State v. Isaiah J. Knight
A-39-22 (087822)
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
March 5, 2024
253 N.J. 546
PIERRE-LOUIS, J.
Argued October 10, 2023 September Term 2022
SYLLABUS
This syllаbus is not part of the Court‘s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
State v. Isaiah J. Knight (A-39-22) (087822)
Argued October 10, 2023 -- Decided March 5, 2024
PIERRE-LOUIS, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether, pursuant to New Jersey discovery rules, the State can obtain from defense counsel an affidavit that constitutes physical evidence of a crime.
On June 1, 2021, Tyzier White was fatally shot as he stood outside of the Neptune Lounge, a bar in Newark. Two men, known by their nicknames as “Zay” and “DJ Neptune,” witnessed the shooting. Both men provided sworn statements in which they identified the shooter, and both later selected defendant Isaiah Knight‘s photоgraph from a photo array. On June 16, law enforcement arrested defendant.
On December 21, 2021, Zay gave a statement to law enforcement, claiming that a woman he met online took him to a residence in Newark. At some point after arriving at the residence and spending time with the woman, three individuals, including two masked men armed with guns, entered the room where Zay was. Zay stated that he was given a written affidavit and told to copy it. The affidavit recanted Zay‘s original statement to law enforcement identifying defendant as the shooter. After Zay copied the recanting affidavit, the captors released him. Defendant‘s sister and cousin were identified as two of the perpetrators and charged with witness tamрering. A superseding indictment also charged defendant with second-degree conspiracy to commit witness tampering and two counts of second-degree kidnapping.
On April 4, 2022, the State filed a motion to compel discovery of the document Zay was allegedly forced to write, believing that defendant‘s alleged co-conspirators turned it over to his counsel. The State‘s certification in support of its motion to compel further alleged that DJ Neptune may have been forced to transcribe a similar recantation and that defense counsel might possess that document as well. The trial court granted the State‘s motion to compel discovery, and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court‘s order. The Court granted leave to appeal. 253 N.J. 546 (2023).
HELD: The sought-after affidavit is physical evidence of the crimes of witness tampering and kidnapping for which defendant and others have been charged. It is therefore subject to reciprocal discovery under
1.
2. Beyond the Rule‘s own exception, constitutional guarantees may bar compelling disclosure of certain materials in certain situations. The right against self-incrimination applies when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating. However, both the state and
3. In this matter, neither party disputes that defense counsel played no role whatsoever in the genesis of Zay‘s affidavit. The affidavit‘s creation was allegedly the result of a kidnapping and witness intimidation plot for which defendant and two other individuals have been criminally charged. The affidavit, therefore, is physical evidence of a crime and does not fall within the exception to the discovery obligations set forth in
AFFIRMED and REMANDED to the trial court.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS‘s opinion.
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Isaiah J. Knight,
Defendant-Appellant.
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
| Argued | Decided |
| October 10, 2023 | March 5, 2024 |
Matthew E. Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney;
William P. Cooper-Daub, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; William P. Cooper-Daub, of counsel and on the briefs).
Claudе Caroline Heffron argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, on the brief).
JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal asks us to determine whether, pursuant to our discovery rules, the State can obtain from defense counsel an affidavit that constitutes physical evidence of a crime.
Defendant Isaiah J. Knight was charged with murder.1 A witness to the murder gave a statement to police and identified defendant as the shooter. Thereafter, the witness met a woman online, and the woman took him to a residence in Newark. At some point after arriving at the residence and spending time with the woman in a room, three individuals, including two masked men armed with guns, entered the room. The witness stated that he wаs given a written affidavit and told to copy it. The affidavit recanted the witness‘s original statement to law enforcement identifying defendant as the shooter. After the witness copied the recanting affidavit, the captors released him, and he then gave a statement to law enforcement regarding the ordeal.
Defendant‘s sister and cousin were identified as two of the perpetrators and charged with witness tampering.
The State, operating under the belief that the recantation affidavit was given to defendant‘s attorney, moved to compel discovery of the affidavit from defense counsel. Defendant objected, but the trial court granted the State‘s motion to compel. Defendant appeаled, claiming that defense counsel cannot be compelled to turn over the affidavit pursuant to this Court‘s precedent and constitutional privileges in the
We granted defendant‘s motion for leave to appeal and now affirm. The sought-after affidavit is physical evidence of the crimes of witness tampering and kidnapping for which defendant and others have been charged. As such, the affidavit is subject to reciprocal discovery under
I.
A.
On June 1, 2021, Tyzier White was fatally shot as he stood outside of the Neptune Lounge, a bar in Newark. Two men, known by their nicknames as “Zay” and “DJ Neptune,” witnessed the shooting.2 Both men provided sworn statements in which they identified the shooter as a man known to them by the nickname “B.A.” Zay added that he knew B.A.‘s real name was Isaiah Knight because Zay and defendant have the same name. Both Zay and DJ Neptune later selected defendant‘s photograph from a photo array.
On June 16, 2021, law enforcement arrested defendant on murder charges. He has been detained pending trial since September 2021.
On December 21, 2021, Zay claimed that a woman he knew as “Aminah” from prior interactions contacted him on Instagram wanting to meet up. According to Zay, Aminah picked him up and drove him to 145 Hobson Street in Newark, where an unknown woman let them into the multi-family residence. Zay stated that once inside a bedroom on the second floor, he and Aminah smoked marijuana. Zay recalled that at some point Aminah grabbed her coat and a lighter and said she wanted to go outside to smoke a cigarette. When she opened the door and left the room, however, the unknown woman who had let them in, along with two masked men armed with guns, entered the bedroom.
Zay recalled that the men mentioned a “discovery packet.” Then, Zay claims the woman handed him a written document and instructed him to copy it by hand onto another sheet of paper. The document was a written “affidavit,” the substance of which recanted Zay‘s prior sworn statement to police identifying defendant as the shooter. According to Zay, the affidavit stated that he had lied in his previous sworn statement under duress from detectives and that no one should try to find him. Zay stated that as he began to write the words, “I, Isaiah Knight,” the woman said, “No, not his name.”
According to Zay, the men became enraged because they thought he was trying to be funny by signing defendant‘s name as opposed to his own. Zay alleged that the woman then snatched his phone, confirmed his name, and deleted all Instagram messages between him and Aminah. At one point, Zay said he recognized one of the men, and the man acknowledged Zay‘s identification by removing his mask.
Zay recalled that as he continued to copy the text of the affidavit, the men told him that they were going to kill him and leave him in the apartment as soon as he finished signing. But while looking through Zay‘s phone, the woman noticed that Zay had texted a friend abоut being at 145 Hobson Street. Given Zay‘s text message to his friend about his whereabouts, Zay overheard the woman and two men discuss whether the friend would link Zay‘s death to the address if they killed him. As a result, the perpetrators released Zay.
The following day, Zay went to the Essex County Prosecutor‘s Office Homicide Task Force and gave a second sworn statement describing the prior evening‘s events. He also provided law enforcement with Instagram pictures of Aminah and the man he recognized. Law enforcement subsequently identified Aminah as Aminah Anderson, defendant‘s sister, and the man as Sylvester Richardson, defendant‘s cousin.
Zay gave a third statement to law enforcement in which he identified both
In April 2022, law enforcement arrested Anderson and Richardson on witness tampering charges. In his statement to law enforcement, Richardson admitted that he is defendant‘s cousin and that Anderson is defendant‘s sister.
B.
On September 10, 2021, an Essex County grand jury indicted defendant for the following offenses: first-degree murder, second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. On March 16, 2022, an Essex County grand jury returned a superseding indictment against defendant which included the following additional offenses: second-degree conspiracy to commit witness tampering and two counts of second-degree kidnapping.
On April 4, 2022, the State filed a motion to compel discovery of the document Zay was allegedly forced to write, believing that defendant‘s alleged co-conspirators turned it over to his counsel. The State‘s certification in support of its motion to compel further alleged that DJ Neptune may have been forced to transcribe a similar recantation and that defense counsel might possess that document as well.3
The trial court held a hearing on the State‘s motion to compel discovery. In opposing the motion, defendant relied оn State v. Williams, 80 N.J. 472 (1979), to argue that the State was not entitled to the affidavits under
The trial court granted the State‘s motion to compel discovery. The court distinguished Williams, finding that the item at issue in that case was work product formulated by defense counsel based on witness interviews. Here, the court reasoned that the affidavits are “evidence of the crime of witness tampering, and not anything formulated or written based on defense‘s own investigation or work product.”
The Appellate Division granted defendant‘s motion for leave to appeal the trial court‘s order. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court‘s order compelling disclosure of the affidavits. The court concluded that Zay‘s and DJ Neptune‘s written statements, potentially held by defense counsel, fall under the rubric of
We granted defendant‘s motion for leave to appeal. 253 N.J. 546 (2023). We also granted motions by the Attorney General and the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) to appear as amici curiae.
II.
A.
Defendant urges this Court to reaffirm the longstanding rule that a defendant must only disclose materials the defense intends to use or rely on at trial. Defendant argues that, even if he or his counsel possess the affidavits, the reciprocal discovery rule does not apply and he should not be required to turn them over because he does not intend to use them at trial. Defendant claims that compelled production violates his
Defendant also claims that compelled production of the affidavits would violate his
The ACDL supports defendant‘s position that the Court should not allow the State to infringe upon the attorney-client relationship and a defendant‘s
B.
The State argues that this Court should uphold the trial court and Appellate Division‘s decisions. According to the State,
The Attorney General echoes the State‘s arguments regarding
III.
A.
Our scope of review in this matter is limited. State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 521 (2019). “[A]ppellate courts ‘generally defer to a trial court‘s disposition of discovery matters unless the сourt has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law.‘” Ibid. (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we “generously sustain [the trial court‘s] decision, provided it is supported by credible evidence in the record.” Id. at 522 (alteration in original) (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384 (2010)).
This Court “need not defer, however, to a discovery order that is well ‘wide of the mark,’ or ‘based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law.‘” State v. Hernandez, 225 N.J. 451, 461 (2016) (first quoting State in Int. of A.B., 219 N.J. 542, 554 (2014); and then quoting Pomerantz, 207 N.J. at 371)). We review a court rule‘s meaning or scope de novo, affording “no deference to the interpretative statements of the trial court and Appellate Division, unless they are persuasive in their reasoning.” Ibid.
B.
As noted, defendant asserts that the affidavits are not subject to disclosure under our discovery rules and that, even if they were, the
Although “a defendant has a right to automatic and broad discovery of the evidence the State has gathered in support of its charges” upon the issuance of an indictment, the Rule also places the onus on defense counsel to supply the prosecution with broad categories of items. Id. at 252-53; see also Ramirez, 252 N.J. at 295-96;
With regard to the defendant‘s discovery obligations,
(B) any relevant books, papers, documents or tangible objects, buildings or places or copies thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of defense counsel, including, but not limited to, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, video and sound recordings, images, electronically stored information, and any other data or data compilations stored in any medium from which information can be obtained and translated, if necessary, into reasonably usable form;
. . .
(D) written statements, if any, including any memoranda reporting or summarizing the oral statements, made by any witnesses whom the State may call as a witness at trial. . .
[
Significantly, the Rule “does not require discovery of a party‘s work product consisting of internal reports, memoranda or documents made by that party or the party‘s attorney or agents, in connection with the investigation, prosecution or defense of the matter.”
Beyond the Rule‘s own exception, constitutional guarantees may bar compelling disclosure of certain materials in certain situations.
The
Both the state and federal privileges against self-incrimination are personal to the defendant and cannot be asserted by or on behalf of third parties. See State v. Baum, 199 N.J. 407, 419 (2009); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. Our Court has recognized that “a fundamental policy limiting the scope of the privilege” is that “the Fifth Amendment privilege is a purely personal one.” Baum, 199 N.J. at 417 (quoting Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974)).
The
C.
Defendant relies on two cases in which this Court found that a defendant‘s constitutional protections limited discovery obligations.
This Court has recognized that “[t]o safeguard the defense attorney‘s ability to provide the effective assistance guaranteed by these constitutional provisions, it is essential that he be permitted full investigative latitude in developing a meritоrious defense on his client‘s behalf.” State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 582 (1978). Such latitude to conduct an investigation would be constrained if defense counsel “must risk a potentially crippling revelation to the State of information discovered in the course of investigation which he chooses not to use at trial.” Ibid.
In Mingo, this Court considered how the principles underlying the reciprocal discovery rule relate to the attorney work product privilege and the right to effective assistance of counsel. 77 N.J. at 587. In that case, defense counsel sought to compel the State‘s production of a note allegedly written by the assailant. Id. at 579. Defense counsel wanted to engage a handwriting expert to examine the note and compare the hаndwriting to defendant‘s handwriting. Ibid. The trial court granted defense counsel‘s request, conditioned “on defense counsel‘s agreeing to furnish the prosecutor with a copy of any” expert report generated, regardless of whether defendant planned to use the report at trial. Ibid. After comparing defendant‘s handwriting exemplars to the note, the defense expert concluded that the same person had written all the documents. Id. at 580. As a result of the expert report‘s inculpatory nature, defense counsel decided to forego using the expert‘s report at trial. Ibid. The State, however, having received the report from defense counsel, subpoenaed the expert to testify on the State‘s behalf, and the expert did so. Ibid.
In considering whether the trial court should have admitted the expert‘s testimony, this Court held that defense counsel cannot be compelled, via discovery, to give the State inculpatory expert materials it generated in preparation for trial unless the defense intends to introduce or use that expert evidence at trial. Id. at 582, 584. We held that such a rule furthers the
Although an attorney‘s work product privilege is “closely analogous” to the right to effective assistance of counsel, the Court rejected the argument that the expert report at issue was work product. Id. at 585. The Court reasoned that the expert‘s report “constitute[d] a species of evidence admissible under some circumstances
One year after the Mingo decision, the Court expanded its holding to include statements or summaries of statements made by a State witness to defense counsel when the defense does not intend to use the statements at trial. Williams, 80 N.J. at 480-82. In Williams, defense counsel and his investigator interviewed the victim on two occasions. Id. at 476. During the second interview, the victim selected defendant‘s picture in identifying him as the perpetrator. Ibid. That was the only time the victim identified the defendant as the assailant, and identification was at issue in the State‘s case. Id. at 477, 479-80.
The State moved for reciprocal discovery of the photographs and interview memoranda. Id. at 476. Defendant objected because he did not intend to introduce any of those materials at trial. Ibid. The trial court granted the State‘s motion and ordered defendant, pursuant to
After reviewing the materials, the State served subpoenas on counsel and his investigator to testify as thе State‘s witnesses during trial. Ibid. To avoid testifying, defense counsel stipulated to his interview with the victim. Ibid. During summation, the prosecutor emphasized that the victim‘s sole identification occurred when defendant‘s own attorney showed her a picture of the defendant. Id. at 477.
The Court concluded that the trial court‘s order compelling reciprocal discovery of inculpatory material in defense counsel‘s file trespassed on the defendant‘s right to effective assistance of counsel. Ibid. The Court explained that
IV.
Applying those principles, we hold that the affidavits in this case are discoverable pursuant to our discovery rules and that neither the
Defendant relies on this Court‘s prior caselaw regarding reciprocal discovery to support his argument that the affidavits, if they exist and are in defense counsel‘s possession, should not be turned over to the State. The holdings in Mingo and Williams, however, do not control in this factally distinct and unique case. In Mingo, the State sought to obtain an inculpatory expert report that defendant did not intend to use at trial. 77 N.J. at 580. In Williams,
In this matter, neither party disputes that dеfense counsel played no role whatsoever in the genesis of Zay‘s affidavit. The affidavit‘s creation was allegedly the result of a kidnapping and witness intimidation plot for which defendant and two other individuals have been criminally charged. The affidavit, therefore, is physical evidence of a crime. It is not the product of the defense investigation or attorney work product, and it therefore does not fall within the exception to the discovery obligations set forth in
The affidavit would also fall under
Compelling defense counsel to turn over in discovery an item in his possession that is physical evidence of a crime does not trigger the same
Defendant‘s argument that compelling the discovery of this affidavit violates his
The unique facts of this case lead this Court to the conclusion that the affidavits,
If counsel is in possession of the affidavits and turns them over, the State must take precautions in introducing the affidavits at trial to avoid identifying defense counsel as the source of the documents so as not to prejudice defendant before the jury. The State can appropriately lay a foundation for the admission of the documents at trial by sanitizing the manner in which the State came into possession of the documents without stating that the affidavits came from defense counsel.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Appellate Division‘s judgment and remand this matter consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS‘s opinion.
PIERRE-LOUIS
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY