605 N.E.2d 426 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1992
James A. Jackson was found guilty of a violation of R.C.
"Absent a valid complaint, a municipal court is without jurisdiction over a traffic violation case and cannot entertain a motion to amend the complaint."
Jackson was issued a Uniform Traffic Ticket on April 16, 1991, describing his offense as "court suspension." The arresting officer did not indicate the Ohio Revised Code section or Springfield ordinance section that Jackson had allegedly violated. On June 21, 1991, Jackson moved to dismiss "based on the fact that the complaint is void in that it has not apprised the defendant as to the statute he has violated." On June 26, 1991, the state of Ohio moved to amend the traffic ticket to allege a violation of R.C.
By order of July 11, 1991, the trial court sustained the motion of the state of Ohio to amend the complaint to allege a violation of R.C.
Subsequent to the ruling of the trial court, Jackson entered his plea of no contest to a violation of R.C.
Jackson's claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to permit the amendment of the traffic ticket to show a violation of R.C.
In support of his jurisdictional argument, Jackson cites three appellate opinions which predate the adoption of the Ohio Traffic Rules. In re Van Hoose (1951), 61 Ohio Law. Abs. 256, 103 N.E.2d 842; Columbus v. Jackson (1952),
As noted in Cleveland v. Austin (1978),
In State v. O'Brien (1987),
It is one thing to say a trial court should dismiss an insufficient Uniform Traffic Ticket citation. It is quite another thing to say that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to permit the amendment of an insufficient traffic citation. Where the amendment of the Uniform Traffic Ticket sought by the state is a designation of the statute or ordinance allegedly violated by the defendant, the trial court has jurisdiction to permit the amendment.
The first assignment of error is overruled.
Jackson's second assignment of error is as follows:
"The trial court erred by permitting the state to amend the original traffic affidavit pursuant to Criminal Rule 7(D)."
Although we have concluded in connection with Jackson's first assignment of error that the trial court had jurisdiction to permit the amendment adding a designation of R.C.
Because the amendment permitted by the trial court was expressly prohibited by Crim.R. 7(D), we sustain the second assignment of error.
In accordance with our disposition of the second assignment of error, the judgment appealed from will be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
BROGAN and GRADY, JJ., concur.