173 Iowa 638 | Iowa | 1916
*638 “See. 282. Disorderly Houses — Keeping. 14. If any*639 person within the corporate limits of this city, knowinglypermits or allows in any house, apartment, hotel or building owned by him or under his control, any lewd and boisterous conduct between male and female persons who are there present as guests or patrons, or if any person knowingly permits or allows in any house, apartment, hotel or building owned by him or under his control, any person to resort thereto for an immoral purpose with another person to whom he or she is not married, he shall be deemed guilty of keeping a disorderly house.”
As counsel for appellant state the facts, there is no case against the defendant; but this is from her standpoint. The sufficiency of the evidence is challenged; but, if the jurors believed the State’s witnesses, as they had a right to do, they could have believed from the evidence that defendant was guilty of keeping a disorderly house.
In view of a new trial, perhaps it would be better that we should not discuss the evidence too much. And, because the case is reversed on the ground that the trial court admitted evidence of the reputation of the place, it will not be necessary to set out the evidence which we think sustains our holding that the case was one for the jury. As bearing upon the question as to whether evidence of the reputation of the place was admissible, we should briefly refer to the evidence to show that the evidence admitted tends to support the charge made in the information that defendant was keeping a disorderly house, under the first part of the ordinance. It is doubtless true that such evidence would be admissible if the' charge was keeping a house of ill fame. If it is thought that the latter part of the ordinance does define a house of ill fame, then the evidence does not show that persons permitted ■ to resort 'thereto were not married. There is evidence that at one time, 15 or 16 men went to the defendant’s house within a space of two hours, but none of them were admitted. At another time, two automobiles drove up and stopped near her
By assignments 2 and 3, it is claimed by appellant that the court erred in admitting testimony of different witnesses concerning the reputation of the house. One contention of. the appellant at this point is that the crime defined by the ordinance and charged in the information is a single, specific act, and that it was necessary, therefore, that some specific act of. immoral conduct be shown, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, and that the reputation of the house was not involved. But we think the gist of the offense charged is the keeping of a disorderly house. It has been held that one act of gambling will complete the offense, under a statutory provision prohibiting a person from keeping a house resorted to for the purpose of gambling, and that it is as complete if the house is kept for one day as if kept for a year. State v. Crogan, 8 Iowa 523; State v. Cooster, 10 Iowa 453. Proof of one sale of intoxicating liquor in a building is sufficient to constitute a nuisance, that is, in keeping or maintaining a place where liquor is sold or kept for sale contrary to law. State v. Reyelts, 74 Iowa 499. ■ ,
Under other provisions of the statute, which provide that, if a person be found at a hotel, boarding house or other place,
There are cases, however, holding that, to constitute a disorderly house, there must be a habitual violation of the law. 14 Cyc. 483.
Proof of the reputation of houses of ill fame has been made competent evidence by statute. Code Sec. 4944. This reads:
“The state, upon the trial of any person indicted for keeping a house of ill fame, may, for the purpose of establishing the character of the house kept by defendant, introduce evidence of the general reputation of such house as so kept.”
It is the contention of appellant, as we understand it, that this section limits the proof of the reputation of the house to those cases alone which are prosecuted by the state under indictment; while appellee contends that the state has granted to cities the power to prohibit disorderly houses, houses of ill fame, etc. Code Sec. 704. And they say that the authority granted the cities to prohibit such houses is concurrent with that of the. state and that, such power having been granted to the city by the state, it follows that the statutory rule of evidence accompanies the authority granted to the city; in other words, that when the state made such evidence competent in trials commenced by the state under indictment, it made the same evidence competent in trials prosecuted by the city; that if such were not true, then the
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the cause. remanded for further proceedings in harmony with this opinion. — Reversed and Remanded.