State v. HunterState v. Hunter
Repper-Pagan Law, Ltd., Christopher J. Pagan, 1501 First Avenue, Middletown, Ohio 45044, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Marquis Hunter, appeals his 15-year prison sentence imposed by the Butler County Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter with a firearm specification.
{¶ 2} Appellant was indicted in April 2017 on one count of murder with two firearm specifications (using a firearm and discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle) and a repeat
{¶ 3} On October 26, 2017, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. A presentence investigation report (“PSI“) ordered by the trial court indicated that appellant witnessed the murder of his father when he was eight years old, was subsequently in counseling from the ages of eight to ten, and was primarily reared by his maternal grandmother who was physically abusive to him. The PSI further indicated that appellant was diagnosed with PTSD while serving a prison term for a 2010 felonious assault conviction but that he did not attend counseling.
{¶ 4} At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel submitted the report of Dr. Bobbie Hopes, a clinical forensic psychologist, who had psychologically evaluated appellant at the request of defense counsel. Dr. Hopes’ report was appellant‘s primary mitigation evidence and was admitted into evidence as Exhibit A.
{¶ 5} Based upon the report, defense counsel argued that as a result of witnessing the murder of his father when he was only eight years old, appellant suffers from PTSD. Appellant‘s PTSD was exacerbated and he became hypervigilant after he was shot in a bar by a friend of the victim in February 2017, several weeks before the homicide. The victim was present when appellant was shot in the bar. Fearing for his safety and that of his family, appellant subsequently armed himself. On the night of the homicide, appellant was in the backseat of a car, about to smoke marijuana before going into a bar, when “out of nowhere” the victim and the person who had shot appellant approached appellant‘s car “in a menacing way.” Suffering from PTSD and greatly fearing for his life and that of his friends, appellant
{¶ 6} In her report, Dr. Hopes expressed the opinion that appellant had been afraid for his own safety and that of his family ever since he had been shot in February 2017, and that the shooting had greatly exacerbated his PTSD symptoms which began after the murder of his father. Dr. Hopes further opined that appellant was fearful, hypervigilant, and guarded at the time of the homicide, and that whether his fears were real or somewhat distorted by PTSD, appellant‘s fear “was genuine and he believed he had to protect himself from others whom he believed meant to harm him.”
{¶ 7} The state admitted that the victim approached appellant‘s car on the night of the homicide but stated “there might be some dispute” as to why the victim did so. The state indicated there was no evidence that the victim or his friends were armed that night. The state observed that the victim was not the individual who shot appellant in February 2017 but conceded that the victim was with that individual when appellant was shot in the bar.
{¶ 8} Upon considering this evidence and reviewing the PSI and Dr. Hopes’ report, the trial court sentenced appellant to a mandatory ten-year prison term for the involuntary manslaughter, with a mandatory and consecutive 5-year prison term for the accompanying firearm specification, for an aggregate 15-year prison term.
{¶ 9} Appellant now appeals, raising one assignment of error:
{¶ 10} BY CLEAR-AND-CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE SENTENCING RECORD FAILS TO SUPPORT THE AGGREGATE 15-YEAR SENTENCE.
{¶ 11} Appellant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him to 15 years in prison for his offenses because the trial court failed to consider the applicable “reduced-seriousness factors” and “reduced-recidivism factors” under
{¶ 12} We review the imposed sentence under the standard of review set forth in
{¶ 13} In sentencing an offender for a felony, the trial court “shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing,” which are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and to punish the offender.
{¶ 14} When sentencing a defendant, a trial court is required to consider the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in
{¶ 15} We find no error in the trial court‘s decision to sentence appellant to 15 years in prison for involuntary manslaughter with a specification of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressly stated in open court that it considered
The Court has considered purposes and principles of sentencing, weighed the recidivism and the seriousness factors. This defendant entered a plea and was convicted pursuant to that plea to an amended Count I, involuntary manslaughter, a felony in the first degree; also entered a plea of guilty to a five-year gun specification.
The Court has considered the information presented this afternoon, the pre-sentence investigation report, the report from Dr. Hokes (phonetic) entered into evidence as Exhibit A, the statement of the victim‘s mother this afternoon here on the
record, his previous prison sentence, including that for felonious assault in 2010. Prison is mandatory in this case. The Court will impose a mandatory sentence on Count I of 10 years [,] will not impose a fine. Furthermore, we will impose a five-year gun specification, that‘s a mandatory consecutive sentence[.]
{¶ 16} Furthermore, in its sentencing entry, the trial court specifically stated that it “considered the record, the charges, the defendant‘s Guilty Plea, and findings as set forth on the record and herein, oral statements, any victim impact statement and pre-sentence report, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under [
{¶ 17} Appellant disagrees with the trial court‘s balancing of the seriousness and recidivism factors in
{¶ 18} Appellant‘s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 19} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.