State v. HuiettState v. Huiett
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- Before:
- Harwell
This case involves the issue of whether the trial judge erred in committing appellant Randall Huiett to the South Carolina State Hospital pursuant to
Appellant Randall Huiett was indicted in 1977 for the October 28, 1976 ax-murder of a dairy worker. Appellant’s first trial on May 4 and 5,1977, ended in a mistrial. On May 11 and 12, 1977, appellant was retried and convicted of murder despite his defense of insanity. This Court reversed and remanded the case.
1
Upon remand and in a subsequent proceeding, appellant was then found not guilty by reason of insanity after a bench trial held on February 28,1989. The trial judge then committed appellant to the South Carolina State Hospital for a 120-day evaluation pursuant to
DISCUSSION
Appellant asserts that the trial judge erred in committing him to the South Carolina State Hospital pursuant to
It has been held that an ex post facto law “is an enactment, criminal or penal in nature, which is retrospective and disadvantages the offender affected by it.” United States v. Mest, 789 F. (2d) 1069, 1071 (4th Cir. 1986); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed. (2d) 17 (1981). As early as 1798, the United States Supreme Court set forth what constitutes an ex post facto law in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, 650 (1798):
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law; and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.
The purpose of an ex post facto clause is to “assure that federal and state legislatures [are] restrained from enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation” and that “legislative enactments ‘give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.’ ” Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429-430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed. (2d) 351, 359 (1987) (citations omitted). Therefore, in order for a law to fall within the ex post facto prohibition, two critical elements must be present: (1) the law must be retrospective so as to apply to events occurring before its enactment, and (2) the law must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Miller v. Florida, supra.
No
ex post facto
violation occurs if a change does not alter “ ‘substantial personal rights,’ but merely changes ‘modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance.’ ”
Miller v. Florida,
482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. at 2451, 96 L.Ed. (2d) at 360 (citations omitted). Even
In order to determine whether the trial judge’s application of
In turn, Sections 44-17-510 through 44-17-600 give jurisdiction for judicial commitment proceedings to the probate court rather than the trial judge and the chief administrative judge. Section 44-17-520 provides for the probate court to give notice to the parties of the filing of a petition for judicial commitment and the patient’s right to counsel. Section 44-17-530 provides that the probate court shall appoint counsel if counsel has not been retained, and two examiners, one a licensed physician, to examine the person. Section 44-17-530 also permits the person to request an additional examination by an independent examiner. Section 44-17-540 provides that if the two court appointed examiners agree the person is not mentally ill, the court must terminate the proceedings and dismiss the petition. However, if the two court appointed examiners are divided as to the person’s condition, the court may terminate the proceedings or appoint a third examiner who must be a psychiatrist, and charge the three examiners to render a majority opinion within seven days. Sections 44-17-550,44-17-
On the other hand,
Appellant asserts that he was disadvantaged by the retroactive application of
We have reviewed appellant’s arguments and find them to be without merit. First, the application of
Affirmed.
Gregory, C.J., and Chandler, Finney and Toal, JJ., concur.
Notes
We reversed this conviction and remanded the case for a new trial in State v. Huiett, 271 S.C. 205, 246 S.E. (2d) 862 (1978) because of an improper jury instruction in which the trial judge explained to the jury that if they found appellant not guilty by reason of insanity, applicant could be committed to the South Carolina State Hospital pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. 44-23-610 (1976) for examination and that if appellant was found not to be mentally ill, he would be “set free.” We ruled that this instruction warranted reversal of appellant’s conviction because it was irrelevant to the jury’s determination of appellant’s guilt or innocence and may have prevented the jury from returning a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity out of a fear that they might be freeing a dangerous individual into society.