State v. JacksonState v. Jackson
Rendered on September 16, 2010
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, for plaintiff.
Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and David L. Strait, for defendant.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
McGRATH, J.
{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, defendant, Maurice E. Jackson (“Jackson“), appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (case No. 09AP-689), denying his petition to contest reclassification pursuant to Ohio‘s Adam Walsh Act
{¶2} In 1985, Jackson was convicted of rape and served 13-1/2 years in prison. Prior to his release, a hearing was held pursuant to
{¶3} With the enactment of Senate Bill No. 10 (“S.B. 10“), Ohio‘s version of the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA“), which amended provisions of
{¶4} In case No. 09AP-689, Jackson raises the following seven assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial cоurt erred in failing to find that retroactive application of all provisions of S.B. 10 violates the Retroactivity Clause contained in Section 28, Article II, of the Ohio Constitution.
The trial court erred in failing to find that rеtroactive application of all provisions of S.B. 10 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that S.B. 10 violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Ohio Constitution.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that retroactive application of S.B. 10 violates the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that retroactive application of S.B. 10 violates the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution and Sеction 10, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that the lifetime reporting and registration requirements imposed upon the Petitioner under S.B. 10 violate procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that S.B. 10‘s residency restrictions violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that S.B. 10 violates Section 16, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution as it
invalidated the terms of a valid contract – the plea agreement – which involvеd a lesser classification, ten years of reporting, fewer restrictions on conduct, no residential restrictions, and substantially reduced impact on his life.
{¶5} In case No. 09AP-687, the state raises the following assignment of error:
THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 1,000-FOOT RESIDENCY RESTRICTION IN
R.C. 2950.034 , AS SUCH RESTRICTION WAS NOT A “NEW REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT” THAT COULD BE CHALLENGED IN DEFENDANT‘S PETITION CONTESTING RECLASSIFICATION UNDERR.C. 2950.031(E) .
Together, Jackson‘s assignments of error assert certain portions of the AWA are unconstitutional. Because disposition of Jackson‘s third assignment of error resolves his appeal, we first аddress it. We then address the state‘s sole assignment of error.
{¶6} Jackson‘s third assignment of error asserts the trial court erred in denying his petition to contest reclassification because application оf the AWA‘s tier system of classification to offenders who were judicially classified under former versions of
{¶7} Statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and a party seeking to have a statute declared unconstitutional must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Brayden James, 113 Ohio St.3d 420, 2007-Ohio-2335, ¶13; State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 171. An appellate court‘s review of the constitutionality of a statute is de novo. See State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404.
{¶8}
{¶9} After the trial court denied Jackson‘s petition to contest reclassification and he appealed, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued its decision in Bodyke. In considering a challenge to the constitutionality of the AWA, Bodyke concluded ”
{¶10} As part of its decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the history of Ohio‘s sex offender registration laws, emphasizing the importance of separation of powers and noting the court has “held that ‘[t]he administration of justice by the judicial branch of the government cannot be impeded by the other branches of the government in the exercise of their respective powers.’ ” Id. at ¶45, quoting State ex rel. Johnston v. Taulbee (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 417, paragraph one of the syllabus. In that context, the Supreme Court concluded the pоrtions of the AWA governing reclassification of sex offenders already judicially classified under Megan‘s Law violate the separation of powers doctrine for two reasons: (1) “the reclassification scheme vests the executive branch with authority to review judicial decisions,” and (2) “it interferes with the judicial power by requiring the
{¶11} As Jackson was no longer in prison at the time he received notification of his reсlassification under the AWA, the attorney general used
{¶12} In its appeal, the state does not challenge the trial court‘s declaration that the residency restriction set forth in
{¶13} In Bodyke, the Supreme Court held the attorney genеral‘s reclassification of a sexual offender whom a trial court order previously had classified under prior law
{¶14} More recently, the court clarified the effect of the severance remedy in Chojnacki, which involved an offender whom the trial court had classified as a sexually oriented offender. The offender subsequently filed a petition challenging his reclassification by the attorney general, along with a request for appointment оf counsel for purposes of the hearing on his petition. The Twelfth District Court of Appeals held that the order denying his request for appointed counsel was not a final appealable order and dismissed the appeal. On a certified conflict, the Supreme Court considered whether the order denying appointment of counsel constituted a final appealable order.
{¶15} The Supremе Court, however, dismissed the appeal as moot based on its earlier Bodyke decision that severed the statutory provisions governing petitions challenging reclassification. In so concluding, the court statеd “[t]he reclassification hearing which has resulted in this appeal and the related certified question arose under the now-severed provisions of
{¶16} In this case, the only issue the state rаises in its appeal arose from
{¶17} Accordingly, the state‘s assignment of error is rendered moot.
{¶18} Having sustained Jackson‘s third assignment of error pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Bodyke, rendering moot his six other assignmеnts of error, and having rendered moot the state‘s assignment of error, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and dismiss the state‘s appeal.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and state‘s appeal dismissed.
BRYANT and SADLER, JJ., concur.