[¶ 1] Pete Jacobsen appeals from a district court order revoking his probation and resentencing him on his conviction for issuing checks without sufficient funds or credit. We affirm, concluding the district court’s finding that Jacobsen violated the terms of his probation was not clearly erroneous and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Jacobsen’s probation and resentenced him.
I
[¶ 2] In December 2005, Jacobsen issued a check for $37,000 to Warwick Public School without sufficient funds in the account to cover the check. Jacobsen was charged with issuing a check without sufficient funds or credit under N.D.C.C. § 6-08-16. Jacobsen and the State reached a plea agreement whereby he agreed to plead guilty and to pay full restitution of the $37,000, and the State agreed to a deferred imposition of sentence for one year, during which time Jacobsen would be on supervised probation.
[¶ 3] At a June 7, 2006, hearing to accept Jаcobsen’s guilty plea, the district court questioned Jacobsen at length about his financial ability to make the required restitution payments. Jacobsen advised the court he and his wife were in the process of selling their house, in which he claimed they had $70,000 to $80,000 in equity. Jacobsen advised the court of his intention to use thе proceeds from the sale of the house to pay off the restitution “as
[¶ 4] The court accepted Jacobsen’s guilty plea and deferred imposition of sentence for one year. Jacobsen was placed on supervised probation subject to various conditions, including requirements that he maintain suitable employmеnt and pay restitution of $37,000, with required monthly payments of at least $3,000 beginning on August 1, 2006.
[¶ 5] Jacobsen was allowed to move to Florida, where he was supervised by the Florida Department of Corrections. Ja-cobsen made his monthly $3,000 restitution payments for August and September 2006, but failed to make any payment in October or Novеmber. North Dakota probation officials then requested information from Jacobsen’s probation officer in Florida. In a response dated November 8, 2006, Florida officials indicated Jacobsen had been unemployed for over two months, his wife and children had moved to Indiana to live with her family, and Jacobsen was homeless and living with his brother in Florida. The State filed a petition for revocation of probation in North Dakota on December 12, 2006. Jacobsen subsequently made a $12,000 restitution payment in December 2006 and paid off the $19,000 balance in January 2007.
[¶ 6] At the April 2007 revocation of probation hearing, the Stаte presented evidence showing Jacobsen and his wife had sold their house in Grand Forks in July 2006 and had received a check for $55,177.71 upon closing. The court also received conflicting evidence on Jacobsen’s employment history in Florida. The November 8, 2006, communication from Florida authorities was admittеd into evidence, indicating Jacobsen was homeless and had not worked for two months. However, Jacobsen’s required written monthly reports to the Florida Department of Corrections were also introduced. In those reports, Jacobsen certified that while in Florida he had earned $3,000 in August, $5,000 in September, $3,000 in October, and $2,000 in November.
[¶ 7] The district court found Jacobsen had violated the terms of his probation by failing to make his monthly restitution payments as ordered by the court, by failing to maintain suitable employment, and by failing to apply the proceeds from the sale of his home to the restitution owed. The court revoked thе deferred imposition of sentence and probation and sentenced Jacobsen to serve seven months and eight days with the North Dakota Department of Corrections.
II
[¶ 8] This Court reviews a revocation of probation under a two-step analysis.
State v. Stavig,
Ill
[¶ 9] Jacobsen contends that “[t]he trial court’s finding of fact that Defendant violated probation conditions by willfully failing to pay restitution as ordered by the Court was clеarly erroneous.” He claims that he was financially unable to make the required monthly payments but that he “put forth a good faith effort to make the restitution payments” and “made bona fide efforts to repay the money.”
[¶ 10] The district court’s determinations on whether the defendant violated the terms of probation are findings of fact.
See Wardner,
[¶ 11] Jacobsen does not dispute that he failed to make the required $3,000 monthly payments when due in October and November 2006. The Stаte presented uncontradicted evidence that Jacobsen and his wife received more than $55,000 from the sale of their house in July 2006. Although there is some conflict in the evidence on Jacobsen’s earnings in Florida, Jacobsen argues he earned $13,000 between August 1 and November 30.
[¶ 12] In spite of this evidence, Jaсobsen contends the State presented “no evidence” that he had willfully failed to pay restitution because “[i]t was not shown that he had frivolously spent his income, that he had purchased large items or expensive gifts, or that he had in any other way squandered his earnings away.” Ja-cobsen’s argument is premised upon a misunderstanding of which party bore the burden of proof. The State was not required to show Jacobsen had squandered the $55,000 in house sale proceeds and $13,000 in salary. Rather, Jacobsen had the burden to explain where those funds went and why they were unavailable to satisfy his restitution obligation.
See Tupa,
[¶ 14] Jacobsen also seeks to excuse his failure to pay restitution because he “substantially complied” with the conditions of probation and paid the restitution in full in January 2007, months before the full payment was due. Jacobsen cites no authority for his novel assertion that “substantial compliance” is all that is required of a probationer. Furthermore, we note Jacobsen’s additional payments of restitution came only after the petition for revocation had been filed in North Dakota and Jacobsen had been arrestеd in Florida. These arguments are without merit.
[¶ 15] We conclude the district court’s finding that Jacobsen violated the terms of his probation by willfully failing to pay restitution as ordered by the court is not clearly erroneous. The district court also found violations of other conditions of probation. Because the State nеed show only a single violation to sustain revocation of probation, it is unnecessary to address Ja-cobsen’s challenges to the court’s findings of other violations.
See Hoff v. Fitterer,
IV
[¶ 16] The second prong of our probation revocation analysis requires that we consider whether the court abused its discretion when it decided that revocation of probation was warranted. Jacobsen contends the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment because, under
Bearden v. Georgia,
[¶ 17] The question presented in
Bear-den,
as framed by the Supreme Court, was “whether a sentencing court can revoke a defendant’s probation for failure to pay the imposed fine and restitution, absent evidence and findings that the defendant was somehow responsible for the failure or that alternative forms of punishment were inadequate.”
Bearden,
“We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the authorized range of its sentencing authority. If theprobationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternative measures of punishment other than imprisonment. Only if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the State’s interеsts in punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a deprivation would be сontrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Id.
at 672-73,
[¶ 18] Jacobsen’s reliance upon Be ar-den is misplaced. The record demonstrates the district court followed the dictates of Bearden and considered whether Jacobsen had the means to pay the ordered restitution. The State presented evidence indicating Jacobsen had rеceived sums of money sufficient to pay the October and November restitution payments when due. Jacobsen failed to rebut that evidence, or otherwise explain the disposition of those funds, despite ample opportunity to do so at the hearing. The court accordingly found Jacobsen willfully failеd to pay restitution as ordered by the court notwithstanding his ability to do so. We have upheld that finding on appeal.
[¶ 19] When the defendant can, but willfully fails to pay, there is no requirement that alternative forms of punishment be considered and the court may revoke probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment. Id. As the Bearden Court noted:
“If the probationer has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution when he has the means to pay, the State is perfectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanction to enforce collection. Similarly, a probationer’s failure to make sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay the fine or restitution may reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to society for his crime. In such a situation, the State is likewise justified in revoking probation and using imprisonment as an appropriate penalty for the offense.”
Id.
at 668,
[¶ 20] Furthermore,
Bearden
is inapplicable under the facts in this case. In
State v. Nordahl,
“To allow an accused to offer an agreement with a sentence limitation based on restitution being made and then allow him to take аdvantage of this limitation when restitution is not made is a windfall this court will not permit. Although the Supreme Court has disallowed confinement or an increase in confinement when restitution was not made, those cases are distinguishable from the case before us. Those cases dealt with restitution and increased confinеment as part of the adjudged sentence, something over which the defendants had no control.”
[¶ 21] The Court in Nordahl, at ¶ 26, thus concluded Bearden did not apply when restitution was based upon a plea agreement:
“In this case, Nordahl had control over the plea agreement and its contents. The severity of Nordahl’s offense was lessened from a felony to a misdemeanor based on his agreement to quickly repay the victims. Nordahl’s reliance on the Bearden case is misplaced because allowing a defendant to avoid restitution by subsequently pleading in-digency after entering into a valid plea agreement would cause a windfall to the defendant as characterized by the Foust court.”
[¶ 22] We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Jacobsen’s probation and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment.
V
[¶23] We affirm the district court order revoking Jacobsen’s deferred imposition of sentence and probation and sentencing him to serve seven months and eight days with the North Dakota Department of Corrections.