{¶ 1} Third party-appellants, Bankers Insurance Company and John Craven General Agency, Inc., appeal from the judgment of the Sidney, Ohio Municipal Court, denying their motion for remission of bond. This appeal, submitted on the accelerated calendar, is being considered pursuant to App.R.11.1(E) and Loc. R.12. Pursuant to Loc.R.12(5), we elect to issue a full opinion.
{¶ 2} The record presents the following facts. Appellant Bankers Insurance Company, Inc. is engaged in the bail bonds business. Appellant John Craven General Agency, Inc. is Bankers’ general agent in the state of Ohio. On September 11, 2002, Craven’s agent for Shelby County, Ohio, posted a $5,000 surety bond on behalf of Christina Jackson in the Sidnеy Municipal Court. By the terms of the bond, Jackson was to appear on November 6, 2002, to face charges of child endangering. Whеn Jackson did not appear in court as ordered, the trial court instructed appellants to produce Jackson by Deсember 2, 2002, or face forfeiture of the bond. The appellants failed to appear with Jackson on that date and, consequently, the court ordered the bond forfeited. Two days later, on December 4, 2002, a Sidney police officer arrested Jackson and took her into custody.
{¶ 3} On December 18, 2002, appellants filed a motion for remission of bond, requesting full or partial remission of the forfeited bond pursuant to R.C. 2937.39. According to the motion, appellants searched diligently for Jackson but could not locate hеr. Appellants insisted that in light of the short time between the bond forfeiture and Jackson’s arrest, remission would be fair and appropriatе. Additionally, appellants cited the extreme financial burden placed on the individual who indemnified the bond for Jackson. On Decеmber 19, 2002, the municipal court summarily denied the motion without hearing. It is from this order that appellants now appeal.
{¶ 4} Appellants raise one assignment of error:
“The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to grant remission of the forfeited bond to appellants.”
{¶ 5} The purpose of bail is to ensure that a criminal defendant appears at all stages of the criminal proceedings.
State v. Hughes
(1986),
*522 “After’judgment has been rendered against surety * * *, the court or mаgistrate, on the appearance, surrender, or re-arrest of the accused on the charge, may remit all or such portion of the penalty as it deems just * * *.”
{¶ 6} The consideration of bond remission pursuant to R.C. 2937.39 is a matter of first impression for this court. The statute itsеlf hands down no obligatory factors for a trial court to consider but rather grants the court discretion, as indicated by the use of the рhrase, “may remit.” Therefore, the only issue before this court is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant remission of appellants’ bond. An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of law or judgment; it impliеs that the trial court’s attitude in reaching that judgment was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
Blakemore v. Blakemore
(1983),
{¶ 7} Other Ohio appellate сourts have considered post-appearance bond remission pursuant to R.C. 2937.39 and have set forth certain factors for сourts to consider. In
State v. Patton
(1989),
{¶ 8} In
State v. Christensen
(Apr. 16, 1999), Greene App. No. 98CA53,
*523 {¶ 9} In summation, we note that the appellate districts, upon consideration of this issue, uniformly require trial courts to consider and weigh various factors in order to reconcile the purposes of both bail and bond remission. We agree with these decisions and hold that when considering a request for post-appearance bond remission pursuant to R.C. 2937.89, a trial court should balance the reappearance of the accused аnd the efforts expended by the surety to effectuate the reappearance against the inconvenience, exрense, and delay suffered by the state and any other factors the court finds relevant. A trial court’s conclusions after conducting this balancing test will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion.
{¶ 10} In the matter sub judice, the trial court denied appellants’ motion for remission in a summarized judgment entry and did not set forth the reasons for its denial. In the absence of a record we are unable to ascertain the trial court’s reasons for denying the motion and are unable to review the propriety of its considerations. Thеrefore, we find the trial court’s decision arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 11} For thе reasons stated, it is the order of this court that the judgment of the Sidney, Ohio Municipal Court be, and hereby is, reversed and remanded for further consideration in accordance with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.