Case Information
*1 Certiorari Denied, February 16, 2012, No. 33,401
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number:
Filing Date: November 23, 2011
Docket No. 28,517
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LEROY JARAMILLO,
Defendant-Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY Stephen Quinn, District Judge
Gary K. King, Attorney General
Francine A. Chavez, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
Liane E. Kerr
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellant
OPINION
KENNEDY, Judge. When a deputy medical examiner left the county medical examiner’s office to go into
private practice and subsequently required a hefty fee from the State for his trial testimony, the State put his former supervisor on the witness stand to testify to the autopsy that the first pathologist had conducted. In the course of the supervisor’s testimony during direct examination, he read to the jury some contents of the autopsy report prepared by the absent doctor. The entire report was thereafter admitted as evidence and presented to the jury. To *2 the extent the district court admitted the report as an exhibit, the admission was constitutional error as it violated Defendant’s confrontation rights. Thus, we reverse Defendant’s conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
{2} In October 2004, ten-month-old Cristyan Ibarra was taken to the emergency room in Clovis, New Mexico by his mother and Defendant. Owing to his symptoms, which included internal cranial bleeding, Cristyan was transported by air to Lubbock, Texas. There, he was pronounced dead several days later. Dr. Sridhar Natarajan, who at that time was employed by the Lubbock County Medical Examiner’s Office, performed Cristyan’s autopsy. Dr. Natarajan determined the cause of death to be closed head injuries and ruled the manner of death to be a homicide. The findings in the autopsy report were reviewed, confirmed, and signed off in a separate opinion document by four other medical examiners in the Lubbock County Medical Examiner’s Office. Dr. Thomas Parsons, who later testified about the cause of Cristyan’s death, was not one of these signatories. Dr. Natarajan eventually left the Lubbock County Medical Examiner’s Office. When
he was contacted by the State to testify at the trial in this case, he stated that he required a fee of $60,000 for his testimonial services. The State concluded that this sum of money was beyond its reach and made no further efforts to obtain his services. At trial, the State called Dr. Parsons, the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for Lubbock County, to establish the cause and manner of Cristyan’s death. Prior to Dr. Parsons being examined, the defense objected to any admission of the
autopsy report into evidence based on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The objection specifically asserted that the report was testimonial in nature and that Dr. Natarajan had not been shown to be unavailable as a witness. It is undisputed that the defense did not have an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Natarajan. Defendant insisted that for the report and its contents to be admissible, its author, Dr. Natarajan, would be required to appear to testify about its contents. Defendant’s specific objection was that any use of or reference to the report by Dr. Parsons would be improper because it “would [admit] otherwise . . . unpresentable [evidence by] just filtering it through an expert witness.” Nonetheless, the district court admitted the report and permitted Dr. Parsons to testify
to its contents. Dr. Parsons confirmed that he was testifying for Dr. Natarajan. At the district attorney’s request, Dr. Parsons read directly from the autopsy report when testifying about Cristyan’s age and the circumstances leading up to his death. Dr. Parsons also testified to Dr. Natarajan’s specific observations and notations made during the autopsy. In addition, a section of the admitted autopsy report, signed by five non-testifying pathologists, stated: “It is our opinion that Cristyan . . . died as a result of [c]losed [h]ead [i]njuries. . . . The manner of death is classified as a [h]omicide.” The report identified one other person as having assisted in the autopsy and that person did not testify at trial. Subsequently, Defendant was convicted of child abuse resulting in death. He now appeals on the ground that his right to confrontation was violated.
II. DISCUSSION Defendant argues that the district court erroneously admitted the autopsy report and
improperly allowed Dr. Parsons to testify to the substantive findings that Dr. Natarajan recorded in the report. Because admission of the autopsy report alone constituted prejudicial error mandating reversal, we need not address Defendant’s argument regarding Dr. Parsons’ testimony.
{7}
The district court explicitly admitted the report as information of the type upon which
medical examiners would typically rely in rendering their opinions. At trial, Defendant
objected to the report’s admission on the ground that Defendant had no opportunity to
confront Dr. Natarajan. The State responded that, “if [Dr. Parsons] believes the information
in the report is accurate, that should be able to be entered into evidence. And[,] of course,
every expert’s going to be looking at reports and things of that nature to render opinions.”
In making its ruling, the district court referred directly to its belief that
Crawford v.
Washington
,
A. Confrontation Clause Requirements
{8}
“The Confrontation Clause guarantees the accused in a criminal trial the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, regardless of how trustworthy the out-of-court
statement may appear to be.”
State v. Mendez
,
1.
The Autopsy Report in This Criminal Case was Testimonial
The United States Supreme Court held in
Bullcoming
that “[a] document created
solely for an evidentiary purpose, . . . made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as
testimonial.” 131 S. Ct. at 2713 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
Melendez-Diaz v. Mass.
, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (holding that a statement is
testimonial if the declarant would reasonably expect the statements to be used
prosecutorially). In , the New Mexico Supreme Court, adopting
Melendez-Diaz
,
*4
analyzed, in the context of reports of chemical analysis, what sort of forensic report might
constitute a testimonial statement.
Aragon
,
{10} Furthermore, the Aragon Court stated that a testimonial statement “is a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. ¶ 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In particular, considered whether the witness’s “statements go to an issue of guilt or innocence.” Id. ¶ 8. In this case, the autopsy report was made with the intention of the medical examiner to establish the cause and manner of Cristyan’s death. The medical examiner’s finding of homicide was critical to substantiate allegations that Defendant abused Cristyan and caused his death. Therefore, the autopsy report was prepared with the purpose of preserving evidence for criminal litigation. In this case, the face of the autopsy report itself states that an autopsy was requested because of “the circumstances” of Cristyan’s death, being a severe brain injury of a sort commonly associated with trauma. By the time the medical examiner had determined the cause of death to be closed head injuries and the manner of death to be homicide, there was no doubt this would be used against someone in a criminal prosecution. NMSA 1978, Section 24-11-7 (1973) requires an autopsy with complete findings when a “medical investigator suspects a death was caused by a criminal act or omission or the cause of death is obscure[.]” Furthermore, Dr. Parsons testified that the report was prepared for use in litigation.
There is no reason to suspect that a pathologist with considerable experience and knowledge of statutory duties to report suspicious deaths to law enforcement officers would not anticipate criminal litigation to result from his determination that the trauma-related death of a child was the result of homicide. The statements in the report were made to establish the facts related to Cristyan’s cause of death; ruling the death a homicide reflects directly on the issue of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. No question existed that the report would support and be used in a criminal prosecution. The State advanced a number of contentions in its briefing to support the autopsy
report being considered to be outside of what is considered a testimonial statement, all of
which are unavailing or predominantly based on law preceding
Melendez-Diaz
. In its
supplemental brief, the State argues that
Melendez-Diaz
and
Aragon
do not address the
issues in this case. First, the State argues that “[u]nlike [the] blood alcohol reports or
chemical forensic reports, Texas medical examiners do not solely prepare autopsy reports
for use in future prosecutions [because the] reports are prepared pursuant to [a] duty imposed
by law to investigate many deaths which are not the subject of criminal prosecution.”
See
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 49.25, § 6 (West 2003) (listing the instances where the
medical examiner has a duty to investigate a death). The State insists that the autopsy was
not performed at the request of law enforcement and was non-adversarial, relying on
Garcia
*5
v. State
, and was thus non-testimonial.
for use in prosecution of a criminal case, we conclude that the purpose of the autopsy report was to provide prosecutorial evidence. Thus, we hold that the statements contained in the report were testimonial.
2.
Defendant had No Opportunity to Cross-Examine Prior to Trial
“A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to an effective cross-examination.”
,
{16}
Defendant’s inability to cross-examine the declarant’s testimonial statements is
dispositive in this case. Where the government seeks to admit a testimonial out-of-court
statement, it must establish that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.
State v. Rivera
,
703
“We review the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard and will
not reverse in the absence of a clear abuse.”
See State v. Sarracino
,
{18} Although we have held that the admission of the autopsy report violated Defendant’s confrontation rights, we briefly address the State’s argument that the district court properly admitted the report under Rule 11-703, which provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. Our Supreme Court’s opinion in Aragon disposes of this argument. First, the Court
in
Aragon
stated that “[o]nce it has been established that the Confrontation Clause does not
bar admission of the statement, the rules of evidence govern whether the statement is
admissible.”
{21}
The district court in this case was operating under the misperception that the
information contained in Dr. Natarajan’s autopsy report, upon which Dr. Parsons relied, was
admissible because Dr. Parsons relied on it. Whether the reliance was justifiable is of no
importance.
Komis
,
C.
Erroneous Admission of the Report was not Harmless Error
Admission of the report violated Defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation.
“When a constitutional trial error has been committed, the burden is on the [s]tate to
demonstrate the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The central focus of this
inquiry is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction.”
State v. Romero
,
error analysis does not center on whether, in spite of the error, the right result was reached.
Rather, the focus is on whether the verdict was impacted by the error.” ,
critical. The testimony from the medical examiner regarding Cristyan’s injuries and the cause of his death were the crux of the case. The wrongfully admitted report bolstered the credibility of this testimony with the unchallenged corroborative opinions of five non- testifying pathologists. The impact of Dr. Parsons’ testimony is inseparable from the bolstering it received from the inadmissible original source of his information and the four other pathologists’ signatures attesting to its conclusions. Thus, to remove all constitutionally offensive evidence as to the cause and manner of death, there would not be substantial evidence to convict Defendant. The testimony of Dr. Parsons was heavily intertwined with the report and was supported by it. Its impact cannot be regarded as minuscule. No other evidence could have proven that Cristyan’s death was a homicide caused by Defendant’s abuse. Furthermore, Dr. Parsons’ statement to the jury that he was testifying for Dr. Natarajan, and the admission of the report and its included opinions provided the jury with an overwhelming quantity of unconfronted testimonial evidence that was improperly admitted. The report was the crux of the State’s case, proving that Cristyan’s death was a homicide. This constitutional violation rises to the level of harmful error because we cannot be
certain that the wrongfully admitted evidence did not impact the verdict. Accordingly, we reverse Defendant’s conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.
III. CONCLUSION
{26} In light of the court’s improper admission of the autopsy report in violation of Defendant’s confrontation right, we reverse the district court and remand for a new trial consistent with our holdings here. IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________________ RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge
_________________________________
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge
Topic Index for State v. Jaramillo , No. 28,517
AE APPEAL AND ERROR
AE-HE Harmless Error
CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CT-CT Confrontation
CL CRIMINAL LAW
CL-CN Child Abuse and Neglect
CL-HO Homicide
CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CA-CX Cross-examination
CA-EX Expert Witness
CA-RT Right to Confrontation
CA-WT Witnesses
EV EVIDENCE
EV-AE Admissibility of Evidence
EV-AV Availability of Witness
EV-EW Expert Witness