History
  • No items yet
midpage
State v. Irizarry
763 P.2d 432
Wash.
1988
Check Treatment

*1 27, 1988.] En 53287-7. Banc. October [No. Respondent, v. Ricardo M. Washington, Defendant, Michael Irizarry, Ransom, Alan

Appellant. Ladenburg Haselman, & by Anthony Haselman, for H. appellant. Griffies,

William H. Prosecuting Attorney, and Chris Quinn-Brintnall, Senior Appellate Deputy, respon- for dent. J.—

Andersen,

Facts of Case In planned the course of the robbery pizza delivery- Tacoma, man in Brander Allan Castle was stabbed to death in the early hours of In morning July 1984. connection therewith, M. pleaded Ricardo Irizarry guilty to murder for his exchange testimony at the trial herein, Michael Alan Ransom. on the jury tried before Ransom was The defendant At degree. the first charge objections, over defense request prosecution, only on the crime instructed also on "included in the first but *2 felony murder. offense" of of the "included Ransom was convicted

The defendant He to the Court of felony appealed of murder. offense" We his to this court.1 appeal certified Appeals which accepted review. presented. issue is principal

One

Issue offense felony crime of murder a lesser included Is the degree? aggravated of murder the first within crime Decision not a lesser included Felony murder is Conclusion. in the first the offense of murder offense within instructing erred in degree, and the trial court conviction of this nonincluded it The defendant's was. trial. requiring error new prejudicial offense constitutes our state constitution It fundamental that under is charge informed of the criminal an must be person accused trial, tried for an at and cannot be he she is meet or statutory subject rule is to two charged.2 This offense (1) is a lesser where a convicted of exceptions: in the information charged offense the one included (2) (RCW 10.61.006); is where a defendant convicted of an inferior one which is a crime offense (RCW 10.61.003).3 2.06.030; RAP 4.2. 1 RCW (amend. Carr, 10); v. State art. § 2 Const. 484, 487, (1982); Pelkey, v. 745 P.2d 854 Foster, Pelkey, at 487-88. 589 P.2d 789

3 State 9A.32.030) (RCW The first murder defines statute ways the three different the crime murder which the first be committed: degree can (RCW

1. 9A.32.030(l)(a)); Premeditated murder (RCW 2. by Murder indifference life extreme to human 9A.32.030(l)(b)); and (RCW 9A.32.030(l)(c)).4 Felony

3. murder murder is defining statute first clear;5 equally crime in the premeditated is murder (not extreme indifference or (1) degree. person "Murder the first A in the first degree when: "(a) premeditated person, With a intent to cause the death of another he person person; causes the death such or of a third or "(b) life, manifesting Under circumstances an extreme indifference to human engages grave any person, conduct he which creates a risk of death to thereby person; causes the death of a or "(c) attempts (1) robbery, He commits or to commit the either crime of (2) degree, rape (3) degree, first or second burglary in the first or second degree, degree, kidnapping, arson in the first in the first or second and; degree, in the course of or in furtherance such crime immediate *3 therefrom, he, flight participant, person or another causes the death aof other participants; 9A.32.030(1) generally (part). than one of the . . .“ RCW See WPIC 26. 5"Aggravated person first guilty murder defined. A of by he or she commits murder as RCW defined 9A.32.030(1)(a), amended, following now as or hereafter and one or more of the aggravating circumstances exist: "(1) officer, officer, The victim was a law enforcement corrections or fire performing fighter who was his or her official duties at the time of the act result- ing reasonably by in death and the victim known was or should have been known person to killing; be such at the of the time the "(2) resulting death, person At the serving time of the act in the a was imprisonment, escaped, term of had or was on or authorized unauthorized leave in facility program persons from a state or or for the incarceration or treatment of crimes; adjudicated of "(3) death, resulting person custody At the time of the act in a county county-city jail consequence having as adjudicated guilty or a of a been of felony; "(4) person pursuant agreement The committed the murder an to that he or money any thing murder; committing she would receive or other of value for "(5) person person paid The solicited another to commit the murder and had agreed money any pay thing committing had to or or other value for of mur- der; 594

murder) or more of the of one accompanied by presence criminal listed circumstances statutory aggravating ).6 (RCW statu These of the code procedure title 10.95.020 penalty" of are "aggravation circumstances tory aggravating A not "elements" of as such.7 crime and are factors elements only "when all included offense exists lesser elements of the necessary greater the lesser offense are (Italics ours.)8 felony is of a Because commission offense." in the first necessary not a element felony murder cannot it the offense of degree, follows "(6) The victim was: "(a) current, judge; juror juror; prospective, or former witness A or former prosecuting attorney; proceeding; attorney; deputy adjudicative prosecuting paroles; proba- attorney; prison or a a member of the board of terms defense officer; parole tion or "(b) performed or to related to the exercise of official duties The murder was victim; performed "(7) person the commission of crime committed the murder conceal crime; committing identity any person protect or conceal or "(8) part of and the murders were a common more than one victim There was person; single plan the result of a act or or scheme of, of, "(9) or in in furtherance The murder was committed course following flight one of the crimes: from immediate "(a) Robbery degree; in the first or second " (b) degree; Rape in the first or second "(c) degree; Burglary in the first or second "(d) degree; Kidnapping in or the first "(e) degree; in the first Arson newsreporter "(10) employed self-employed regularly or as a The victim was research, investigative, or hinder the the murder was committed to obstruct (Italics ours.) reporting RCW 10.95.020. victim." activities Mak, (1985); 304, Kincaid, 312, v. State 105 692 P.2d 823 6 State v. 599, 407, denied, 995, L. Ed. 2d S. cert. U.S. 718 P.2d 5. See footnote Ct. 7 Kincaid, at 312. Bishop, Roybal, 8 State v. *4 Miller, 488; App. (1978); Pelkey, 185, 191, 30 Wn. at 580 P.2d (1981), denied, review 635 P.2d within

be an included offense the charge aggravated Similarly, felony murder the first murder is not a degree. lesser degree.9 murder Mak, 407, In State v. cert. denied, 93 L. 2d Ct. U.S. Ed. 107 S. instructions on murder as a lesser included offense were given by trial court in a case involving aggravated degree.10 murder the first As we held, did there this not constitute reversible error because it was the requested who those instructions. As defendant pointed connection, we out the lesser included instruction, offense not having been excepted by to at trial defendant, case; further, became the law any error in connection therewith was error invited defendant which could not complained of on appeal.11 In us, the case however, before duly excepted defendant giving of the felony murder included offense instruc tions, thus preserving his claim of error for appeal.

Since the this case was (i.e., murder in the first degree the crime of premeditated murder plus statutory aggravating circumstance), on instruction the lesser included of premeditated offense murder the first (i.e., premeditated the crime of in the first degree statutory circumstances) without aggravating could have been given.12

Since defendant was not of premeditated convicted (nor the first any lesser included 10.61.003; Mak, 9 See ROW at 745.

10 Mak,at 746-47.

11 Mak, at 747-49. 583; Roybal, Miller,

12 See at at 445.

596 crime), is man- degree of that reversal lesser offense or dated.13 not, is the defendant charges against all

Dismissal of defend- having convicted the however, mandated. The murder, the defendant felony improperly, albeit ant of violating offense without consti- with that still be prohibitions.14 jeopardy double tutional appeal the defendant's contention of remaining The cause, jurors for where Excusing prospective taken. not well he was not error as they penalty, to the death opposed were in that of this state is well settled law now contends. regard.15

Reversed and remanded.

Brachtenbach, J., Hamilton, Tern., J. Pro concur. Utter, majority's I agree J. with the (concurring) — included offense analysis that murder is not lesser However, I that this point murder. must out of aggravated the issue of argument has never heard on decided court subjects a to excusing scrupled jurors whether conviction-prone under jury and is thus unconstitutional which the Washington The cases to Constitution. to refers were decided with reference majority briefed and yet court has not federal constitution. Because this on restrictions interpreted Washington Constitution's issue, briefing this court has the benefit until this v. of State Gun at least the nonexclusive factors considers 54, is still an wall, 808 this 106 Wn.2d 720 P.2d (amend. 10); 1, Bingham, 6; v. 22 State amend. Const. art. § 13 SeeU.S. Const. 820, 553, 559-60, (1985), aff'd, 719 109 App. Wn.2d P.2d 699 P.2d 262 105 Wn. 40 (1986). (1983); 543-44, Dowling, 542, State v. P.2d v. 497 State 98 Wn.2d 656 14 See (1982). denied, 1205, Anderson, cert. 459 U.S. 842 P.2d 96 Wn.2d 638 Mak, (1986); 176, 180-88, Hughes, at 707- 902 106 Wn.2d 721 P.2d 15 State v. 08. Wethered, State v. 466,

open question. (1988). Despite the similar the sixth amendment language and article section United States Constitution Constitution, both defendants Washington entitling impartial "by presump- trial this court jury", does tively federal is not apply analysis analysis sup- ported history language, and context our Reece, 757 P.2d 947 constitution. v. Gunwall, Coe, State supra; I note are P.2d that studies establish- *6 more ing through and more accurate the methodologies correlation between the exclusion of scrupled jurors and conviction. See Due Process vs. Fitzgerald Ellsworth, & Crime Death Qualification Jury Attitudes, Control: and ("As Law & Hum. Behav. the controlled sim- realistic, ulations become more the differences between death-qualified and jurors excludable becomes more pro- nounced."). Further, I find compelling Justice Marshall's McCree, to Lockhart v. dissent L. U.S. Ed. 2d 106 S. Ct. 1758 noting, concerns, among other the great difference between a to be happening stacked against defendant, the it being against stacked the through a scheme excuses cause by for prosecution. Lockhart, (Marshall, J., 90 L. Ed. 2d at 161 dissenting). analysis

This court well reject federal on this issue if presented we are adequate briefing on the in Washington Nothing majority Constitution. should discourage be read in to Ransom his new trial or future fully defendants from their asserting rights protected by the Washington Constitution. C.J., J.

Pearson, Utter, concurs with part, dissenting part) J. Callow, (concurring —I technically, murder, concur majority with the case, as it was this is not a lesser included However, I murder. offense lesser doctrine believe the rationale included offense and I cannot With the result agree was violated I that we opinion majority. follows of the submit from further. go step should

Facts there is some Things put perspective unless cannot involved. Here recitation the factual situation pizzas Store an for to be Domino's Pizza received order apartment pizzas to an South Tacoma. The delivered deliveryman Soon given 22-year-old delivery. were to a for thereafter, body police indicating received a call that a in the apartment complex. police had been found When the arrived, deliveryman still died breathing, was but shortly. The medical examiner determined that the cause stab chest and side area. death was three wounds deep perforated One of these wounds was 5V2 inches another, inches also deep, the heart and liver while 4% penetrated the heart. There was also evidence wounds cartilage in nose. eye Investigation area and broken waylaid empty been revealed that the victim had attempting while to deliver apartment and stabbed apart- were found pizzas. pizzas ordered two ment, Blood money strewn the floor. about *7 of both bespattered empty apartment. fingerprints frame defendants were found on the of a broken window. Lesser Included Offense RCW 10.95.020 states: degree murder person guilty aggravated

A is first as degree murder defined he or commits first she 9A.32.030(l)(a) . . more of the follow- RCW ing aggravating . and one or circumstances exists: murder, degree first aggravated In order to be convicted in the first must have committed person a 9A.32.030(l)(a) which reads: under RCW (1) of murder first person A when:

(a) With a premeditated intent to cause the death another person, he causes the death person of such or of . . . person; third Thus, premeditated unless there is a intent to cause the death person coupled of a with one of the cir- aggravating 10.95.020, cumstances listed under RCW the commission of aggravated first In has not occurred. other words, first degree murder cannot upon occur proof 9A.32.030(l)(b) (extreme of the commission of RCW life) 9A.32.030(l)(c) indifference to human or under RCW murder). (felony Premeditated present intent must be order to fulfill requisites of aggravated first degree murder. Austin, State v.

In 105 Wn.2d 716 P.2d 875 (1986) general rule was announced as follows: crimes for which person may in be convicted are

[T]he limited to those the information. State v. Foster, Accord, 466, (1979). Wn.2d State 589 P.2d 789 Martin, v. 1, 94 Wn.2d 614 P.2d 164 There are two recognized exceptions to this latter rule: where a is convicted of offense, a lesser included RCW 10.61.006; where a defendant is convicted of a crime of an inferior degree to the one charged, RCW Foster, 10.61.003. State v. at 471.

However, Washington courts have a number of cases involving degree murder routinely instructed juries that the crime of aggravated first degree murder necessarily includes the lesser crime of in State v. Ng, murder. See Papers Clerk's 763, 104 Wn.2d Rupe, (1985); 713 P.2d 63 734, 743 P.2d Mak, (1987); denied, cert. State v. Campbell, 479 U.S. 995 denied, cert. P.2d 929 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).16 exactly Ng, 16 Here the language was instructed in almost the same inas Mak,

Rupe, Campbell, as follows:

Notice Ransom In this case the amended information in the First Aggravated Degree" with crime of Murder "the Instruction defendant, Ransom, Alan of crime of "To the Michael the convict degree, following elements the crime must be murder in the first each of the of proved beyond a reasonable doubt: "1) . . . . . the . the death . That. defendant. caused "2) . . . . the . acted with intent to cause the death That defendant. "3) premeditated accomplice intent or an with That the defendant acted . . . cause the death ”4) the Brander Allan Castle as a result of the acts of defendant That died "5) County, Washington; in the acts Pierce That occurred ”6) present: following aggravating the factor was That "(a) murder to conceal the commission of the defendant committed the any committing identity person protect a and to of crime conceal crime; or "(b) of, of, or in in the furtherance was committed course Robbery Degree." flight of in the First immediate from the crime Instruction you beyond is "If a reasonable doubt that the defendant are satisfied any charged, guilty found lesser of the crime be crime, necessarily charged, if the which is the crime the commission of included beyond guilt of such lesser crime evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant's doubt. a reasonable necessarily Degree Aggravated "The in the First includes crime of Murder Degree. in the lesser crime of Murder First person proven against and there exists reasonable a crime has been "When person guilty, he or she shall of the two or more crimes that doubt as to which only be convicted of the lowest crime." Instruction person degree when or she "A the crime murder in the first he commits robbery attempts in the first or second to commit commits or flight or in immediate from such crime in furtherance of such crime course person participant of a other than one another causes death he or she or participants." Instruction degree, each of the crime of murder "To the defendant convict proved beyond following a reasonable doubt: of the crime must elements "(1) day July, Allan Castle was 8th Brander on or about the That killed: " robbery attempting committing to commit or That the defendant degree; the first or second "(3) participant death of Brander caused the the defendant or another That flight from immediate of and in furtherance of Allan course Castle such crimes: "feloniously premeditated that he did intent" cause death of and that so to the victim he did "conceal *9 in the identity any person of a crime" —"or committing of, of, in course furtherance or in immediate from the flight of Robbery contrary crime First to RCW Degree, 9A.32.030(l)(a), 10.95.020(7), RCW 9A.56- RCW .200(1) (a) (c)”. (Italics mine.) Thus, Ransom on put was that he notice was with violations of the three say identified each. He statutes and elements of cannot him the State inform it that did not that would to attempt beyond prove a reasonable doubt that he had caused a premeditated death another with intent to cause death and that he did so the commission a rob- facilitate bery.

However, if at we look technicalities and not the sense rule, a since premeditated intent is an essential to aggra- murder first degree, vated it cannot be said that premeditated is not proven prosecution intent could prove murder in the first under degree RCW 9A.32- .030(1)(c) (felonymurder).

The primarily asserted the murder in the first (under 9A.32.030(l)(c)) degree RCW was not a lesser included offense within crime of aggravated degree first felony murder claiming that murder the first is not a lesser included offense within the crime of aggravated first because murder the first degree that "in requires the murder be committed course and in furtherance such crime flight immediate therefrom" whereas first degree murder requires statute murder he committed "in the of, of, course furtherance or in immediate from" flight of the one enumerated crimes.

Thus, directly defendant did not raise the rationale majority, set forth but asserted that "(4) crimes; participant That Brander Castle was Allan not a "(5) That the acts which caused the death decedent in Pierce of the occurred County, Washington." 9A.32.030(l)(c) RCW a under lesser of included offense murder under 10.95.020(9) (a) RCW because of the difference in the word- ing describing partici- of the statutes when the manner of pation the crime. I majority ignores argument. the defendant's would it.

answer statute, objective primary When is to interpreting effect to the intent. give Legislature's ascertain and Keller, 98 Janovich Wn.2d Herron, P.2d It read into a provisions for this court statute improper omitted, yet we construe stat- which the Legislature consequences which utes as to avoid absurd or strained so Keller, interpretation. from literal at 728. would result commonly use "or" in a indicates Although the statute alternatively and applied two provisions an intent *10 pro- the indicates an intent that generally the of "and" use the two words conjunctively, visions be applied if with interpretation comports such interpreted otherwise Sands, 1A Citing the C. probable Legislature. the intent of (4th 1972) 21.14, ed. it was at 91 Statutory Construction § Keller, at State v. 729: supra noted in however, in of been, laxity so the use great has [t]here courts generally that have and terms the "or"] ["and" that interchangeable one the are that words said other, if to do so consis- for the may be substituted intent. legislative tent omitted.) (Footnote (1906) 602, 604, 87 P. 932 stated Tiffany, State v. Wash. and, to mean or construed is sometimes that "No doubt statutes, wills, and contracts." More versa, and vice mean in a statute interpreted to "or" recently, "and" was person could which a under forth the conditions setting mental institution. from a state release obtain a conditional interpreted "or" was In a similar case Keller, at 728-30. of the likely intent "and," again to effectuate mean 359, 647 P.2d 1039 Jones, App. 32 Wn. Legislature. grounds, rev'd other on defendant, majority, Here the as the not the controversy it, requirement saw over that death arises whether "in occur the course of and of such or furtherance crime flight immediate forth ele- separate therefrom" sets two crime, course in further- ments — so, ance of the crime. If this were the elements of first degree felony murder would not fit within the elements of murder, requires which that "in occur of, of, death the course or in furtherance flight" immediate from the crime. defining robbery

RCW 9A.56.200 first degree *11 In bar, case ments. at pizza murder deliveryman was committed both the course of and in furtherance of the crime. It was clear that the State intended to prove that the murder was committed both the course of and furtherance a robbery attempted robbery. cir- those conclusion that

I with the majority's disagree are somehow RCW 10.95.020 cumstances described that the same special category ánd transformed into a aggravating an the same acts could be describing words time an ele- at the same under RCW 10.95.020 while factor 9A.32.030(l)(c). is a This crime under RCW ment a form mechanistically imposes approach technical which over substance. me to write prompts and that problem that arises must is I be prosecutors that submit that

separately aggra- frame an information when as to how to instructed but, trial, is to at charged murder degree vated first proof premeditation a failure of on there occur as how to instruct be informed intent. Courts should also verdict forms. appropriate a situation with in such jury is degree if first murder aggravated It be that cannot a felony proven, is degree first murder charged but In circumstances where place every time. retrial must take felony a the commission of killing place a takes aggravated prosecutor appropriate charge deems it and a a con- murder, might support but the evidence degree first aggra- for felony first murder but not degree viction for defendant should be murder: vated first him, against jury, charge notified of the properly forms, consistent verdict instructions proper of the alterna- guilty find the defendant be able to should delay of second thereby the cost and avoiding tive trial.17’18 following along lines: somewhat 17 Iwould instruct charged first with the crime of "The count charges felony degree murder. These 2 with the crime of first

murder and in count allege committed an the defendant and in effect are made in the alternative either crime of act which constitutes unlawful you commit- If find that the defendant murder. or the crime of you charged, constituting then must deter- one of crimes so ted act or acts committed. so mine which of offenses particular agree guilty you to the must all as to find the defendant "In order offenses, guilty and, such you of one of find the defendant offense committed you of the other." find him not must *12 Charging the Alternative in part: 10.37.060 reads exists. RCW The mechanism or against any person, charges there are several When transaction, for two or act or or for the same persons, more acts or transactions or for two together, connected of crimes of the same class or more acts or transactions instead of offenses, may properly joined, which be or or informations the whole several joined indictments having may information, indictment, sep- in one or be counts; . . . arate 4.3(a) states

CrR may Two or more offenses Joinder of Offenses. sepa- each offense stated joined charge, one count, offenses, felonies or misde- rate when the whether meanors or both: character, Are of or similar even not the same scheme or

part single plan; of a or (2) Are based on the same conduct or on a series of parts of a together constituting single acts connected or scheme or plan. this,

I submit that under circumstances such as it would proper have been to have a defendant with two counts, one for first murder and the felony other for first murder under RCW 9A.32- .030(1)(c), I it appropriate charge submit same such manner when out of the offenses arise transac- tion but which do not fit the framework of RCW 9A.32- .030(1)(a) Orland, and RCW 10.95.020. L. 4A Wash. (3d 1983) offenses, Prac. ed. regarding joinder of § states: jury regarding multiple 18 I would also instruct the use of verdict forms as

follows: count, possible guilty "In this case there are two verdicts as to each or not guilty. possible These various verdicts are set forth in the forms of verdict which you Only possible may by you will receive. one of the verdicts be returned as to each count. may guilty guilty "You find the defendant or not you may guilty guilty find the not murder under count or 2. murder under count counts, you may find the defendant not under both but "You guilty under find the defendant both counts." separate offenses joining propriety The test of the act or arise out of the same they one information because is whether evidence together connected transaction or are State v. of the other. includes evidence of one offense 938; P.2d CrR 63 Wash.2d Courville 4.3(a)(2). in are set forth In the guidelines such a situation Russell, 349, 352-54, P.2d 332 wherein it was said: *13 attorney ultimately above, prosecuting

As related more than retrial to do information on amended the charge 9A.32.050(l)(a). murder under RCW degree intentional second add was amended to The information committing means felony murder as an "alternative" degree second murder. 4.3(c)(1) offenses" as follows. defines "related

CrR offenses, pur- for are related Two or more offenses rule, jurisdiction within the they are poses of this and are based on the same court and venue of same conduct. murder and second degree Clearly, intentional second thus intimately connected and felony are degree are related offenses within murder . . . definition. the above inten- above, charged was petitioner As indicated fel- degree and with second second degree as an alternative tional committing means of ony murder was instructed that jury murder. The degree second or degree of intentional second petitioner convict murder, felony jury second "alternative" alternative cho- particular as to the must be unanimous to the supplied form Unfortunately, the verdict sen. second distinguish did not between jurors jurors murder. The intentional second murder and ulti- on the guilty vote or were authorized to provision murder. No of second charge mate com- the alternatives each of considering made for posed charge. Smith, 744, 754-55, P.2d 571

State v. 74 Wn.2d 303, 396 P.2d Long, in State v. As we said Brunn, 145 Wash. (1964), from quoting never be of counts should joinder 260 Pac. 990 way unduly utilized such a as to preju- embarrass or crime, him charged deny dice one with a or a substantial right. from Drew v. quote The defendants following States, (D.C. 1964):

United 331 F.2d Cir. justification for a rule joinder liberal on trial. appears economy single offenses to be the of a The argument against joinder is that the defendant may prejudiced following for one or more of the (1) reasons: he become embarrassed separate or con- defenses; founded presenting may use the evidence of one of the crimes infer disposition part a criminal on the of the defend- ant guilt from which found his of the other crime or crimes charged; jury may cumulate the evi- dence of the various crimes charged guilt and find when, if separately, considered it would not so find. A less tangible, perhaps equally persuasive, but element prejudice may hostility reside a latent feeling engendered by charging of several crimes as dis- only Thus, tinct from in any given one. case the court must to the defendant weigh prejudice caused joinder against obviously important considerations economy expedition judicial administration. Winters, See also State v. State v. Kinsey, 773, 775-76, App. 7 Wn. *14 denied, (1973). review (1972),

P.2d 470 82 1002 Wn.2d Anderson, In 739, 740-41, 96 Wn.2d 638 P.2d denied, cert. 1205, 459 U.S. 842 setting forth two offenses two counts in approved one information was related, if the offenses stating: were the court 4.3(c)(1) provides CrR that offenses are related based upon the same jurisdiction conduct and are within the and venue of the same court. The death scalding bathtub Anderson, v. Anderson I described 94 Wn.2d [State 176, (1980)] charges 616 P.2d 612 was the basis for both charges brought against of first petitioner, murder. The two 9A.32.030(l)(b)

one and the upon based RCW 9A.32.030(l)(a), other RCW are related and upon based have been in the same information. joined could Courville, See also State v. P.2d 387 (1963). 938

608 Penalty

Death Jurors jurors I for Finally, excusing prospective concur that to the death they opposed penalty cause where are substantially prevent extent that their views "would jurors duties as accord performance" their impair proper. their with the instructions and oath ance court's 45, 581, L. Texas, 38, 65 Ed. 2d 100 S. Adams v. 448 U.S. (1980); 176, Hughes, v. Ct. 2521 State Mak, 692, 407, P.2d (1986); v. 718 902 105 denied, (1986); see Lockhart v. also cert. 479 U.S. 137, McCree, 162, L. 106 S. Ct. 1758 476 U.S. Ed. 2d 412, Witt, L. Ed. 2d (1986); v. U.S. Wainwright Illinois, U.S. Ct. 844 Witherspoon 105 S. L. Ed. 2d 88 S. Ct. 1770

Conclusion long murder cases are dura- Aggravated We owe the tion, always expensive. often and complicated State, defendant, public all those involved and and duplication as to of effort direction how avoid responsible approach unnecessary I this a retrials. believe be dicta. though pronouncements even evidence, here, support as conviction of might When out of one separate arising or the other of two offenses one and offense includes evidence of transaction evidence one should the alternative. another the defendant be by It be clear to the instruction should made may not form the defendant found verdict that counts, either one be convicted under under both not both. count or other but accusations I had full notice believe him, rationale and surprised, against was "lesser included offense” doctrine common sense of the conviction, I submit uphold While I would satisfied. situations, in such we technically if retrial is mandated *15 owe it prosecutors and defendants in avoiding assist if possible. such retrials JJ., concur with J. Durham, Callow,

Dolliver January 25, Reconsideration denied 1989. 27, 1988.] 53357-1. En Banc. October

[No. John R. Respondent, v. Chevron Chemical Stewart,

Company, Appellant. notes guilt that follows the act is in "the commission of a rob- bery or of immediate therefrom". In each flight of the stat- (in of, of, utes various acts course furtherance from) flight are alternative aspects an element and the proof any individual, isolated, one of these descriptive phrases of the statute prove is sufficient the occurrence an element the crime. Neither statute when given its plain creates meaning enlarged, or magnified, super or element of the crime. There description remains but requiring proximity, involvement with connection between the death and activity, the criminal and that death occurred because the defendant committed crime. I phrases submit these descriptive ele- defining the ments the two are equivalent offenses A alternative. reasonably murder committed to effectuate a felony fits within either requirement it be "in committed of" course the crime or that it be committed "in further- of" thereby ance the crime fulfilling require- both of these

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Irizarry
Court Name: Washington Supreme Court
Date Published: Oct 27, 1988
Citation: 763 P.2d 432
Docket Number: 53287-7
Court Abbreviation: Wash.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In