State v. JacksonState v. Jackson
Rendered on the 14th day of May, 2010.
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RAYMOND DUNDES, Attorney Reg. #0041515, Montgomery County Area Two Prosecutor‘s Office, 6111 Taylorsville Road, Huber Hеights, Ohio 45424
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
PAMELA PINCHOT, Atty. Reg. #0071648, 7501 Paragon Road, Dayton, Ohio 45459-5316
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Yvonne Jackson appeals from her conviction and sentenсe for speeding, driving under a suspension and seat belt violation.
{¶ 2} The record indicates that on November 15, 2008, Riverside Police Officer Michael Ruchel was on duty in a marked cruiser sitting in the area of Airway
{¶ 3} Ruchel initiated a traffic stop and cited Jackson for speeding in violation of Riverside Ordinance 333.03, driving with a suspended license in violation of
{¶ 4} At trial the State presented Ruchel as its sole witness. Following Ruchel‘s testimony, Jackson made a motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29 which was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, Jackson testified on her own behalf. She admitted that she was driving under a suspension and that she was not wearing a seatbelt.
{¶ 5} The parties waived closing argument and the triаl court stated that it found Jackson guilty of all three charges “based upon the evidence presented.” Jackson was sentenced accordingly. She has filed a timely appeal in which she asserts the following two assignments of error:
{¶ 6} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT‘S CRIMINAL RULE 29 MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE‘S CASE.”
{¶ 7} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED THE APPELLANT OF SPEEDING WHEN THE STATE FAILED TO PROPERLY LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR THE ACCURACY AND RELIABILITY OF THE RADAR UNIT
{¶ 8} In her first argument, Jackson contends that the triаl court erred when it failed to sustain her Crim. R. 29 motion for acquittal which she made at the close of the State‘s case.
{¶ 9} Crim. R. 29(A) states that a cоurt shall order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for the charged offense. “Reviewing the denial of a Crim. R. 29 motion therefore requires an appellate court to use the same standard as is used to review a sufficiency of the еvidence claim.” State v. Witcher, Lucas App. No. L-06-1039, 2007-Ohio-3960.
{¶ 10} “In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorablе to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a rеasonable doubt.’ (Internal citations omitted).” State v. Crowley, Clark App. No.2007 CA 99, 2008-Ohio-4636.
{¶ 11} We begin with Jackson‘s motion for Crim.R. 29 acquittal.1 In making her motion, Jackson first argued that the State did not submit sufficient evidence to support a finding that she was, as cited, under a license suspension at the time of the traffic violation. We find no merit in this claim.
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{¶ 13} “(A) No person whose driver‘s *** license *** has been suspended under any provision of the Revised Code, other than Chapter 4509. of the Revisеd
{¶ 14} The trial court admitted State‘s exhibit 1 which is a certified copy of Jackson‘s driving record from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Those records show the status of Jackson‘s license as “suspended.” Therefore, wе conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling this portion of the motion for acquittal.
{¶ 15} Next in her motion, Jackson argued that the State fаiled to submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the radar device in question was functioning properly at the time of the traffic stoр. Specifically, she argued that Ruchel failed to insure that the device was tested so as to “account for any obstructions or hindrance to the signal of the radar being sent and coming back.”
{¶ 16} We note that the record demonstrates that Ruchel calibrated the radar device at the beginning, and again at the end, of his shift using the standard “tuning forks” test and that it was tested to account for items, such as metal, that might affect thе function of the device. Ruchel further testified that the calibrations showed the device was functioning properly. Further, according to Ruсhel‘s unrebutted testimony, there were no obstacles, or metals, between the device and Jackson‘s car which would support her claim of obstructions or hindrance to the signal. Indeed, Ruchel testified that there were no other cars near her vehicle at the time. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in overruling this portion of the motion for acquittal.
{¶ 18} Further, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for failure to wear a seat belt. Ruchel testified that he observed Jackson driving without a seatbelt, which was again, admitted by Jackson during her testimony.
{¶ 19} Finally, we conclude that the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to support the conviction for speeding despite Jackson‘s argument to the contrary in which she complains that the “State failed to establish that Officer Ruchel was qualified to operate the radar device.”
{¶ 20} “When a measuring device is not subject to judicial notice, there must be testimony from the officer as to his qualifications to operate the device and that the device was in proper working order.” City of Cleveland v. English, Cuyahoga App. No. 84945, 2005-Ohio-1662, ¶ 11. In this case, thе record establishes that the Court had sufficient evidence to determine that the radar device was a stationary device. “The admissibility into evidence of a speed reading obtained by a [stationary] radar speed meter without independent expert testimony as to the nature and function of, or the scientific principles underlying, such speed meter has been firmly established in Ohio.” State v. Wilcox (1974), 40 Ohio App.2d 380, 381-382, citing East Cleveland v. Ferell (1958), 168 Ohio St. 298.
{¶ 21} Moreover, Jackson did not оbject to Ruchel‘s testimony regarding the
{¶ 22} Both of Jackson‘s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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DONOVAN, P.J., GRADY, J., concur.
(Hon. Robert P. Ringland, Twelfth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment оf the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).
Copies mailed to:
Raymond Dundes
Pamela Pinchot
Hon. James D. Piergies