63 So. 859 | La. | 1913
The defendants resist the suit on the ground that the state is estopped from obtaining a license from them for the years 1909 to 1912, inclusive, for the reason that the state has already accepted a license from the same defendants for all of their business as retailers, conducted during the said years. That the state is estopped for the further reason that defendants’ affidavit, if untrue, should have been traversed promptly after the receipt of defendants and payment of the license thereunder.
This court has no jurisdiction of the defense just above stated. There is no question of the uneonstitutionality of a tax involved.
But the defendants further urged in the pleadings that the state claims a license for the years 1909 to 1912, inclusive, under authority of Act 148 of 1906. Defendants aver that said act is unconstitutional, null, and void and in direct violation of the Constitution of the state and of articles 31 and 32 in having more than one object and also in failing to re-enact the amendment sections in full. That the demands are prescribed. Defendants also deny that they are engaged in business as merchants and also deny that they are wholesale dealers.
What has been said of the title may be said of the act. In the first section it provides for a limit by prescription, which purpose is clearly expressed in the title and directly connected with the question of prescription and the purposes of the act. The second section provides when licenses become delinquent. The third, the burden of proof, upon whom it lies in certain contingencies. The fourth, additional method of making service of process upon the taxpayer from whom a Ecense is claimed. The fifth affords to defendants no reEef as it refers to social clubs and classifying them under section 13 of Act 171 of 1898.
For similar ruling, see State of Louisiana v. Mustaiche (No. 19,871, of the docket of this court) 62 South. 637, 133 La. 216.