State v. JacksonState v. Jackson
Defendant, Charisma Jackson, was convicted of cruelty to a juvenile in violation of
On the night of October 24, 1996, the defendant, Charisma Jackson, brought her two-year old son, Demark McGrue, to the Meadowcrest Hospital Emergency Room. At trial, Dr. Beaehren, the emergency room physician who treated Demark that night, testified that Ms. Jackson reported that Demark had fallen off of a rocking horse. Dr. Beaehren observed bruising on the side of Demark‘s head and face, as well as bruising on the child‘s upper arms. Dr. Beaehren told the jury that he suspected child abuse because Demark‘s injurеs were not consistent with falling off of a horse. The doctor called Child Protection Services that night.
Patrice Hammond, a social worker with the Crisis Unit of the Office of Community Services, became involved in the case on October 25, 1996 and investigated the allegations of abuse. She testified that Dr. Beaehren told her that Demark‘s injuries were not consistent with the explanation Ms. Jackson had provided for his injuries. Ms. Hammond testified that she had also talked to the defendant on the night of October 25, 1996, and told the defendant that Demark, the oldest of the defendant‘s
One month later, on November 22, 1996, Demark was once again taken to the Meadowcrest Hоspital Emergency Room, with more serious injuries. Dr. Matthew Grimm, an orthopedic surgeon, examined Demark at Meadowcrest Hospital. Dr. Grimm testified that Demark had a broken thigh bone, which he placed in traction. He then sent Demark to Children‘s Hospital, where the child received additional treatment from Dr. Scott Benton. At that time, Ms. Hammond discovered that the defendant was not in compliance with her agreement because she had again allowed Demark to be in the care of Willie Keller on that day.
Dr. Benton, an expert in pediatric forensic medicine, testified that Demark‘s femur wаs completely dislocated. Dr. Benton further testified that Demark had also suffered blunt abdominal trauma that had caused injury to his liver. Dr. Benton testified that his notes reflected that Ms. Jackson was not at the hospital and that Ms. Jackson‘s sister, Stephanie, had told him that another sister found Demark at the house in pain and had brought him to the emergency room. Based on his evaluation of Demark, Dr. Benton determined that the child‘s injuries were consistent with abuse.
Detective Wayne Lawrence of the Gretna Police Department assisted in the criminal investigation of possible child abuse. Detective Lawrence identified state‘s exhibits one and two as photographs of Demark‘s November injuries. One of the photographs depicted Demark in traction. Detective Lawrence testified that the first officer on the scene noted that there were blisters on Demark‘s feet and the other photograph was taken to show these blisters.
On cross-examination, Detective Lawrence testified that the defendant had given a statement to him and told him that she had left her children in Willie Keller‘s care on November 22, 1996 while she went to work. The children were in good condition when she left. Ms. Jacksоn related that when she came home from work at 5:30 p.m., Keller was not there and the children were unattended. She told the detective that she climbed in a window because she did not have a key to the door. Thereafter, she noticed something wrong with Demark‘s leg. She told Detective Lawrenсe that, at 5:45 p.m. she and the children left through the window and took a taxi to Shoney‘s where she and Keller were employed, so that her supervisor could look at Demark‘s leg. Her supervisor then drove her and Demark to the hospital. Detective Lawrence further testified that Willie Keller told him thаt he had left the home at 5:45 p.m., and that when he returned, the children were gone. He then went to work.
Detective Lawrence subsequently submitted warrants for both the defendant‘s and Keller‘s arrest.
After learning of the November incident, Ms. Hammond concluded that the defendant had allowed Demark to return to a dangerous environment and transferred the case to the Family Service Unit of Child Protection. Ms. Hammond testified that she believed that the risk to Demark in his mother‘s care was high and that the defendant displayed a lack of willingness to protect Demark from harm. Rather, Ms. Hammond testified that the defendant‘s primary focus was to maintain the relationship with Willie Keller. Ms. Hammond testified that the defendant had moved out of Willie Keller‘s home on November 23, 1996. Finally, Ms. Hammond testified that her office had received another complaint of child abuse in June 1998, the month of trial, concerning a skull fracture sustained by the defendant‘s seven month-old child.
Twenty-one year old Charisma Jackson testified on her own behalf. The defendant testified that on October 24, 1996, Willie Keller told her that Demark had fallen off of а rocking horse, and that is what she related to the physician at Meadowcrest. She testified that she thought that Keller‘s mother had accompanied her to the hospital that night. The defendant denied that anyone had told her that they did not believe that Demark had fallen off of the rocking horse. She admitted that Child Protection had instructed her that Demark was to have no contact with Keller, and that he must stay at her parents’ house. However, the defendant stated that she thought the restriction applied only for that night, and that it was permissible for Demark to subsequently return to Willie Keller‘s home in Grеtna. The defendant also testified that she needed Keller to watch her children, but admitted that she had wanted her relationship with him to work out.
The defendant testified that on November 22, 1996, she had left the children with Willie Keller because there was no one else who could watch them. After she climbed thrоugh the window, she noticed Demark pointing to his leg. She pulled his pants down and saw bruising and swelling on his leg. She climbed back out of the window. The defendant explained that she took a taxi to Shoney‘s because she did not have enough money to get to the hospital. She said that her supervisor at Shoney‘s drоve them to the hospital. She stated that she left after the doctors told her what was wrong with Demark, and also that she spoke to Patrice at the hospital. She then returned to Shoney‘s where she encountered Willie Keller. The defendant testified that when she asked him what had happened, hе said that he did not know. When the prosecutor questioned the defendant concerning a seven-millimeter circular healed lesion on Demark‘s upper arm that had been noticed by Dr. Benton, the defendant said that she did not notice it. She denied that she had burned his arm or his foot, and testified that she did not smoke.
In her appeal, defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction of cruelty to a juvenile because the state failed to prove that she intentionally neglected the child or was criminally negligent in her care of the child.
The standard for testing the sufficiency of evidence requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Hawkins, 96-0766, p. 7 (La.1/14/97), 688 So.2d 473, 479; State v. Stoltz, 98-235 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/25/98), 717 So.2d 1243. When circumstantiаl evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense,
The defendant was convicted of cruelty to a juvenile, which is defined in
A. Cruelty to juveniles is the intentiоnal or criminally negligent mistreatment or neglect, by anyone over the age of seventeen, of any child under the age of seventeen whereby unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused to said child. Lack of knowledge of the child‘s age shall not be a defense.
The term “intentional” as used in
An alternative to proving that an accused intentionally mistreated or neglected a child,
But ordinary negligence does not constitute proof of criminal negligence, and the State is required to show more than a mere deviation from the standard of ordinary care. State v. Rock; supra; State v. G.R., 95-735, p. 3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/26/96), 672 So.2d 1009, 1010, writ denied, 96-1021 (La.6/28/96), 675 So.2d 1122.
In the instant case, the defendant argues that the state failed to prove thаt her leaving Demark in the care of Willie Keller after the October incident was a gross deviation below the standard of care. Rather, she asserts that her decision was “clearly unwise“, but that her “error in judgement was not so egregious as to amount to a gross deviation below the standard of сare...” The record reflects, however, that the state established the defendant‘s criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. Dr. Beaehren testified that he informed the defendant on October 25, 1996, that he did not believe Demark‘s injuries were consistent with the history that her boyfriend had providеd. Ms. Hammond testified that she talked to the defendant on October 25, 1996, at which time she instructed the defendant that Demark
The defеndant, on the other hand, denied that Dr. Beaehren had told her that he did not believe her story that Demark could not have received his injuries from falling off of the rocking horse. While the defendant admitted that Ms. Hammond told her that Demark was to have no contact with Keller and that he must stay at her parents’ home, she testified that she thought Ms. Hammond meant that the restrictions applied for that night only. The defendant also testified that she believed that it was permissible for Demark to stay with Keller.
The jury was required to evaluate the testimony of both the state‘s witnesses and testimony of the defendant. It is well-settled that whеre there is conflicting testimony as to factual matters, the question of credibility of witnesses is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact. State v. Price, 94-214, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/31/95), 650 So.2d 360, 363. Here, the jury made a credibility determination and believed the testimony of the state‘s witnesses rather than the testimony of the defendant. It is not the function of this court to assess the credibility of witnesses or to re-weigh the evidence. State v. Bordenave, 95-2328, p. 2 (La.4/26/96), 678 So.2d 19, 20; State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559, 563 (La.1983); State v. Batiste, 96-1010, p. 14 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/27/98), 708 So.2d 764, 772, writ denied, 98-0913 (La.9/4/98), 723 So.2d 954. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant committed the offense of cruelty to a juvenile.
Defendant also requests that we review the record for errors patent. We have conducted an error patent review in accordance with
For the above discussed reasons, the defendant‘s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.