State v. I-90 TRUCK HAVEN SERVICES, INC.State v. I-90 TRUCK HAVEN SERVICES, INC.
Lead Opinion
[¶ 1.] An employee of 1-90 Truck Haven Services, Inc. (Truck Haven), pled guilty to selling alcohol to a minor. Several months later, the State requested that the magistrate court impose an administrative sanction or fine on Truck Haven. Truck Haven filed a motion to dismiss. Although the magistrate court refused to dismiss the case against Truck Haven, the circuit court later reversed the magistrate court’s order and found that an administrative fine could not be imposed on a licensee pursuant to
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2.] On March 30, 2000, an employee of Truck Haven, Donald Soulek (Soulek), sold alcohol to a person under the age of twenty-one.
WhetherSDCL 35-4-78 .2 allows for the imposition of administrative fines against Truck Haven.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 3.] This appeal involves the interpretation of a statute. In Martinmaas v. Engelmann,
Questions of law such as statutory interpretation are reviewed by the Court de novo.... The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used. Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed. Since statutes must be construed according to their intent, the intent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject. But, in construing statutes together it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. When the question is which of two enactments the legislature intended to apply to a particular situation, terms of a statute relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute.
(citing Moss v. Guttormson,
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 4.] Whether
[¶ 5.] The relevant statutes at issue in this appeal are
No licensee3 may sell any alcoholic beverage: (1) To any person under the age of twenty-one years[.] ...
A violation of this section is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
[¶ 6.] The express words of this statute clearly state that a licensee can be criminally charged with selling alcohol to a person under the age of twenty-one. However,
A licensee ... is not in violation of§ 35-4-78 , and no criminal penalty may be imposed on the licensee if:
(1) The person making the sale in violation of§ 35-4-78 is an employee or agent of the licensee;
(2) The employee or agent does not own a controlling interest in the licensee; and
(3) The licensee or person having a controlling interest in the licensee is not present at the time of the sale.
[¶ 7.] Although
If a sale is in violation of§ 35-4-78 and does not constitute a criminal offense against the licensee, the state’s attorney for the county in which the sale took place may as part of any proceeding against the person making the sale request that the court require the licensee to pay a fine in accordance with §§ 35-4-78.1 to 35-4-78.4, inclusive.
[¶ 8.]
Upon a request from the state’s attorney and notice to the licensee, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the licensee is liable under §§ 35-4-78.1 to 35-4-78.4, inclusive, and upon a finding that the licensee is liable, the court may order the licensee to pay a fine not to exceed:
(1) Five hundred dollars upon the first violation within two years;
(2) Seven hundred fifty dollars upon the second violation within .two years; and
(3) One thousand dollars for the third violation within two years.
We stated in Faircloth v. Raven Industries, Inc:
Ultimately, the purpose of statutory interpretation is to fulfill the legislative dictate. Intent is ordinarily ascertained by examining the express language of the statute. We therefore defer to the text where possible. We read statutes as a whole along with the enactments relating to the same subject. We assume that the Legislature intended that no part of its statutory scheme be rendered mere surplusage.
[¶ 9.] Truck Haven first raises the argument that because
[¶ 10.] This statutory interpretation is bolstered by the legislative history that exists.
[¶ 12.] In summary,
[¶ 13.] Truck Haven next argues that the dismissal of the case against it was supported by additional grounds. Specifically, Truck Haven contends that the action against Truck Haven was not part of the proceeding against its agent, Soulek, which
[¶ 14.] Next, Truck Haven argues as an additional ground that the action against Truck Haven violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Truck Haven asserts that the authority to regulate an alcoholic beverage licensee is exclusively an administrative function. The statutory language of the statutes at issue clearly requires a hearing before the judiciary, not an administrative agency. Specifically,
[¶ 15.] Finally, Truck Haven argues that its right to due process of law was violated because it did not have the opportunity to participate in Soulek’s criminal proceeding. We stated in Wuest v. Winner School Dist.,
[¶ 16.] This Court has held that the rule in this jurisdiction, as it is in others, is that as between the state and the licensee, “there exists no property right in the license, but merely a privilege to conduct that state regulated business.” Kurylas,
[¶ 17.] There are substantial constitutional and statutory differences between the conduct of a misdemeanor criminal proceeding versus an administrative proceeding, which may lead to the imposition of a civil fine. See, e.g., City of Pierre v. Blackwell,
[¶ 18.] For the above reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. It is undisputed that no person having a controlling interest in the corporate licensee, Truck Haven, was present at the time of Sou-lek’s illegal sale.
.
It is a Class 2 misdemeanor to sell or give for use as a beverage any alcoholic beverage to any person who is eighteen years of age or older but less than twenty-one years of age unless it is done in the immediate presence of a parent or guardian or spouse over twenty-one years of age or by prescription or direction of a duly licensed practitioner or nurse of the healing arts for medicinal purposes.
. The term "licensee” is not defined in the code. Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999), defines "licensee” as "[o]ne to whom a license is granted.” The resolution of this case does not hinge on the definition of a "licensee.”
.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
[¶ 22.] In this case, clearly the criminal action against Soulek had concluded. The criminal case Cri. # 0011625, the State of South Dakota v. Donald Lee Soulek, was filed on April 12, 2000. Soulek pleaded guilty and was sentenced on April 19, 2000. At that time the status of this criminal case was listed as terminated. Then more than eight months after Soulek pleaded guilty, the State filed an order to show cause in civil case Civ. # 00-3583, State of South Dakota v. I-90 Truck Haven Service, Inc., Licensee, seeking a civil fine against Truck Haven.
[¶ 23.]
[¶ 24.] We should follow the “paramount rule of statutory construction and simply declare “what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said.’ ” Goetz v. State,