[¶ 1] Bo James appeals from a judgment entered after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence and he conditionally pled guilty to driving under the influence. • We conclude sufficient evidence established reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion to stop James’s vehicle. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] On June 9, 2014, at about 2 a.m., Sergeant Ficken was oh duty in Watford City. Ficken heard a semitruck continuously honking or blowing its horn. When he looked in the direction of the sound, he observed a Dodge pickup pulling a stock trailer traveling westbound in front of the semitruck. Ficken stopped the truck to investigate. The truck driver reported to Ficken that the pickup driver cut him off and was possibly drunk. Ficken testified he called Deputy Travis Bateman via radio, “notified him of the incident,” and told him. to be on the lookout for a Dodge pickup pulling a stock trailer westbound on Highway 85 outside of Watford City.
[¶ 3] Ten to fifteen minutes later, Bate-man told Ficken he located the vehicle and stopped it in the Arnеgard area. Ficken testified that there was very light traffic and it would take ten to fifteen minutes to get from Watford City to, where the stop occurred. According to Bаteman’s report, Bateman observed the stock trailer drifting left and right, and striking the center and fog lines of the roadway. He stopped James’s vehicle after it passed through a construction zone. The stopped vehicle was a Dodge pickup pulling a stock trailer.
[¶ 4] James was charged with driving under the influence. He 'mоved to suppress evidence, contending law' enforcement officers conducted a traffic stop without reasonable and articulable suspiciоn or other justification in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion and James entered a conditional guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), reserving his right to’ appeal the order denying his motion to suppress.
II
[¶ 5] Our standard of review for a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence is well established:
“When rеviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the district court’s findings of fact and resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. We affirm the distriсt court’s decision unless we conclude there is insufficient competent evidence to support the decision, or unless the decision goes against the mаnifest weight of the evidence.”
City of Dickinson v. Hewson,'
III
[¶ 6] James argues the district court erred'in denying his motion to suppress because insufficient competent evidence established the investigating officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle.
[¶7] “Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Cоnstitution, police may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, detain an individual for investigative purposes when therе is no probable cause to make an arrest if a reasonable and articu-lable suspicion exists that criminal activity is afoot.”
Anderson v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp.,
[¶8] “Traffic violations, even if pretextual, provide the requisite probаble cause to conduct ah investigatory vehicle stop.”
State v. Bartelson,
“ ‘It is well settled, traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct which provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops.’ Zimmerman v. North, Dakota Dep’t of Transp.,543 N.W.2d 479 , 482 (N.D. 1996); see also City of Bismarck v. Glass,1998 ND APP 1 , ¶ 12,581 N.W.2d 474 ; Storbakken,552 N.W.2d at 80 (citation omitted).. Driving or weaving upon the wrong half of the roadway is a traffic violation under N.D.C.C.. § 39-10-08(1). See Zimmerman, at 481-82- (deciding a reasoning mind could have concluded Zimmerman committed a traffic violation by crossing the center line outof her lane of traffic); State v. Vande-Hoven, 388 N;W.2d 857, 859 (N.D.1986) (concluding weaving provided sufficient basis to crеate an articulable and reasonable suspicion VandeHoven was violating the law); State v. Dorendorf, 359 N.W.2d 115 , 116-17 (N.D.1984) (concluding the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop Dorendorf after observing his vehicle weaving within its own lane of traffic). But see Salter,505 N.W.2d at 113-14 (deciding an. officer’s observation of ‘slight’ or ‘minimum’ weaving was insufficient to serve as a valid basis for stopping Salter’s vehicle).”
See also N.D.C.C. § 39-10-17(1) (“Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, ... [a] vehicle must be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and may not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”).
[¶ 9] Although a vehicle’s weaving characterized as “slight” or “minimum” does not justify a traffic stop, “[tjhis Court has held in numerous cases that weaving within the lane, and never crossing the center or fog lines, coupled with other factors, has provided officers with reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.”
Pesanti v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp.,
[¶ 10] At the suppression hearing in this case, the district court held reasonable suspicion existed to stop James’s vehicle, explaining that: '
“considering all the facts, the time of the night, the vehicle description, and the fact that there’s light traffic, and the weaving and swerving within the lane, striking the center and fog lines is a reason to pull .Mr. James over. So, I will deny the motion to suppress. And while I agree it’s not unusuаl to see a pickup driving a stock trailer around out here, at 2:00 a.m, with the facts we have here, it’s- a little more unusual. So, I think that the officers did have a reasоn to stop him.”
[¶ 11] On this record, we agree with the district court and conclude a reasonable person in officer Bateman’s position would be justified in stopping James’s vehicle because of the objective manifestations to suspect the motorist has violated or is violating the law, i.e., observing the stock trailer drifting' left and right and striking the center and fog lines, coupled with the other factor of the early morning hour. Based on the totality of, the circumstances, reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to stop James’s pickup for further investigation.
IV
[¶ 12] James contends we must view Bateman’s stop as the product of a tip from the truck driver relayed to Bateman through Sergeant Ficken. James further
[¶ 13] We affirm, concluding sufficient evidence established reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion to stop James’s vehicle.
V
[IT 14] The district court-judgment is affirmed. ■