State v. Hunt

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DARRYL EUGENE HUNT CAROLINA

No. 507A85 (Filed 1989) May prior erroneously § 1. Criminal Law 89.4— inconsistent admitted statements — felony prosecution by admitting trial court erred in a for murder which, fourteen-year-old prior prostitute inconsistent statements of a retarded true, strongly if contradicted defendant’s as to his whereabouts the night of the crime. Once the court determined that witness was hostile or cross-examination; unwilling, properly permitted subject the State to her to however, by permitting testify the trial court erred an officer to as to the by of the proper substance prior statements denied the witness. The use of the corroborate the officer’s been the fact that the par- demonstrate witness made him statemеnts to on a date, prove purported ticular the facts those statements to relate. The jury likelihood that would confuse the of substance the statements with impeachment purposes by use compounded their for of the nature of limiting court’s trial instructions. lineup right 2. 66.5— preju- Criminal Law to counsel denied —no identification — dice prejudicial prosecution felony There was no error ain for murder in ad- mitting lineup of a lineup place results identification where the took lobby jail; of one the floors the witness an rode elevator to that floor window; lineup through and observed the the elevator door neither of defend- officer; ant’s counsel was allowed in the elevator with the witness an object defendant did not when the witness identified him before the picked lineup. object the man he of the out Failure to when identification right propriety is made before the is a waiver to have the of that appellate identification considered court. dissenting. Justice Mitchell Meyer joins dissenting opinion.

Justice from judgment him to life sentencing APPEAL for imprisonment degree, conviction murder the first said Cornelius, J., judgment May at the 28 imposed 1985 session Court, FORSYTH County. Heard in Superior Supreme Court 1989. March General,

Lacy H. F. Thornburg, Attorney Bryant, Steven General, Assistant state. Attorney Adam Stein for defendant. v. Hunt

MARTIN, Justice. in the first based degree of murder was convicted

Defendant tо life imprison- and sentenced felony the murder doctrine upon error, we assignments several defendant raises Although ment. one: to The state’s introduction necessary discuss find corroborative, and substantive hearsay for impeachment, evidence the effect of that improper, prejudicial and purposes to new trial. entitles the defendant a to the vic- by the state tended show that Evidence presented 6:45 a.m. on to death at approximately tim was and stabbed raped for the state in Winston-Salem. Three witnesses August in cir- seen inculpatory as the man had identified defendant before, on during, the shortly and after assault cumstances a white past victim. The first witness had drivеn a black man and closely near the field where the victim’s walking together woman witness identified less than body was later found. The lineups. A photographic in-person one month later from both and a.m. ac- walking by witness the same field at around 6:40 second tually report observed the assault and called it. The witness gotten look of the as- good testified that he had a at face sailant, whom he identified in court This witness as defendant. in and line- photographic in-person had also identified defendant The third a in down- ups. employed state’s witness hotel approximately town Winston-Salem. At 6:45 a.m. he had seen a directly lobby enter the hotel go black male men’s room. The witness testified thаt he seen this on at least had man the man the rest- three other occasions when had asked use long room. restroom, on occasion man remained Because so him employee security guard asked a to tell The restroom a leave. entered the about half-hour later employee bloody saw red-tinted water in the sink and towels. paper this witness not make connection did a between he until picture man had seen and defendant he saw latter’s murder, year he iden- paper positively almost a after who had tified defendant as man used the restroom. Mitchell Sammy testified that he and his friend Defendant household, of 9 spent night August arriving had the McKee 11:30, going until аround 11 p.m. coming around he room asleep living when fell chair. Defendant testified THE IN SUPREME COURT had left 7:30 the next that he wakened around downtown, 8:30, Samrtiy the bus taking stopping around breakfast, had to where Mitchell then the courthouse going Sammy essentially the appearance. make an Mitchell attested to whereabouts, times, defendant and involving same and activities resi- the 9th and 10th of of three August. himself similarly of the McKee dents household corroborated and not night account that house spending until sometime after 7 a.m. leaving Crawford, fourteen-year-old was called prostitute,

Marie testify. After her ac- preliminary questions eliciting the state with of her and her close de- knowledgment fendant, occupation friendship ever directly asked her she had whether prosecutor that his him a statement. She admitted given come to office and denied, first then stated she could she had come to office but recall, him the a statement. given police or detective having not the witness’s the state’s offer to refresh objected Defendant to statements, dire followed. memory as and voir to dire, reminded of two voir Marie Crawford was During the officers, signed transcrip- had made to and police she shown, her. Marie repeatedly of those statements were to tions these, memory that was her or of it knowledge admitting denied statements, denying any memory but subscribed on thе signature paper upon or of uttering signing the transcribed words read to the wit- they had been written. statements as which dire, believed, strongly if contradicted defendant’s on voir ness August: 9-10 his whereabouts night Sammy Darryl Mr. Mitchell were 10th Hunt and [0]n Sammy Mitchell left Darryl 6 and Hunt and at Motel wearing a.m. were both about 6:00 and that room at he Darryl me was pants going and black and told black shirts Darryl I saw was about 9:30 a.m. call next time a cab. The room he came back to the motel he was nervous when and Darryl grass mud or he he needed a drink. and said his pants stains knees[.] Darryl were at Motel and ago me two weeks [A]bout lady got the white that

Darryl some stuff about saying when we Sammy said did it Darryl that killed downtown televi- on the news and the watching Crimestoppers were Darryl sien and I said to I Iwish knew who that lady killed I could the money Darryl because use said Sammy did it he fucked her too. At the conclusion of Marie’s voir dire testimony, defendant argued that the state permitted should be its wit- impeach statements, ness inconsistent that reasoning probative value such would be tendency overwhelmed its prejudice defendant. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to statements, suppress the concluding may the witness been hostile or unwilling, permissible for the state to statements, cross-examine her respecting the alleged relevance and probative value her testimony would substantial- ly outweigh any danger of unfair prejudiсe confusion.

Before jury, again Marie Crawford denied that she had the prior made statements. Despite fact that her signature was inscribed beneath both statements and despite ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‍admission she remembered signing a piece paper, she persistently and, denied having made the statements themselves the extent of her their truth. knowledge,

Q. Now, 30th, 1984, on August you did have a conversa- tion with you Officer Daulton while being were detained being courthouse and tried for soliciting prostitution prostitution? and

A. I don’t remember.

Q. you do you And remember the statement made him on that day? sir, No,

A. I don’t. Q. you Do you that told him remember that on nights 9th, 10th, 1984, August August that you spent the night Darryl Sammy Mitchell and that they you were with at Motel 6 on Patterson Avenue? sir, No,

A. I did not. Q. you Are saying you that not did make that statement you don’t remember making statement? A. I did make that statement. v. Hunt 11th, 1984,

Q. you did make September And Daulton? statement Officer No,

A. sir. Q. State’s Exhibit No. to what is marked Referring you I’ll if is a look Exhibit 38 and ask you you made? statement making I not remember this statement.

A. do Q. on that statement? your signature Is that Yes, A. sir.

Q. you following make statement Of- And did ficer— court, but the trial objected, inquiring

At this defendant point later be overruled de- testifying, Daulton would whether Officer the testi- purpose corroborating “for objection fendant’s [the] jury accordingly. witness” and instructed the mony a later jury. then to the two statements were read through were reintroduced These statements to whom had been made. The officer detective police of the first that Marie had recounted substance testified on 30 that this to him an interview statement on 11 Septem- statement were both transcribed the second to her and transcriptions He testified that he had read the ber. she them. When the signed allowed her read them before evidence, into the statements themselves state offered that, the court as he had understood objected again, reminding was not ruling, the admission of the statements the court’s only for of chal- purpose evidence but be as substantive credibility. objection The court overruled defendant’s lenging into without the introduction of both statements allowed instruction. limiting the trial court instructed chаrge jury, In its final that Marie had made it had heard evidence Crawford trial, testimony with her but that conflicted prior statements statements as evi- must not consider earlier however, time; of what was said at that earlier dence of the truth by determining ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‍be considered such evidence could Nevertheless, credibility of the witness. the tes- recapitulating Daulton, timony of Officer the court reiterated the substance of both statements.

A. ^[1] Analyzing whether these statements were properly used at defendant’s trial is in this case complicated they the fact that credibility to have been admitted for both appear and substantive under the authorization of more purposes than one of thе North Rules of Evidence. In order Carolina to determine whether these statements were properly any admitted for one purpose, is nec essary to examine not the defendant’s stated for grounds ob jection and the trial court’s reason for admitting the statements occasion, on each but also the purposes for which were ac tually used. Crawford,

After voir dire of Marie the trial court ruled the statements admissible purpose for the of impeaching the credibil witness, ity of that a practice that North Carolina’s Evidence expressly permits: credibility Code “The may of a witness be at by any tacked party, including the party him.” calling N.C.G.S. (1988). 8C-1, Rule 607 It logical corollary is a to this rule that the cross-examination of a own party’s witness be governed the same rules govern the cross-examination of witnesses called the opposing party. These include the rule that extrinsic evidence of prior may inconsistent statements not be used im a witness where peach concern questions matters collateral to Greene, 183, the issues. State v. E.g., 296 N.C. 250 S.E. (1978). Such collateral matters have been held to include testi mony contradicting a witness’s denial that he made a prior state ment when that purports to reiterate the substance of See, Williams, the statement. v. e.g., State 322 N.C. 368 S.E. (1988); Cutshall, 2d (1971); 180 S.E. 2d 745 Moore, 166 S.E. 2d 652 The same principles govern admissibility of Marie Craw- ford’s purpоses of impeachment in this case. the trial Once court determined that Marie was a hostile or un- witness, it willing properly permitted the subject state to her to However, cross-examination. the trial court erred permitting testify Officer Daulton to as to the substance of the prior state- ments denied Marie. Officer Daulton could properly have been 349

State v. Hunt Marie, fact, she made denied had called contradict But, date. as this specified statement to him on the Court Williams, “it was concern- improper impeach made clear in [her by offering what or not told she had Officer ing Daulton] 456, 368 S.E. at 322 2d testimony of Daulton].” [Officer 626.

B. impeachment court Rule 403 to balance the trial applied tendency to de against prejudice of statements their value unsworn unfairly jury. Although prior confuse the fendant truth, hearsay when not offered for their are not statements difficulty impeachment which between jury distinguishes with and the of confusion results danger substantive evidence Webster, v. 734 widely E.g., United States recognized. has been (7th 1984); v. 531 F. 183 Morlang, United F. 2d 1191 Cir. States 1975). Mueller, (4th Evi 3 D. Louisell & C. Federal See also Cir. reason, of “overwhelming weight dence 299 For use of identical Fed. R. authority” regard [federal] “that inconsistent long impeachment prior Evid. 607 has been where, employed as a mere sub may permitted not be statement jury not otherwise admissible.” get before the evidence terfuge 183, also 531 F. 2d 190. Sеe United Morlang, v. United States F. 2d withdrawn in on other part v. 763 Hogan, States (5th 1985) (a may not party F. 2d 82 introduce Cir. grounds, guise impeachment of “under inconsistent before the substantive placing the primary purpose 763 F. is admissible.” 2d at which not otherwise evidence (5th 1981), Miller, F. 2d Cir. United States (quoting (1982)). denied, Judge 74 L.Ed. 2d 106 As 459 U.S. cert. Webster, jury’s like it is taking advantage Posner noted evi impeachment limited regarding purpose ly confusion scrutinize the courts to has moved federal appellate dence party’s of a own hearsay impeachment for the evidence use witness. case, in a for the 607], an criminal would be abuse [Rule

[I]t it give it knew would not a witness that call prosecution evidence, hearsay introduce sо could just useful miss hope the defendant against THE IN SUPREME COURT the subtle distinction between impeachment and substantive or, it, if it didn’t miss it. ignore evidence — Webster, 1191, 1192, v. United States 734 F. 2d in quoted United (10th Peterman, 1988), 1474, v. 841 F. States 2d 1479 Cir. cert. --- denied, (1989). ---, U.S. 102 L.Ed. 2d 774 It in is the rare case which federal court has found that the hearsay introduction of by state its impeach (or own by witness primarily solely) motivated desire put substance of that jury. statement before the Circum ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‍indicating good stances faith and the absence of subterfuge these exceptional cases included the facts that the witness’s case, testimony was extensive and vital to the government’s (2d DeLillo, Cir.), denied, United States v. 620 F. 2d 939 cert. 449 835, (1980); U.S. 66 L.Ed. 41 2d calling the party witness reversal, genuinely was ster, surprised 1191; United v. Wеb States 734 F. 2d or that the trial court followed introduc tion of instruction, the statement with an limiting effective DeLillo, 939; Soldier, F. 620 2d United States Long v. 562 F. 2d (8th 1977). 601 Cir. this is not bound Court federal courts’ inter 607, it, pretation Rule we guided are wise to be and the unanimous recognition by the federal circuit courts of the unfair and potential ness prejudice of permitting hearsay evidence to be substantively considered under the guise of impeachment evi Peterman, dence is impressive. v. See United States 841 F. 2d 1474; (1st United States 1986), v. 807 F. 2d 257 Frappier, Cir. cert. denied, 1006, (1987); 481 U.S. 95 L.Ed. 2d 203 United States v. Johnson, (D.C. 1986); F. 802 2d Gables, 1459 Balogh’s Cir. Coral (11th Getz, 1986) (en Inc. v. 798 banc); F. 2d 1356 Cir. United (3d Sebetich, 1985), v. States F. denied, 776 2d 412 Cir. reh’g 828 --- ---, 98 (1987), denied, F. 2d 1020 cert. U.S. L.Ed. 673 2d (1988); 697; United States v. Hogan, 763 F. 2d United v. States Webster, 1191; F. Crouch, 734 2d United States v. 731 F. 621 2d (9th 1984), denied, 1105, Cir. (1985); cert. 469 U.S. 83 2d L.Ed. 773 (8th 1981); United States v. 668 F. Fay, 2d 375 Cir. United Statеs DeLillo, 939; v. 620 F. 183; United States v. 531 Morlang, F. 2d (6th 1974), United v. Dye, denied, States 508 F. 2d 1226 Cir. cert. (1975). 420 U.S. 43 L.Ed. 2d 653 It persuasive is also that the North Bell, Carolina Court Appeals State v. App. N.C. (1987), masking has the tactic disapproved 362 S.E. 2d 288 sub- in order to its hearsay get as impeachment impermissible App. Hyleman, See also State jury. stance before the 424, (1988), grounds, rev’d on other 366 S.E. 2d S.E. 2d 830 case, accompanying circumstances Under the facts of no assur- provide unsworn statement Marie’s introduction of case testimony was critical to the state’s Marie’s ance either that and followed good faith altogether was introduced or that it brief about Except instructions. limiting effective witnesses another of the state’s bicycle, which color of testimony consist- Marie’s riding, seen defendant he had thought credibility and bias. to her challenges entirely responding ed witness testimony government’s of the extensive Unlike the testimony of his relatively insignificant portion and the DeLillo of value to the anything was little if there impeached, was Moreover, to know testimony. appeared the state in Marie’s state cooperate she would not the stand that Marie was called to before de- knew that prosecutor her statements. by reiterating in Atlan- jail while she was visited Marie counsel had fendant’s resulted in visit had prosecutor suggested in 1985. The ta testify, al- to officers nor need neither talk Marie she convincing urged had beеn not to dire that she Marie denied on voir though The pros- not to do so. her own decision said it had been talk and had not told officers whether Marie subsequent question ecutor’s going she was not North Carolina that back accompanying notice be- state was on fact that testify made evident un- would not reiterate their witness began that fore the trial to hear. jury wished the it sworn statements C. jury would confuse likelihood case the In this im- purposes use for with their of the statements substance court’s the trial by nature of compounded peachment initially indicated court the trial instructions. limiting unsworn statements Marie’s prior was to consider credibili- the officer’s determining of later purpose for the limited warning either similar subsequent include failed to ty, the court when by Marie or denied read to and were when the the officer. direct examination during they were reiterated IN THE SUPREME COURT v. Hunt State Instructions the statements the final regarding during charge were no ambiguous. less Moreover, by actually the time the statements were intro- exhibits,

duced as were before the as substantive evi- dence, all apparent earlier efforts to restrict their use to of Marie or corroboration of impeachment testimony the officer’s “If were mooted their substantive use. . . . ... is evidence, not substantive it is not rendered competent compe- tent because tends to corroborate some other witness.” (1926). Lassiter, 210, 216, 131 S.E. Defendant objection realized this and objected; erroneously over- statute, ruled. rules exempted Unless of evidence or 8C-1, hearsay is not admissible. N.C.G.S. Rule 802 Marie’s unsworn statements are not this rule exempt from vir- 801, 803, any tue exception listed in Rules or any under Furthermore, evidentiary other exception. to offer statements declarant has disavowed corroboration the testi- mony of one witness does strengthen credibility. the witness’s “In contradictory no the law of evidence can aspect evidence be used as corroborating, strengthening, or confirming evidence.” Lassiter, S.E. 191 N.C. at at 579.

D. The state’s contention that the challenged testimony was competent as corroboration of Officer Daulton is without merit. The use of proper Marie’s prior statements to corroborate the testimony of Officer would only Daulton have been to demon strate the fact that Marie had made him statements to on a par date, ticular not to the facts prove those statements purported to relate. Of those Officer had personal Daulton no knowledge. See (1988). 8C-1, Rule 602 N.C.G.S. The written statements signed § were Marie not prior consistent corroborating statements officer, the but were hearsay Marie. See State v. McAdoo, 364, denied, 35 N.C. 241 S.E. App. 2d cert. (1978). 93, 244 S.E. 2d 262 “The rationale justifying admission of prior consistent justify statements does not admission of extraju dicial declarations of someone other than the purportedly witness being corroborated.” 1 on Brandis North Carolina Evidence (3d 1988). at 243 ed. THE IN SUPREME COURT 353 E. statements, Finally, challenged the written they had been admissible, otherwise also fail the test of N.C.R. 403: Evid. relevant, “Although may evidence be if excluded its probative value is substantially the outweighed preju- of unfair danger dice, issues, confusion of the or misleading the ...” The Commentary to 607 speaks directly Rule the of im- danger evidence peachment the use of this as rule a check the on use of improper such evidence: “The impeaching proof be must within meaning relevant the of Rule 401 403 and Rule must in fact be There can impeaching.” be no question prejudice testimony from the resulted had returned Marie’s motel room three hours after the murder with occurred “mud on the grass” or stains knees of his pants, that he was “very nervous and and wanted to upset” “get drunk” and did so. of testimony The effect this far prejudicial outweighed the need to show Marie to less than be credible re- (especially where the testimony her mainder of little included of value to the state’s case) or need credibility. to bolster Officer Daulton’s if testimony Even Marie’s of subject state- ments had not been collateral of purposes their introduc- tion not been subterfuge, suspect application of the test of safеguard properly Rule them. excluded court’s trial discretion exclude or admit evidence under broad, Rule 403 is has Court observed that the trial ruling court’s be should reversed abuse discretion arbitrary when it can be shown to have been “so that it could not have been the result of reasoned decision.” State Thompson, 618, 626, However, S.E. in- culpatory substance of statement and the doubt surrounding inculpatory other compels conclusion that the trial Moreover, correctly. court apply failed Rule the prejudicial statements, effect of the which were admissible for either cor- purposes, magnitude roborative substantive indicates the error. there were three witnеsses who identified de- fendant as one had seen the victim the murder, the record reflects doubt about each, including opportunity the limited for observation of the by, who certain discrepancies description witness drove assault, the who the belated witness the identifica- reported addition, record re- In the third witness. by the of defendant tion problems telling to had having Marie admitted flects officers police had been told in she past truth the the youth, her the of the crime. Her at scene could placed that she be was held at the being the that she of fact prevaricating, habit law, of are all being ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‍implicated and her fear the violating time for the unsworn statements thе supporting possibility facts been than reliable. less might themselves reasons, “there is a rea- we conclude that For the foregoing that, in not been com- question had the error possibility sonable mitted, the been trial.” result would have reached a different 15A-1443(a) is to a new trial. Defendant entitled N.C.G.S. § the ^[2] lineup identification We turn now to defendant’s the hotel contention that employee were the erroneously results of surrounding to the the because circumstances introduced right sixth to violated defendant’s amendment that identification to necessary of the effective assistance counsel. issue of guidance of we discuss this for the appeal, disposition in in this casе. proceedings and the court further counsel two voir record shows that defendant’s counsel The dire occur, notified as to when it would lineup were was to in present jail. lineup place were at the The take both lobby in jail. of one of the floors witness was ride an lineup through elevator that floor and observe elevator to accompany window. of defendant’s counsel asked door One elevator, in the he witness and officer but was told officer lobby he could in the charge lineup although in remain men lineup, with the neither of defendant’s participating in the elevator. permitted counsel be One lineup lobby observed the from the but counsel consequently the elevator The witness occupants. unable observe testified nor that the officer in the elevator had neither spoken other- any lineup wise indicated one and that the person witness the five men and had written simply observed down num- ber to defendant’s the line. This corresponding position corroborated in the the officer who accompanied him. right present

Defendant’s have counsel post-indict- at a lineup ment which accused is identifying exhibited an 355

State v. witness to a is crime assured the sixth amendment. Gilbert v. 263, (1967); California, 388 18 U.S. L.Ed. 2d 1178 United States v. Wade, 218, (1967); 388 18 U.S. L.Ed. 2d 1149 State v. 298 Cherry, 86, (1979), denied, 941, 257 2d 551 N.C. S.E. cert. 446 U.S. 64 L.Ed. (1980). 2d 796 A defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel in such circumstances order to prevent remedy “dangers and seriously, variable which might crucially, factors even derogate Wade, 228, from a fair 388 at trial.” U.S. 18 L.Ed. at 1158. In Wade the Supreme recognized Court that such factors could exist on either the defendant’s or the witness’s side of lineup, citing not . suggestive “physical conditions . . surrounding the con itself, n.13, duct of the line-up” U.S. at 230 18 L.Ed. 2d at 1159 n.13, but the use of devices obscuring “what is on the said wit side,” id., ness’s or the more blatant fingering suspect of the 233, the witness. Id. L.Ed. 2d at 1161. arguendo Assuming that defendant’s right constitutional violated, assistance of at the counsel lineup defendant waived that error failing object when the witness later identified him before the man he had picked out of the lineup. 15A-1446(b) (1988). Hammond, 662, N.C.G.S. In State (1983), 300 S.E. 2d 361 similarly defendаnt objected prior identification, an in-court and a dire was voir held. After the voir dire, however, the defendant to object failed identifica- once the actually tion was made in the of the This presence jury. Court held object that defendant’s failure to to the witness’s identifica- during tion trial waived right propriety to have the the in-court identification considered on appeal.

The same here principle applies to the introduction of the subsequent witness’s defendant was man he previously lobby selected as the man he had seen in the hotel the murder. object Failure to when identification is is made before the a waiver of the have the right pro- identification priety considered court. appellate evidence, “An appellant assertion in Court objection, introduction of which he no interposed was obtained States, rights violation of his under the Constitution the United state, or under of this does prevent Constitution Foddrell, 546, 557, rule.” operation of this 291 618, S.E. 2d THE SUPREME COURT IN v. Hunt a mo- filed with this Court February 19On Court, en- on 15 October This relief. for appropriate tion motion would be determined directing that an order tered 14 November defend- argued. On was appeal the direct after for appropriate motion supplemental with this Court filed ant new trial is entitled that defendant determined Having relief. relief for appropriate motions appеal, his direct upon moot, hereby dismissed. the same are now are New trial. dissenting.

Justice Mitchell im- the State to allowing erred in the trial court agree I that Marie evidence of its witness Crawford peach whereabouts concerning the unsworn statements prior in Like the ma- of the murder this case. on the in- accompanying the “circumstances I believe that jority, no statement provided unsworn prior troduction of Marie’s testimony was critical to the state’s . . . Marie’s that assurance impeach been allowed to The State should case . . . .” prior of those unsworn statements. by evidence Crawford that the defendant has carried conclusion majority’s how- prejudicial, thаt the error was showing on appeal burden Instead, ever, in it is clear by the record this case. is unsupported in the State to allowing impeach court’s error to me that trial did not affect the evidence of her its witness Therefore, I from the of the ma- holding at trial. dissent outcome the defendant a new trial. jority awarding against the State’s case on reveals that appeal The record A some of overwhelming. just brief review the defendant was erroneously readily reveals that the the State’s evidence harmless. The State’s evi impeach admitted Crawford Sykes twenty-six-year- was a to show that Deborah dence tended for the Winston-Salem Journal-Sentinel. She was оld editor copy 6:45 on 10 approximately to death at a.m. Au and stabbed raped from the off West End Boulevard a few blocks a field gust major as a result of sixteen newspaper. She died offices wounds, her heart. Abrasions pierced at least one of which stab vagina of the victim’s anus and tearing the areas vagina both her anus and presence of'sperm indicated sexually raped. victim had been assaulted and that he Murphy forty-five Thomas testified years old and was employed Dye Finishing at Hanes in Winston- Company Salem. On 10 he left home at 6:15 approximately work. at a light a.m. drive to While traffic at West End Boule- vard, defendant, he observed the and the Darryl victim Eugene Hunt, on standing they the sidewalk. He thought were drunk be- cause appeared leaning be other. each He saw the de- fendant’s arm right around neck of the victim observed the defendant was holding the victim’s hand with his right hand. Murphy positively identified the two people he saw on that victim, defendant, occasion as Sykes, Deborah and the Darryl Eugene Hunt. Murphy said that there was no doubt the de- fendant was the man he had observed.

Johnny Gray testified that he was walking to a friend’s house 6:40 a.m. on 10 approximately at 1984. August taking While a Towers, Crystal near shortcut the he heard a woman scream. He over fence the looked a and saw on defendant of a woman top her. He beating observed the assault approximately fifteen seconds, which during time the defendant was on the wom- sitting an’s stomach as he hit in the her face and Gray chest. could not tell whether a the defendant had knife in his Although hand. the herself, woman to free struggled she could not do so. The de- fendant had her arms pinned ground the with his and she legs, time, could kick her At that legs. the woman did any clothing on below her waist. As Gray walked from away the scene, he turned back saw the defendant running across ran, Cherry As Street. the defendant he tucked his shirt inside pants. Gray observed that the to the zipper pants Gray was down. testified there was no doubt that the defendant was the man he saw.

Gray decided that the best thing he could do was call the po- lice, because he believed the woman hurt. He to a was went tele- a on lounge booth outside Thurman Street he phone where called police the told them what he had seen. He used a false name occasion, involved, because he did not on want to become but correctly identified himself ‍​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌​‍later He the loca- police. gave of the on woman Crystal tion attack as a field near station. The police dispatcher the downtown fire Towers behind erroneously dispatched testified that she who received call fire station where of another downtown car to area police was discovered. nothing 1984 he on on August Weavеr testified that

Roger House, Hyatt a hotel in down- duty an auditor employed a.m., 6:45 ob- approximately At Weaver town Winston-Salem. directly and go enter the hotel into the served the defendant least He had defendant in the hotel restroom. observed when the asked permission three occasions defendant had prior permission asked use the restroom. the defendant had occasions, request per- restroom on all he did not use the 1984. on the When the defendant morning August mission after what seemed a normal period did not leave restroom time, security guard Weaver had a enter the restroom ask the left, Shortly en- to leave. after defendant Weaver defendant reddish-pink tered the restroom and noticed a substance bloody sink. found towels in the paper dispenser He trash was positive restroom. Weaver testified that he the defendant he enter the man had seen the restroom on the 1984. In of the identification -light positive unequivocal eyewitnesses, disinterested all three strains any credulity jury gave to assert significant weight pretrial concerning unsworn Marie Craw- ford, fourteen-year-old a retarded who had been a prostitute since spent she who had good part was eleven and life institu- juvenile tionalized in mental health and detention facilities. Spe- that, is realistic cifically, possibility there no the rejecting evidence, jury any аlibi the gave significant weight “impeachment” the State’s evidence that this retarded child pros- 9-10 titute had said she the 1984 spent night with the that left in the early defendant at Motel 6 and he hours pants returned dirt appearing nervous. where, here, must be in mind the It borne that error as- arises than under the serted other Constitution of the United States, the the has burden of that showing the error defendant must do “a prejudicial establishing so reasonable that, committed, the error in possibility question had not been a different result would have been reached at the . . . trial 15A-1443(a) (1988). See also State v. N.C.G.S. Spruill, (1987); DeLeonardo, 360 S.E. 2d S.E. majority holds that the defendant has car- that, burden. holding ried this It bases this its upon conclusion evidencе of jury had the statements a witness the knew was a retarded child introduced, who prostitute lying admitted in the been past not

there is a reasonable possibility jury the would have majority reached different result. The is able to reach this con- only by baldly asserting clusion that “the record reflects doubt testimony” about of each of the eyewitnesses disinterested they who testified that saw the defendant and the victim together and, at about the time of the murder eyewit- case one ness, while the murder was being committed. view, my In a fair reading the record reflects no such testimony concerning eyewitnesses. “doubt” of the All of the eyewitnesses testified positively unequivocally during both direct cross-examination the defendant was the man Further, saw at the times in question. record does not show eyewitnesses any reason to be It untruthful. seems any obvious reasonable would have— person —as rejection its of the based defendant’s alibi evidence upon eyewitnesses of the disinterested who observed the de- the victim together during fendant and or near the killing upon time of its commission and not the State’s “impeachment” concerning statements of the retarded child prosti- tute. The record does not support conclusion that trial, would have reached a different result at had the evidence of Instead, statements not been admitted. it is clear to me any us contrary on the record before such conclusion is Therefore, reason and common sense. I dissent holding from the majority trial. awarding new joins dissenting in this opinion. Justice MEYER

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Hunt

Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina

Date Published: May 4, 1989

Citation: 378 S.E.2d 754

Docket Number: 507A85

Court Abbreviation: N.C.