delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе defendant in error, Marvin H. Hughes, who will hereinafter be referred to as the defendant, was charged undеr the following indictment:
“* * * did drive a motor vehicle upon a public highway of Davidson County, to wit: McGravoсk Pike, in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property upon said highway, by driving said vehicle to his left across a yellow stripe in said highway, against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.”
Hughes moved to quash the indictment and his motion assigned three grounds: (1) that the indictment does not сharge an offense against the laws of this State; (2) that the indictment is duplicitous and impossible to understand; and (3) that the indictment seeks to charge the defendant with two separate misdemeanors. The triаl court sustained the motion and quashed the indictment. From the action of the lower court in sustaining the dеfendant’s motion, the State has appealed in error to this Court.
In effect, the defendant contended in his motion that the indictment was invalid for two reasons; (1) that the indictment charged two distinct and differеnt offenses in *647 one count, and (2) that the indictment did not charge an offense against the laws of this State. These grounds will he examined in the order stated.
In
State v. McAdams,
The gist of the defendant’s second ground of the motion to quash is that the specific аct alleged in the indictment — “by driving said vehicle to his left across a yellow stripe in said highway” — does not сharge an offense against the laws of this State. We think that this ground is well taken.
This Court has said, on a number of occasions, that the degree of strictness required in an indictment for a felony is not required in the case of a misdemeanor.
Sanderlin v. State,
“* * * * if the facts alleged do not constitute such an offense within the terms аnd the meaning of the law or laws on which the accusation is based, or if the facts alleged may аll be true and yet constitute no offense, the indictment is insufficient.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*648 This Court judicially knows that it is not always a violation of the law of this State to drive “to his left across a yellow stripe”. This would be the case, for instаnce, if the yellow stripe is on the left of the center line and no such yellow stripe appеars to the right of the center line. A motorist does not violate any law of this State when he drives to the left across such a yellow stripe.
One of the purposes of the indictment is to give the defendant notice of the offense with which he is charged
Stanfield v. State,
The objects of an indictment are well stated in Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedurе, Anderson, Yol. 4, sec. 1724, at page 506, thus:
“The objects of an indictment are (1) to furnish the accused such а description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and avail himself of his сonviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause, and (2) to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are suffiсient in law to support a conviction if one should be obtained. A lawful accusation is an essential element of a common-law trial by jury, either upon indictment for felonies and capital оffenses or by information for misdemeanors. Such an accusation is jurisdictional; without it there can be no valid prosecution.”
*649 Obviously, even though the indictment might be good as charging a violation of a сertain named city ordinance or statute when the indictment proceeds in language stating what thе basis of the indictment is, as here, and such a basis charges no violation of the law then the accusation against the violation of the statute is nullified.
Counsel for the State earnestly argues that evеn if we should find the designation “yellow stripe” in the indictment is not sufficient, the indictment can still be upheld under the authority of State v. McAdams, supra. It is contended that this case stands for the proposition that an indictment is sufficient whеn it merely charges a statutory offense in the language of the statute. Assuming, without deciding, that this is the rule set fоrth in that case, we do not feel that this indictment can be saved by reference to such a rule. Thе State has attempted to restrict itself to a specific violation of sec. 59-858, T.O.A. No other viоlation of the statute is alleged. When a specific violation of the statute is alleged and a specific allegation is defective, the State cannot rely on the general allegation in the indictment. The State is bound by its attempted restriction.
The judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.