1 Conn. Cir. Ct. 1 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1961
In his appeal from a conviction of evading responsibility, the defendant claims that the court erred as a matter of law in concluding that he violated the applicable statute, § 14-224 of the General Statutes.
There is no dispute about the facts, which are as follows: On January 1, 1961, an automobile operated by Theresa O. Garrity and carrying as pas
The statute with the violation of which the defendant is charged is § 14-224 of the General Statutes, the pertinent provisions of which are: “Each person operating a motor vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident which causes injury, whether or not resulting in death, to any other person or injury or damage to property shall at once stop and render such assistance as may be needed and shall give his name, address and oper
Under the clear language of this statute, the following requirements are necessary to sustain a conviction: The defendant must have been knowingly involved in an accident, and the accident must have involved injury to some other person or damage to property. If these requirements are met, the person who caused the accident must stop, render assistance and give the specified information to the person injured or to the owner of the property damaged. These requirements have formed the basic part of the evading responsibility statute from the time of its first enactment in 1917. Public Acts 1917, No. 333, $ 20. Injury to the operator of the vehicle causing the accident or damage to his vehicle is immaterial, because the statute requires the information to be given by the operator to the owner of the damaged vehicle. In construing a stat
There is no question that the defendant was knowingly involved in an accident. The only question therefore is whether the accident caused injury to the occupants of the Garrity car or to the passenger in the defendant’s car or damage to the Gar-rity car. As to personal injuries, there is no evidence that Garrity was injured, nor the passenger in the defendant’s car; Mrs. Garrity testified that she was not injured and that she stayed with the children because they were frightened. There is nothing in the testimony of any witness from which personal injury could be reasonably inferred. As to damage to the Garrity car, the only evidence was that the side of the defendant’s car struck the rear bumper and taillight of the Garrity car a glancing blow and must have hit the rear end because there was paint on the rear end; there was no evidence that the taillight, bumper or rear end were damaged nor that the paint was from the defendant’s ear, nor anything in the testimony from which any damage to the Garrity car could be reasonably inferred. The state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment