State v. HumanikState v. Humanik
This appeal presents novel questions pertaining to the constitutionality of
The facts necessary for resolution of the difficult issues presented need not be recounted at length. Following a protracted jury trial, defendant was convicted of murder.
The circumstances directly surrounding the shooting cannot be considered in a vacuum. Rather, the tragic incident was the culmination of a series of attempts by the victim, Lisa Guzzo, to sever her long-standing relationship with defendant. The two first met in the summer of 1978 when defendant was 17 and the decedent was 12. Despite the disparity in their ages, defendant was immediately attracted by Ms. Guzzo. They began dating shortly after her thirteenth birthday. In addition, defendant developed a strong attachment to the Guzzo family. Over the years, defendant often stayed at the Guzzo‘s home and generally addressed the victim‘s mother as “mom.” This strong relationship was apparently attributable to defendant‘s “emotionally deprived upbringing.” Defendant came from a broken home and resided with his aunt and her two brothers. In any event, defendant‘s feelings were reciprocated and he continued dating the decedent until the summer of 1981.
On August 5, 1981, Ms. Guzzo told defendant that she had met another man and wished to terminate their relationship. Defendant was obviously devastated. On the following day, he went to the Hillside municipal building and applied for a permit to purchase a gun. After filing his application, defendant made several attempts to determine the identity of the decedent‘s new boyfriend. When his efforts proved unavailing, defendant proceeded to his uncle‘s house. While there, defendant‘s uncle showed him his handgun and demonstrated how to load and unload it. The next day, defendant returned to his uncle‘s house and “test fired” the weapon. At trial, defendant testified that he harbored thoughts of shooting the decedent at this time.
On the following weekend, defendant stayed at his aunt‘s summer bungalow in Toms River. After unsuccessfully attempting to meet the decedent at her place of employment in
At approximately 7 p.m. that evening, defendant drove to the decedent‘s home again seeking to determine the identity of her new boyfriend. Defendant carried with him his uncle‘s fully loaded handgun, a knife and a pair of binoculars he had purchased earlier in the day. When he arrived, defendant noticed a late model M.G. parked in the driveway which he assumed belonged to the decedent‘s boyfriend. Defendant then parked his automobile approximately a block away from the Guzzo‘s home and proceeded on foot through the woods. Unable to observe the decedent, defendant returned to his automobile and parked it on another street. Defendant then went back into the woods and waited for the decedent and her boyfriend to leave. After approximately 40 minutes had elapsed, defendant decided to free Ms. Guzzo‘s puppy from the dog pen hoping that this would attract her attention. When the decedent and her sister came out of the house, defendant, armed with the handgun and the knife, surrepticiously entered the den through the sliding glass door. When Ms. Guzzo returned with her boyfriend, Stanley Emanuels, and her sister, defendant pointed the gun and knife in their direction and ordered them to be seated. During the ensuing hours, defendant sought to persuade Ms. Guzzo to return to him. When she threatened to call for assistance, defendant pulled the telephone off the wall. At approximately 11:30 p.m., defendant heard the sound of an automobile in the driveway. Peering from the window, defendant
Defendant testified that the shooting was accidental. According to defendant, he did not purposely pull the trigger. Defendant first realized what had occurred when he saw the decedent fall after the shot was fired and noticed blood on his hand. Conflicting expert testimony was presented with respect to defendant‘s mental and emotional condition at the time of the incident. Several psychologists testified that defendant suffered from a “borderline personality disorder” and that he did not purposely or knowingly kill the decedent. On rebuttal, the State presented two psychiatrists. They testified that defendant had a marginal “personality disorder,” but that his cognitive abilities were in no sense affected. According to their testimony, defendant was fully capable of performing the mental operations required for a conviction under
The trial judge charged the jury with respect to the offenses of murder, aggravated manslaughter and manslaughter. In his instructions, the judge noted that the “burden of proving the defendant‘s guilt rest[ed] heavily on the State” and that it “never shifted.” The court went on to state that defendant “had no duty or obligation” to prove his innocence. According to the trial judge, the State “had the burden of proving each of the elements of the crimes” charged. In defining the elements of murder, the court emphasized the obligation of the State to prove “purpose or knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.”
I
We will first address questions pertaining to the constitutionality of
The State‘s obligation to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt had its genesis in the common law of England and is constitutionally compelled. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 685, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1883, 44 L.Ed. 2d 508, 511 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 373-374 (1970); State v. Gardner, 51 N.J. 444, 459 (1968). It has been said that the requirement is “bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.” In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 372, 90 S.Ct. at 1077, 25 L.Ed.2d at 380. (Harlan, J., concurring). No one currently disputes the settled principle that
While it is clear that “our society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial burden in order to protect the innocent,” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2326, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 291 (1977), it is equally plain that the risk it must suffer is not without limits. The United States Supreme Court has “decline[d] to adopt as a constitutional imperative [the principle] ... that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused.” Id., 432 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. at 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d at 292. Proof of the nonexistence of an affirmative defense has never been constitutionally compelled. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), for example, the United States Supreme Court held that a state statute which placed upon the defendant the burden of proving insanity was not violative of due process. The question of insanity was said not to pertain to an element of the offense. See also State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47 (1975); State v. Cordasco, 2 N.J. 189 (1949); State v. Molnar, 133 N.J.L. 327 (E & A 1945); State v. Scelfo, 58 N.J. Super. 472 (App.Div. 1959), certif. den. 31 N.J. 555 (1960). In a somewhat similar vein, the Supreme Court more recently upheld the validity of a New York statute which required the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. Patterson v. New York, supra, 432 U.S. at 206, 97 S.Ct. at 2325, 53 L.Ed.2d at 289. Since the statute did not alter the prosecution‘s obligation to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime, it did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof. See State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 443 (1977); State v. Rockholt, 186 N.J. Super. 539 (App.Div. 1982), aff‘d 96 N.J. 570 (1984). In contrast, the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, declared unconstitutional a Maine statute which placed upon the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing was committed in the heat of passion or sudden provocation in order to reduce the offense of murder to manslaughter. Although the statute was phrased in terms of an affirmative defense, as applied, it actually served to compel the defendant to disprove an element of the crime of murder. 421 U.S. at 686-687, 95 S.Ct. at 1883-84, 44 L.Ed.2d at 512. The common thread running through all of these decisions is that a state may constitutionally require the defense to bear the burden of persuasion with respect to a fact or group of facts either as an affirmative defense or as mitigation as long as the prosecution remains obliged to prove every element of the offense.
It is against this backdrop that we consider the constitutionality of
The difficulty seems to be that the topic is sometimes explored under the label of ‘partial responsibility’ or ‘diminished responsibility’ or perhaps confused with some other concept intended to be so described. Both of those characterizations are misleading since they tend to connote an ‘affirmative defense’ designed to defeat a case the State has otherwise established and thus to suggest the intrusion of an amendment to the established basis for criminal accountability. Actually the question is simply whether there shall be excluded evidence which merely denies the existence of facts which the State must prove to establish [the offense charged.] Id. 34 N.J. at 294. * * * * * * * *
The three mental operations [necessary to establish murder] are matters of fact. The judiciary cannot bar evidence which rationally bears upon the factual inquiry the Legislature has ordered. The capacity of an individual ... to execute a homicidal design, or any deficiency in that capacity, may bear upon the question whether he did in fact did so act. Hence evidence of any defect, deficiency, trait, condition, or illness which rationally bears upon the question whether those mental operations did in fact occur must be accepted. Such evidence could be excluded only upon the thesis that it is too unreliable for the courtroom, a thesis which would not square with the universal acceptance of medical and lay testimony upon the larger issue whether there was a total lack of criminal responsibility. Id. at 295. (emphasis supplied).
See also State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 473 (1965). (Weintraub, C.J., concurring). Although State v. DiPaolo, supra, and its progeny, State v. Conforti, 53 N.J. 239, 246 (1969) and State v. Sikora, supra, pertained to the use of psychiatric testimony to contest the existence of premeditation, deliberation and wilfullness under our prior murder statute, the rationale obviously applies to all offenses requiring as an element of proof a particular state of mind. In any event, the Legislature plainly intended to codify the concept in enacting
So posited, the question remains whether the Legislature can, consistent with constitutional principles, place upon the defense the burden of establishing mental disease or defect. We conclude that the statute comports with due process. The identical issue was addressed by our Supreme Court in a somewhat related context in State v. Molnar, 81 N.J. 475 (1980). There, defendant, the acting warden of a prison, was convicted of perjury. The principal thrust of the prosecutor‘s case at trial was that the defendant had deliberately lied when he testified before the grand jury that he was not offered a bribe by an escaped prisoner. The defense conceded that defendant‘s testimony was untrue. Defendant claimed, however, that he was involved in an automobile accident prior to appearing before the grand jury. He asserted that he was suffering from amnesia and, thus, did not knowingly lie to the grand jury. In his instruction to the jury, the trial judge noted that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly testified falsely. Nevertheless, since the defense was premised upon the allegation that defendant suffered from a mental defect, amnesia, it bore the burden of establishing that underlying fact by a preponderance of the evidence. A divided Appellate Division reversed. 161 N.J. Super. 424 (App. Div. 1978). The majority concluded that “the amnesia evidence was not being received in support of an affirmative defense, that is, by way of confession and avoidance, or as a justification or excuse for conduct which would otherwise be criminal ... but to create a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of an essential element of the offenses with which he was charged and as to which the State, not he, bore the burden of proof.” Id. at 444-445. (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision. Initially, the Court noted that the defense of amnesia was not offered to establish defendant‘s insanity. State v. Molnar, supra 81 N.J. at 490. Although loss of memory claims had
The same reasoning was applied by the Montana Supreme Court in upholding the constitutional validity of a statute almost identical to ours in State v. McKenzie, 177 Mont. 280, 581 P.2d 1205 (1978), vacated and remanded sub nom. McKenzie v. Montana, 443 U.S. 903, 99 S.Ct. 3094, 61 L.Ed.2d 871 (1979), aff‘d on remand 186 Mont. 481, 608 P.2d 428 (Mont.Sup.Ct. 1980), cert. den. 449 U.S. 1050, 101 S.Ct. 626, 66 L.Ed.2d 507 (1980).4 There, the Court noted that it was not unfair to impose upon the accused the obligation to prove mental disease or defect. Specifically, the Court stated that “[b]ecause psychiatric evaluation as to subtle gradations of mental impairment is highly subjective and not within the common experience of the layman juror, the State may in fairness require a defendant to convince the jury of his diminished capacity by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. 581 P.2d at 1233. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the State was obliged to prove the accused‘s criminal mental state beyond a reasonable doubt.
We believe that these considerations are fully controlling here. We do not wish to denigrate the value of psychiatric testimony pertaining to gradations of mental impairment. We would be myopic, however, were we to fail to note the continuing controversy surrounding the defenses of insanity and diminished capacity. The lingering suspicion harbored by many is best evidenced by the fact that numerous jurisdictions have rejected diminished capacity as a defense. See Lee v. State, 265 Ala. 623, 93 So.2d 757 (1957); State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521 (1965); Bates v. State, 386 A.2d 1139 (Del. 1978); Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976), cert. den. 433 U.S. 911, 97 S.Ct. 2979, 53 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1977); Zeigler v. State, 402 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1981), cert. den. 455 U.S. 1035, 102 S.Ct. 1739, 72 L.Ed.2d 153 (1982); Ezzell v. State, 88 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1956); State v. Murray, 375 So.2d 80 (La. 1979); Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982); Armstead v. State, 227 Md. 73, 175 A.2d 24 (1961); State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 1982); State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St.2d 182, 436 N.E.2d 523 (1982); State v. Flint, 142 W. Va. 509, 96 S.E.2d 677 (1957); Sprague v. State, 52 Wis.2d 89, 187 N.W.2d 784 (1971). See also Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.1983), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2682, 81 L.Ed.2d 878 (1984). We are satisfied that the Legislature can constitutionally compel the defense to rebut the assumption of mental normalcy as long as the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the requisite state of criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.6 As described previously, the trial judge‘s instructions clearly apprised the jury of the State‘s obligation in that regard. We, thus, reject defendant‘s contention that
We next turn to defendant‘s argument that retroactive application of
The prohibition against ex post facto laws “is designed to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation....” State v. Davis, 175 N.J. Super. 130, 147 (App.Div. 1980), certif. den. 85 N.J. 136 (1980). The Constitution‘s drafters “sought to assure that individuals had fair warning of the impact of legislation and could rely on its meaning.” State v. T.P.M., 189 N.J. Super. 360, 366 (App.Div. 1983). See also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 963-64, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2297, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977),
In several decisions, the United States Supreme Court has held that “no ex post facto violation occurs if the change effected is merely procedural, and does `not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.‘” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964 n. 12, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 23 n. 12 (1981) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590, 4 S.Ct. 202, 210, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884)). A substantial question exists as to whether evidentiary rules are to be considered substantive or procedural for this purpose. Our Supreme Court in State v. Molnar, supra 81 N.J. at 488, held that “burdens of proof — those rules governing the degree of certainty the evidence must engender to warrant a given disposition by the trier of fact — are `procedural’ matters within the meaning of
III
While a fugitive in Las Vegas, defendant wrote a lengthy letter to his aunt, Stephanie Humanik, detailing the events
We are entirely satisfied that the letter was properly obtained by the police.10 Defendant‘s reliance on State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975) is clearly misplaced. There, the police entered defendant‘s apartment ostensibly after his fiance consented. Departing from the United States Supreme Court‘s holding in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), our Supreme Court concluded that New Jersey‘s constitution afforded broader protection than its federal counterpart. Specifically, the validity of the search was said to depend upon whether the consent was voluntary, an essential element of which was the knowledge of the right to refuse. State v. Johnson, supra 68 N.J. at 353-354.
Here, the issue of consent is not involved. Ms. Blunt‘s action in providing the police with defendant‘s letter was not directly instigated by the officers. Ms. Blunt never responded to the police officers’ questions pertaining to defendant‘s
IV
Defendant‘s remaining arguments do not warrant extended discussion. They pertain to various evidentiary decisions of the trial judge. During the direct examination of the defense‘s psychiatrist, counsel sought to elicit testimony pertaining to a letter upon which the expert had relied in reaching his conclusion. The trial judge sustained the prosecutor‘s objection. We agree that the trial court erred in that respect.11 It has long been the law that hearsay statements upon which an expert relies are admissible, not for establishing the truth of their contents, but to apprise the jury of the basis of the opinion reached. See, e.g., Tramutola v. Bortone, 63 N.J. 9, 15 (1973); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 79 (1959); Dietzeman v. Peterson, 196 N.J. Super. 96, 101-102 (Law Div. 1984). Nevertheless, we are convinced that the error had no impact upon the jury. We note in that respect that the letter was ultimately admitted in evidence.
V
Finally, we perceive no justifiable reason to disturb the sentence imposed. Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, the trial judge did not impose an extended term. As noted in State v. Serrone, 95 N.J. 23, 25-26 (1983), “[a] life [term] for murder is really an ordinary sentence.” See also State v. MaGuire, 84 N.J. 508 (1980). Further, the sentence imposed was within statutory limits and fully satisfied the tripartite test set forth in State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984). In our view, the trial judge‘s exercise of discretion was properly based upon findings of fact grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence. So too, the court applied correct legal principles in exercising its discretion. Finally, the sentence imposed did not constitute such a clear error of judgment that it shocks the judicial conscience. State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979); State v. Leggeadrini, 75 N.J. 150, 157 (1977).
In sum, we have carefully considered defendant‘s arguments and are convinced that they are devoid of merit. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Notes
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense. In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect which would negate a state of mind which is an element of the offense. Mental disease or defect is an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.