Michael J. Jankowski appeals from a judgment of conviction for violating an extension of a domestic abuse injunction. Jankowski asserts that his conviction must be reversed because the extension was illegally granted. We agree and reverse the judgment.
In 1987, Jankowski's former wife, Anita Hess, obtained a two-year domestic abuse injunction prohibiting Jankowski from hаving contact with her. First *525 entered on June 10, 1987, the injunction was to last through June 9, 1989.
On June 7,1989, Hess petitioned to have the injunction extended for an additional two years. The request was supported with a verified petition and documents alleging continuеd harassment and domestic abuse. Jan-kowski was given no notice of Hess' request for an extension and no hearing was held on the matter. Nevertheless, an extension was granted to last through June 8, 1991. Jankowski did not challenge the extension.
Jankоwski later was charged with three violations of the extended injunction. He moved to dismiss the charges, alleging that the extеnded injunction was invalid because sec. 813.12(4), Stats., does not permit any injunction, even with an extension under this section, to exceed two years in length. The court denied the motion, stating that Jankowski's proffered interpretation was illogicаl and that, in its view, the statutory language was "intended to allow for [a] potential four year period of coverаge." The three cases were consolidated for trial and Jankowski was found guilty. He appeals.
This case is govеrned by the domestic abuse injunction statute, sec. 813.12, Stats. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law and requirеs no deference to the trial court.
Hudson v. Janesville Conservation Club,
(4) INJUNCTION, (a) A judge . . . may grant an injunction ... if all of the following occur:
1. The petitioner filеs a petition alleging the elements set forth under sub. (5)(a).
2. The petitioner serves upon the respondent a coрy of the petition and notice of the time for hearing on the issuance of the injunction . . ..
*526 3. After hearing, the judge . . . finds reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in, оr based upon prior conduct of the petitioner and the respondent may engage in, domestic abuse of the petitioner.
(c) 1. An injunction under this subsection is effective according to its terms, but for not more than 2 years.
3. If the petitioner states that an extension is necessary to protect him or her, the court may extend the injunction for up to 2 years after the date thе court first entered the injunction.
4. Notice need not be given to the respondent before extending an injunction under subd. 2 or 3.
The petitioner shall notify the respondent after the court extends an injunction under subd. 2 or 3.
Section 813.12(4) (emphasis added).
Jankowski argues that his criminal conviction must be reversed because the underlying injunction, being a total of four years in length, is illegal. He argues that a total injunction period, including extension, cannot exceed two years.
See
sec. 813.12(4)(c), Stats. Since the total periоd here exceeded two years, Jankowski reasons that the extension actually was a new injunction. New injunctions must be preceded by notice and a hearing.
See
sec. 813.12(4)(a). Thus, Jankowski's appellate argument essentially is that the circuit court did not have the authority under sec. 813.12(4) to order the two-year extension. Like statutory interpretation, the questiоn of judicial authority is an issue of law which we review
de novo. In re R.W.S.,
The state responds that Jankowski's reading of the statute renders sec. 813.12(4)(c)3, Stats., meaningless.
*527
The state farther contends that Jankowski's argument constitutes a collateral attack on thе injunction. Such an attack is not allowed absent a showing of fraud in the procurement of the injunction.
State v. Bouzek,
The state's position would have merit if Jankow-ski's did not. In other words, if Jankowski is corrеct, his argument goes to the very lawfulness of the injunction. Nothing in
Bouzek
or
Schramek
suggests that the lower court illegally entered the injunctions in the first instance. Rather, the attacks on the injunctions were based on overbreadth of the injunction,
Bouzek,
Simply because the рarties disagree on the meaning of the statute does not render the statute ambiguous.
See State ex rel. Girouard v. Circuit Court,
Subsection (4)(c)3 of sec. 813.12, Stats., plainly and unambiguously states that the injunction may be extended "for up to 2 years after the date the court first *528 entered the injunction.” (Emphasis аdded.) Here, the court first entered the injunction on June 10, 1987. Had the court entered an injunction of some length less than two yеars, it could have responded to Hess' petition for an extension by extending the injunction for a term of up to two yеars less the length of the original injunction. Otherwise, as Jankowski argues, a petitioner conceivably could obtain a series of two-year extensions, all without the respondent being afforded pre-extension notice or a hearing. That is an unreasonable, and perhaps unconstitutional, result.
Thus, the court was without authority to extend the injunction beyond twо years from the date the injunction first was entered. When a court acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its orders or judgments are vоid and may be challenged at any time.
Kohler Co. v. DILHR,
Because the extended injunction is a nullity, it necessarily cannot serve as a basis for the criminal charges. Accordingly, the court should have granted Jankowski's motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction and remand with directions that the motion to dismiss be granted.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.