reasonable jority opinion states that “did not en- engaged or had believe that he was activity hold that some indication that the conduct. gaged in criminal ingredi- is related to crime was an essential Brown, supra, opinion majority The cites ent is of the test of the action.” This balancing need be proposition for the that a not the case. reason done “to assure that an individual’s holding Terry, supra, The is couched in not expectation privacy able following the terms: solely at the unfettered arbitrary invasion Seemingly, the ma merely today po- “We hold that where a discretion of officers.” Brown, that neglected lice to notice jority officer observes unusual conduct the absence supra, him to conclude in also states that leads “[i]n mis suspecting appellant of experience of his that criminal ac- basis for conduct, public the tivity may (Empha- be afoot the balance between personal appellant’s right sis 88 1884. interest and in favor of free privacy tilts and Terry also states that: “ * * * Brown v. police interference.” dom from appro- a officer in - U.S. at -, 99 priate appropri- circumstances and in an Fortier, P.2d ate Ariz. 553 approach person pur- manner In v. 113 State Hocker, Ariz. poses possible] (1976), 113 investigating criminal 1206 and State engaged suppress. reversed, occupants Appeals sleeping of the car were The Court of find- the light, supported suspicion illegal the that the in this evidence the in conduct. Viewed harassing. subterfuge that the check was check was a and that there was no evidence to show that

313 P.2d adopted way 784 the is in some connected to that type “reasonable,” same supra, activity. of test as Terry, suspicion If his Brown, supra, citing objective Irwin within an of what definition Court of Angeles Los County, Cal.3d reasonable same person under the situation Cal.Rptr. 484, (1969): only perceive, Terry, then supra would then, may pri- upon the officer the intrude “There must suspicion by be reasonable vacy person, of a the which is afforded enforcement that ‘some activity and Arizona constitutions. ordinary’ out is or has occurred, suggestion to connect the disagree majority’s with conclusion detained with the unusual activi that an officer needs to be able ty, and some indication that question an individual about unusual activi Hocker, related to crime.” 113 ty that does somehow indicate to the not 450, 457, Ariz. activity may that “criminal be supra. coming Terry, afoot.” After to this California Court has subse however, conclusion, Hocker, overruling quently rejected Irwin, dictum supra, in Fortier, supra, supra, process, which stated that the suspicious events majority attempts justify ar then must not be as consistent with innocent resting very officer’s actions under activity as activity. with criminal re C., that is articulated these cases. Tony standard Cal.Rptr. Cal.3d majority suggest poten seems to case, however, P.2d 957 That so did tial criminal was afoot and does not overrule Irwin and stated that the by stating “[sjince the vehicle holding of Irwin was based abandoned, dictum. Although this Court cited Irwin both it could have been stolen.” Hocker, Fortier and we have never adopted This is a misstatement of the facts. The the above dictum. suspicion” “reasonable car could I, therefore, disagree that Fortier and have been stolen is not inferable logically Hocker must be overruled. The distinction view of record in this case. majority opinion trys to be make *6 arresting tween At the to suppress, these motion simply cases does Moreover, not exist. officer that he no majority indicated had received is offer ing vehicles, reports any type enforcement false of stolen or other Moreover, that states do not of he believe that an disturbance in the area. “[w]e officer, when why he investiga commences an testified that had no idea the truck he tion, it; need be convinced that ‘criminal activ was there when he went to ity is afoot.’ Arizona, just Neither the going Cali he to see was on. wanted what fornia nor explained why Court The defendant officer require cases that an be officer convinced he left the vehicle unattended and showed criminal is he prove drinking age. afoot before his he license to was of makes investigatory check. There not even reason believe intoxicated or that driver acted may The officer start surveillance driving. suspected him drunk officer of chooses, that he suspicious on the basis of or merely he li- thought The officer smelled activities, even innocent-appearing he quor and checked on defendant’s breath may maintain check this or as surveillance Moreover, drinking age. if he see was of long he do wishes. cases not in the approxi- parked the defendant’s vehicle was slightest doing deter him from this. In- one mile a restaurant mately fourth stead, they merely deter the officer par- operated by his that was owned arresting from either temporarily or detain- ents, actually been may have located person, searching seizing or from' driver’s father. belonged land that to the possessions his before officer may formed a suspicion founded articulable this Although majority criminal and that the suspected afoot under these have this was vehicle, a stolen highways purpose is not for the ascertaining the proper test of the officer’s actions under whether violating the driver is the law. either state or federal case law. The test is In this we think there is a valid distinc- whether the suspected that the vehi- stop purpose tion between a made for the cle was stolen and whether suspicion his investigating already a crime known to reasonable, when weighed against stop have been committed and a for the what a expe- with similar purpose discovering crime in the first rience would suspected have under those added.) Ochoa, instance.” circumstances. Terry, supra. The arrest- Ariz. 582 at ing officer in this case never testified that suspected he the vehicle to be stolen. He Villagrana, also Ariz. stated that approached he the vehicle “be- (App.1977); v. Gutier- cause it’s a little strange at 1:40 a. m. in the rez, morning Ariz.App. have a vehicle sitting out in the desert.” An officer cannot make an inves- then, The issue before tigatory simply detention because it is 1:40 28-305(D) can be used to A.R.S. § a. m. might This be an infringement on instance,” after “discover crime in the first defendant’s travel, fundamental legitimate investigation of a vehi- which is not daytime limited to hours. The any potential cle crimi- has failed to reveal suspicious activities that an officer can activity. very nal For the reasons that vestigate must be more than the wander- Ochoa, I see no reason for discussed in ings insomniac, or one who works making such a If an officer distinction. night shift at a restaurant in the desert. a car for cannot use this statute request officer’s to see the defend- crime, is also purpose discovering ant’s was based on nothing it to able to use why no reason he should be more than an “inarticulate hunch.” The may involve ferret out crimes that Court has consist- stopped car.1 ently refused to sanction such actions. Ter- travelers protects] Constitution ry, “[The supra. Because of the absence from harass- public highways facts that would indicate that “criminal ac- is no tivity agents if there afoot,” by government ment Terry, supra, check suspicion registration, car’s founded support as an basis to investi- gative search, violated requirements re- activity. Founded criminal Arizona and Federal law. for sin- ground quires some reasonable was in- who as one gling out a

The real issue in this case is whether the in criminal to be involved volved or about legitimately asked to see the defend- Ochoa, ant’s registration, Ariz. 582 pursuant activity.” to A.R.S. 28- § *7 305(D), which states registra- that a car’s 544 P.2d 1097 at 1099. tion is subject inspection by members of Appeals opin- that the Court I believe the highway patrol any peace officer. would, this case. disposed of properly ion Ochoa, State v. therefore, of the Court review have denied (1976), however, we held that officers Appeals opinion. may not randomly stop inspect vehicles to for registrations. We stated that: CAMERON, (concurring): Justice Chief 28-305(D) does not “[A.R.S. § authorize]

the stopping upon public I concur in the dissent. travelers using arresting 1. At the re- vehicle, but was motion to offi- stolen simply suppress, although registration cer testified to discover to see the pretext he asked quest conduct was defendant’s car not crime in the first instance. This he does recall looking in marijuana. at it once It is the Court of Appeals he saw the disapproved by Rosenberg, good clear me that 24 Ariz.App. officer was checking faith of a potentially

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Jarzab
Court Name: Arizona Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 27, 1979
Citation: 599 P.2d 761
Docket Number: 4571-PR
Court Abbreviation: Ariz.
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