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State v. Hughes
607 N.W.2d 621
Wis.
2000
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*1 Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, Wisconsin, State

v. Defendant-Appellant. Vanessa D. Hughes, Supreme Court 5, 1999. No. argument 97-1121-CR. Oral October Decided 17, 2000. March 2000 WI 24 (Also 621.) reported in 607 N.W.2d *3 plaintiff-respondent-petitioner For the the cause argued by attorney Balistreri, was Thomas J. assistant general Doyle, whom on the briefs was James E. attorney general. defendant-appellant and there was a brief

For Taylor by argument Cornwall, assistant Andrea oral public defender. state involves a SYKES, J. This case S. 1. DIANE entry police a home. The officers into

warrantless question of the defendant's at the threshold were trespass- investigate complaint apartment about they opened, unexpectedly ing the door when marijuana strong immediately com- odor of detected distinct ing deduced a The officers also inside. from drug any be possibility would evidence of immediately destroyed enter, since the if did not pres- apartment their people alerted to were now question is, under these in the case The ence. strong odor of thе circumstances, does the combination apartment, coming from occupants knowledge part that the on the exigent standing circumstances outside, amount are subsequent justifying the warrantless reverse does, and therefore hold that it We search? circuit appeals that reversed decision court upholding search. order court's Sometime are as follows.1 facts The relevant City p.m. 1996, p.m. June on and 6:00 4:30 between and Scott Brad Schlei Officers Police Milwaukee suppression At the disputed. case are facts in this family and her testimony given the defendant hearing the *4 by given testimony with often conflicted members stating: credibility, finding trial court made officers. extremely testimony This credible. Kurth's] to be [Officer I found stand. I have officer, lady, telling the witness the truth on was people weren't other means that some that. That no doubt about certainly a consent telling that there truth. It also means testimony. I search, simply Kurth's personal on Officer to the 283 Marlock responded to a report of trespassing made Lucas, Richard a security guard at the Windsor Court Apartments, 1127 North 18th Street. The officers knew complex be an area of heavy drug activity where the police had made many arrests and had conducted in the sweeps past. 3. Upon at arriving Court, Windsor the officers

spoke directly Lucas, who informed them that the apartment manager had a standing trespass complaint against Webb, Michael Danny Smith and Marvin Webb, who were not welcome there because of their involvement with illegal drugs and because had caused trouble at complex Lucas past. that he reported had seen Smith and Michael Webb on premises and that they had entered Apartment 306, which was later identified as the defendant Vanessa Hughes' apartment. Officer Schlei was famil- that, turn, supports credibility

believe then in of the other testimony. officers in their It fact, is the function of the trier of court, and not this questions resolve weight as to the testimony and the credibil- ity of Dejmal, witnesses. 141, 151, Estate 95 Wis. 2d (1980). N.W.2d 813 principle recognizes This the trial court's ability to assess each witness's demeanor and per- the overall suasiveness of testimony his or her way in a appellate that an court, relying solely on a transcript, Thus, written cannot. we judge consider the trial to be the "ultimate arbiter of the credi- bility witness," of a City Allis, v. Posnanski West 61 Wis. 2d 461, 465, (1973), 213 N.W.2d 51 uphold will a trial court's credibility determination of goes unless that determination against great weight preponderance and clear of the evi- dence. Phillips, State v. n.4, 218 Wis. 2d 186-87 (1998). N.W.2d 794 We find no reason here to disturb the trial court's credibility, determination of which resolved factual dis- crepancies in favor of the officers' account. *5 fact, Smith in men, and, in had arrested

iar with both past. the Apartment

¶ to to inves- 4. The officers went they They Although tigate. knocked the door. could on apartment, many and voices inside the hear loud music they response. apparent Concerned the received no apartment, peoplе Officer number of inside the Schlei up its arrival decided to call for back and await before knocking again. hallway in the 5. As Schlei and Marlock waited suddenly opened Apartment and

outside the door (a) immediately the confronted with officers were very strong marijuana coming apart- the odor of from (b) very Hughes, surprised ment, and Veronica way apparently sister, her was on defendant's who expect to the store and did not see two Milwaukee hallway. standing police in full officers uniform posses- officers, now She tried to slam door. beyond illegal activity a mere sion of evidence presence having trespass, their been revealed apartment through no action of their those inside changed own, situation. Concerned were faced drug destroy any people evidence inside would entry undertaken, not the officers if an immediate were closing prevented in.2 from the door went Veronica testimony in the from both Veronica is also record There when she Hughes that Veronica screamed saw and Vanessa course, very dramatically this, alerted the police; would have presence occupants apartment to the necessity prevent urgent evidence increased the However, clear the record whether it is not from destruction. immediately upon seeing officers Veronica screamed trial court apartment, after entered the and the never finding subject. made a on apartment. 6. There was initial chaos in the eight people

Seven or *6 were in the main room and two people began running hallway down the toward the apartment. safety, back bedrooms of the For their occupants put officers up ordered the their hands complied except Timothy remain still. All for one kept pockets. Gibbs, who his hands near his Officer up Schlei's frisk of Gibbs turned cocaine. Officer attempted legally Marlock occupied to determine who apartment. Hughes Vanessa volunteered that she legal Hughes was the tenant. Officer Schlei then took explained they aside and that wanted to search the apartment any illegal drugs drug paraphernalia. for point She consented. At some after the officers entered apartment, began, but before the search two back- up squads arrived to assist. During Hughes repeatedly the search, By testimony, "got

taunted the officers. her own she yelling police." According at the to Michael Webb, Hughes running "going was around and off on the police." Hughes argued testified that she with the putting up officers remaining about her hands still. She also refused to sit down when the officers told her to.

¶ 8. apartment, As the officers searched the Hughes repeatedly go told them to ahead and search, they nothing. because would find In fact, the officers marijuana.3 found no However, did find evidence drug activity. garbage, they In found the remains cigar of a blunt, a used tо smoke hollow- ing inserting drug. out the They center and found baggies commonly numerous with cuts, corner used to 3Although the marijuana, officers found no Hughes admit suppression ted at the hearing people were in smoking fact marijuana in apartment 4,1996. her on June They gram illegal drugs. package elec- also found digital scale a white residue on it. tronic a female Marlock summoned 9. Schlei and pat-down search of Kurth, conduct officer, Tina Hughes Hughes. at arrived, was seated When Kurth approached testified that she table. Kurth the kitchen Hughes the search: about you And talked her? Counsel]: -with

[Defense said, here That's when I I’m KURTH: OFFICER And you. right? All that's what —she's to search like, okay. cooperative. And that was it. She did you Did tell that she Counsel]: her [Defense give you to search her? permission have to not *7 I did not that. KURTH: No. do OFFICER people kitchen, ¶ Due to 10. the number Hughes for into one of the Kurth escorted bedrooms began search, Kurth bedroom, In the search. before Hughes any prompting, her skirt lifted and without wearing Hughes pad. stated a that she was and stated lump Kleenex her underwear was that it. removed Hughes however,

¶ tissue, After removed the 11. Hughes' lump underwear, another Kurth noticed lump actu- The second was she removed herself. which bag holding ally plastic corner- individual clear larger containing chunk of crack and one cuts cocaine grams bag contained 5.39 all, In crack cocaine. cocaine. Hughes charged possession of a

¶ 12. (cocaine) deliver with intent substance controlled 161.16(2)(b)l §§ Wis. Stat. under 161.41(lxn)(cm)2.4 Hughes suppress moved to the evi- person being dence seized from her as the fruit of an illegal apartment, alleging search of her that the apartment entered her warrant, without a searched sup- consent, without her and that the search was not ported by probable justified by exigent cause or circumstances.

¶ 13. strong The trial court determined that the marijuana coming apartment gave odor of from the probable officers cause to believe that a crime had been being premises or was committed on the and that there exigent justify were sufficient circumstances to officers' without a warrant. In addition, the court Hughes found that property consented to both the search of her person. August and of her On 22, 1996, Hughes pled guilty charges against to the her. On Octo- prison. 29,1996, ber she was sentenced to 24 months in Hughes appealed. summary disposi- In a appeals tion, finding the court of reversed, Hughes' apartment search of violated her Fourth rights supported by Amendment because it was not burning marijuana, cause, and the odor of exigency, justify without further evidence anof did not entry. the warrantless granting denying 15. Review of an order suppress presents question

motion evidence of con- fact, stitutional ‍​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‍which we review under two different *8 uphold findings standards. We a circuit court's of fact clearly unless are erroneous. Secrist, State v. 224 (1999). 201, Wis. 2d 207, 589 N.W.2d 387 We then independently apply the law to those facts de novo.

4 July 9, 1996, Effective both statutes were amended and by 448, renumbered 1995 Wis. Act 245 §§ and 371 to Wis. Stat. 961.16(2)(b)1 961.41(1m)(cm)2, §§ and respectively.

288 475, 569 212 Wis. 2d N.W.2d Kiekhefer, v. State 1997). (Ct. App. 316 presents us a dilemma as old This case gov- the itself: how best to balance

as the constitution with the interest in law enforcement ernment's Although gener- right we to be left alone. individual's give rights ally individual, we to the of the deference rights yield recognize must to the sometimes those duty government's to enforce the law. warrantless into 17. A officer's by prohibited

private presumptively the residence the United States Constitu- Fourth Amendment to I, 11, of the Wisconsin tion,5 and article section the However, this court and United Constitution.6 exceptions recognized Supreme to Court have States States Constitution The Fourth Amendment to United provides: houses, persons, right people

The be secure their seizures, effects, against papers, and unreasonable searches and issue, proba- violatеd, upon and no shall but shall not be Warrants affirmation, cause, particularly supported Oath or ble searched, things describing place persons or to be to be seized. I, iden the Wisconsin Constitution is Article section 11 of and states:

tical in Fourth Amendment substance houses, papers, right people persons their secure in be against shall searches and seizures not be and effects unreasonable cause, upon sup- violated; issue but and no warrant shall describing particularly place ported by or oath affirmation persons things to be seized. to be searched and inter Supreme States Court's This court follows the United provision Fourth pretation the search and seizure provision of the state con construing the same Amendment 153, 171-72, 388 Fry, 2d N.W.2d 565 v. 131 Wis. stitution. State (1986). *9 requirement government

the warrant where the can exigent probable both show cause and circumstances right that overcome the individual's to be free from government Payton York, interference. Newv. 445 U.S. (1980); 573, 575, Smith, 583-88 State v. 131 Wis. 2d (1986). 220, 228, 388 N.W.2d 601 We find that record this case establishes both, thus hold that entry permissible. entry ¶ 18. To determine whether was law- questions: ful, we must first, answer two did the probable Hughes' officers have cause to believe that apartment crime, second, contained evidence of a exigent did circumstances exist time at the exception requirement? establish an to the warrant requires probable 19. The Fourth Amendment support every cause to search or seizure in order to "safeguard security privacy of individuals against arbitrary by government invasions officials." v.DeSmidt, 119, 130, 454 State 155 Wis. 2d N.W.2d 780 (1990). concept, assuming Probable cause a fluid dif requirements depending upon ferent its context. County Renz, v. 293, 231 2d Wis. 603 of Jefferson (1999). probable N.W.2d This case concerns cause probable Although search, not cause to arrest. concepts interchangeably, two they are sometimes treated require inquiries

in fact two distinct because implicate liberty Secrist, distinct interests. Wis. 2d at 209. probable requirement

¶ 20. Thе cause in protects arrest context an individual's interest in his personal liberty. proper inquiry her Thus, in an challenge arrest is whether cause exists particular suspect believe that a has committed Kiper, crime. 69, 82, State v. 193 Wis. 2d 532 N.W.2d *10 (1995). however, not an arrest but a search This, is 698 case. pri- individual's 21. In the search context the possessions

vacy at home and is in his or her interest proper inquiry is context, In stake. Id. at Secrist, 224 will be of a crime found. whether evidence (citing LaFave, A and Seizure: 2d 209 2 Search Wis. at (3d 3.1(b), § at 7-8 Amendment, Treatise on the Fourth 1996)). required quantum to estab- of evidence ed. probability" probable is a that cause to search "fair lish found in a of a crime be contraband or evidence will particular place. 213, 238 Gates, 462 U.S. Illinois v. (1983). marijuana odor of com 22. The unmistakable

ing Hughes' apartment provided this fair from Many probability. addressed situation cases have upon his her sense of smell relies in which an officer illegal drugs. presence Kiekhefеr, See to detect the of (odor marijuana emanating from 2d at 479 of 212 Wis. probable provided cause officers

bedroom warrant); Brockman, v. 231 Wis. a State obtain search (1939)(distinctive 634, 041-42, 283 338 odor N.W. fermenting sufficient to officers was mash detected finding justi magistrate's support cause warrant); fying Secrist, 224 the issuance of a search ("unmistakable marijuana" odor of ema 2d Wis. at nating provided probable for an officer cause from a car crime the car contained evidence to believe that search). Supreme Court The United States and thus to recognized "[the sub odor of a controlled has also that very stance] might evidence of the well found to be be finding probable persuasive cause to most character" States, United warrant. Johnson v. issue search (1948). 10, 13 U.S. strong marijuana

¶ 23. When smell is in probability" there is a air, "fair present. This is case, common sense. In this the officers building high drug also knew that activity an area of guard security and that two men saw entering apartment not who were welcome at the complex illegal drug activity. because of their In decid ing permissible are whether actions under the Fourth only Amendment, we need determine that the actions of law enforcement were reasonable. Illinois v. Rodri (1990). guez, 497 U.S. 185-86 Under these entirely circumstances, it was reasonable to conclude activity illegal drug probably that evidence of would be Apartment *11 found in 306.

¶ 24. Once cause search has been exigent established, the state must also demonstrate justify entry circumstances to apartment. the warrantless into the objective determining The test for whether exigent police exist officer, circumstances is whether a they under time, the facts as were at the known would reasonably delay procuring believe that in a search gravely endanger would life, warrant risk destruction greatly evidence, of or the enhance likelihood of the suspect's escape. Smith, 131 2d at Wis. 230. recognized In Smith, 25. we four circumstances against which, when measured the time needed to exigent warrant, obtain a constitute the circumstances required entry. for a warrantless at Id. 229. Those cir- (1) (2) pursuit," cumstances are an arrest in made "hot (3) safety suspect others, threat to of a a risk that (4) destroyed, will evidence be a likelihood that the suspect will flee. Id. says

¶26. factor, The State that the third the implicated risk evidence, of destruction of is in this marijuana agree. strong hit that odor case. We apartment door to the defendant's the officers as the gave opened the to a that rise reasonable belief being likely drug the consumed evidence—was —the destroyed. greater occupants consequently But the possibility exigency in is the of the intentional this case drug by apart- organized destruction of the they police occupants of the once were aware ment drugs Marijuana presence outside the door. and other Hughes highly muсh. has conceded as are destructible. drug possessor to assume that It is not unreasonable waiting police knows are for a warrant outside who delay get rid of the evidence. use would argues Supreme Hughes Court's 27. requires us invalidate decision Johnson permitted appeal is not because a warrantless burning drugs. solely But we on basis of smell finding exigent on the circumstances not base our do distinguisha- alone, and Johnson odor so important have this case an additional and We ble. suspects present in Johnson: the factor that was not police. fully presence In here were aware burning opium Johnson, the smelled while hallway standing outside Johnson's closed were their was unaware of door; room the defendant hotel only presence. Thus, risk Johnson, 333 U.S. at *12 implicated that in Johnson is of evidence destruction burning drug in order the associated destruc- it, than the risk of intentional rather consume discovery drug its the in order to avoid tion of by police. Id. Under the circum- the at 15. seizure apartment occupants had case, the this stances destroy intentionally every once evidence incentive present they police Had the were knew the outside. 293 stayed officers outside and called for a warrant, the very likely evidence have would been lost. Kiekhefer, 460, 212 Wis. 2d at and State v. (Ct. 1999) App. Wilson, 229 Wis. 2d N.W.2d 14 distinguishable. are also In Kiekhefer, Johnson, as police marijuana they the detected the odor of while standing were outside the ‍​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‍defendant's closed bedroom apparently door; the defendant his was in room una- presence they ware of their until entered without a upon warrant. The officers entered the room based the any suggesting alone, odor exigency, in the absence of other facts appeals and the court of this found insuffi- justify cient to the warrantless and search.7 appeals The court of emphasized that the Kiekhefer police they had the situation "well in hand" at the time detected odor, marijuana the that there was indication "no Kiekhefer aware presence," was oftheir and that "were not emanating confronted with the sounds of destruction from within entry." Kiekhefer's room so as to excuse the warrantless (Ct. Kiekhefer, 460, 477-79, 212 Wis. 2d App. 569 N.W.2d 316 1997). significantly Here, This differs from pres case. ence of police unexpectedly people was revealed to the in the apartment door; Hughes opened when Veronica that she rapidly again tried to shut it she standing when saw them there in full reasonably interpreted by uniform was the officers as representing illegal activity going consciousness of on inside discovery by and a concomitant desire to avoid its police. important

It is also to note that this is not a situation in exigency police themselves, which the created which generally justify would not a warrantless search of home. See Kiekhefer, lawfully 212 Wis. 2d at 476. The were hallway waiting backup for investigating trespass before com- plaint. They did not detect odor until Veronica Hughes unexpectedly opened They door. were faced with the remaining choice of calling outside and for a warrant based *13 presents a different situation 29. Wilson entirely. to defen- Wilson, officer went the In looking juvenile an for whom he had for a dant's home 260. The officer Wilson, 229 Wis. 2d at warrant. arrest backyard home, he of the to the where around walked children. He fol- of the defendant's encountered one of the house the child to the back door lowed doorway, point smoke he observed the at which entered marijuana coming from the odor and smelled the appeals The court of found Id. at 260-61. basement. upon its based conclusion Fourth Amendment violation unlawfully curtilage inside that the officer was marijuana; in he smelled the home when Wilson's position in a to words, not have he should been other marijuana place. at In this first Id. 266. smell the in the to entitled be casе, however, the officers were hallway Hughes' apartment public to outside trespass investigate approach to her door order complaint. Hughes argues pursuant to the also Supreme Court's deci- United States

rationale in the (1984), Wisconsin, 466 U.S. v. sion Welsh enough possession not serious crime entry justify these circum- under a warrantless disagree. drove Welsh, defendant In stances. We Id. road, walked home. off left the scene and his car having police, the defendant's determined at 742. The identity, suspecting intoxicated, that he was placed a warrant and home without entered his The state Id. 742-43. under arrest. at defendant among upon, attempted justify other based immediately entering prevent drug, upon odor begun as soon likely have that would the evidence destruction exigency them- having created the the door. Not as she closed selves, the choice reasonable. latter *14 things, exigency by of the of destruction evidence: the body warrant, time could obtain a Welsh's would destroy alcohol, metabolize the and thus the evidence argued of his intoxication. The defendant that no exi- gent justified entry circumstances the into his home. Supreme agreed The U.S. Court defendant, the holding: government's only

When interest to arrest for offense, a [the minor of presumption unreasonable- entries] ness of warrantless home is difficult to rebut, and the government usually be should only allowed to make such arrests with a warrant upon probable issued a cause neutral magistrate. detached gravity

Id. at 750. The court Welsh held that the important offense is an factor to consider in determin- ing exigent justify whether circumstances will a entry warrantless of a home. Id. The court did not definitively say, categories however, certain that of per insufficiently grave justify offenses are se to a war- entry, only minor, rantless that noncriminal, (first nonjailable traffic violation in that case offense driving) essentially drunk was so.8 Welsh holds that significant significant the less offense, the more Welsh, At time operating first-offense under the (cid:127)influence an punishable by intoxicant was a non-criminal 346.65(2) civil forfeiture not to $200. exceed Wis. Stat. § (1977-78). subsequent years A second or offense within five became a misdemeanor and carried a fine of than no more $500 imprisonment days of not less than five nor than more one year. drawing The Court bright-line refrained from a rule: that, "Because we conclude presented by the circumstances case, exigent there were no jus circumstances sufficient to tify entry, a warrantless home we no have occasion consider whether impose the Fourth may Amendment an absolute ban justify exigent must be in order circumstances entry under Fourth home warrantless Amendment. suggested in a footnote 31. The Welsh court particular penalty attaches to which a state provides indi- "the and most consistent clearest

offense arresting individuals State's interest cation suspected committing Id. at 754 n.14. that offense." only guidance provides on how This Welsh's footnote purposes of an offense for the seriousness of determine justify exigent evaluating circumstances whether arrest or search. The of a home for warrantless *15 by adopting approach the the used State advocates Supreme City Vegas, Las in v. North Court Blanton of determining (1989), dealt with 489 U.S. 538 which purposes petty for of or serious an offense is whether right jury Welsh, As in to a trial. the Sixth Amendment judge legislature of the best as Blanton looked the particular 541. offense. Id. at of the seriousness an the seriousness of Blanton held 32. objec- purposes should be Amendment offense for Sixth penalties by looking tively the to maximum determined primary legislature. the focus is on Id. fixed the (under potential Blanton, an incarceration maximum presumed to be maximum is a six-month offense with statutory penalties petty); are also rele- however, other vant. Id. at 542-43. approach analysis has its limita- to the This engaged aрplied are not context. We in this

tions when single, a of the seriousness in a evaluation of static right charged particular, Sixth Amendment offense for engaged jury purposes. in a Rather, are we trial of of number the seriousness broader evaluation of Welsh, offenses." certain minor home arrests for on warrantless U.S. 750 n.11. at chargeable against potentially offenses, balanced a cer- (here exigency likely tain sort of intentional evidence) purposes determining destruction of for of legality entry search of warrantless under Amendment, Fourth for which the touchstone is always reasonableness. Hughes suggests only

¶ 34. that we look to the punishment possession marijuana for first-offense determine the seriousness the crime at issue in this approach ignores narrow, search. But too proba- both the facts of this case which established the place, legislature's ble cause first and the punish drug graduated election to on a offenses basis, depending upon pos- as a defendant's status mere presumptive sessor or dealer as well as his or her repeater. status as a first time offender or a It also ignores practical facing realities officers the field presented under circumstances such as those here. Particularly drug context, officers are called upon rapid balancing to make decisions the risk of against intentional evidence destruction the serious- may variety potentially chargeable ness of what be a offenses.

¶ 35. At the time case, in this certainty did know not whether were *16 dealing possessors with mere first offense of small marijuana, repeat offenders, amounts of or or those possessed larger who amounts from intent which to they deliver could be inferred. What know, did how- they investigating trespass by ever, was that were persons illegal were who known to be with involved drugs building heavy drug activity, in a known for its strong marijuana present, and that a odor of was estab- lishing probable quantity drug cause some of the present. They people was also knew that once presence, apartment to were alerted their inside destruction likelihood of intentional evidence extremely high.

¶ the circumstances that, under 36. We conclude seriousness of the case, of the this the determination of exigent purposes cir- of Fourth Amendment for offense analysis requires of the an evaluation cumstances type. penalty of for offenses structure overall marijuana- legislature's of of the view seriousness only penalty it reflected not related offenses is possession a small first offense of has established for drug, penalty quantity has estab- it but also possess repeat offenders, and those who for lished larger giving rise the inference that amounts drug possessed deliver. with intent to marijuana possession mis- is a of 37. First-time by up punishable months demeanor, six 961.41(3g)(e). § or A second Stat. incarceration. Wis. by up subsequent felony, рunishable to one offense is a 961.48(2). year prison. § An offender in state Wis. Stat. subject or fine of for a first offense also to a $1000 subsequent Stat. or offense. Wis. for second $2000 961.48(2). offenders, § addition, first-time In even for mandatory suspension provides for Wisconsin law years. privileges operating Wis. for a maximum five § 961.50. Stat. grad- legislature has also established 38. The penalties raises the maximum which

uated scale of drug quantity penalties increases as the Hughes' present. At the time of intent to deliver is possession arrest,9 first-offense grams less or ten or fewer intent to deliver 500 poten- plants $25,000 and the carried a fine of $500 961.41(lm)(h) 31, 1999, Stat. § 9Effective Wis. December provide longer maximum sentences. been amended to has *17 imprisonment up years. tial of for to three Wis. Stat. 961.41(lm)(h)l. penalties § These to a increased fine of up imprisonment $50,000 to for three months to years grams marijuana five for 500 to 2500 or 10 to 961.41(lm)(h)2. plants. possession § 50 Wis. Stat. For any grams quantity to intent deliver over 2500 plants, an offender a fine $100,000 faced to $1000 imprisonment up years. for to ten Wis. Stat. 961.41(lm)(h)3. Repeat penalty § offender enhancers apply possession also to with intent to deliver. For a subsequent potential second or offense, the maximum 961.48(2). § term of incarceration doubles. Wis. Stat. marijuana, ¶ 39. therefore, Possession of even a signifi- first offense and a amount, small is treated cantly seriously more than noncriminal, nonjailable driving first offense drunk violation subjecting range Welsh, involved in penalties, an offender to a including incarceration, fines loss of driving privileges.10 Furthermore, the nature of the (the exigency in this case intentional destruction of evidence) compelling far more immediate and than (the involved Welsh slow metabolization of alco- hol). taking penalty Therefore, the overall structure for marijuana possession consideration, into and evaluat- ing against backdrop very it real and serious complaint allegation this case also containеd the place school, that the took offense within 1000 feet of a requiring impose service, the court community 100 hours of in addition any penalties, other for first-offense simple possession. Wis. possession Stat. 961.495. For § first-offense with intent deliver, potentially up this enhancer adds years to five incarcer 961.49(l)(b)6. ation to a sentence. Wis. Stat. § *18 exigency present conclude Welsh does not here, we that entry.11 require of this warrantless home invalidation entry Having jus- 40. established that was by second issue raised tified, we now turn to the personal Hughes' parties: consent to the whether voluntary police of coer- and not result search was Hughes' court that consent was cion. The trial found finding ‍​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‍voluntary. appeals disagreed, The court that of sufficiently Hughes' attenuated from consent was not entry an the court had determined was unlawful. that entry lawful, in this to be We have found case analysis need so the not be undertaken. attenuation upon Hughes' find, words and We further basеd voluntary actions, that her consent was otherwise not coerced. question

¶ 41. The of whether a defendant volun tarily search is determined consented independently by appropriate applying the constitu by principles to as the trial court. tional the facts found Phillips, 180, 194-95, 218 577 State v. 2d N.W.2d Wis. (1998). test is whether con The for voluntariness given in the "absence of actual sent search designed improper police practices to over coercive Clappes, defendant." State v. come the resistance of a (1987). 222, In mak 136 Wis. 2d 401 N.W.2d 759 single dispositive. ing is determination, this no factor argument in State makes an alternative defense may entry: enter a residence without this that probable when have warrant to arrest for misdemeanor being committed in their cause to the crime believe upheld have presence persons inside. We exigent cause and upon presence search based involving do of evidence destruction. We circumstances the risk not, therefore, argument. alternative reach State's Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at Instead, we examine the totality special emphasis circumstances, placed surrounding on the circumstances the consent and the characteristics of the defendant. Id.

¶ 42. The State has the initial burden to show voluntary. that the defendant's consent was State v. (Ct. App. Lee, 175 348, 359, Wis. 2d 499 N.W.2d 250 1993). Once the State has shown that the defendant gave willing give consent, was it, and that he or she give did not it as a result duress, threats, coercion or *19 promises, the burden shifts to the defendant to show police improper that the used means to obtain his or her consent. State Nicholson, v. 688, 187 Wis. 2d (Ct. 1994). App. 523 N.W.2d 573 presented 43. The State has evidence that the only verbally defendant not consented to the search of person, affirmatively her police but also assisted the performing that search. Officer Kurth, whom the trial singled being "especially court out as credible," testi- Hughes verbally fied that consented to the search. The any prompting, evidence also established that without Hughes essentially lifted her skirt and revealed the drugs concealed in her underwear before Kurth even began pat-down. Hughes

¶ 44. offers almost no evidence of improper police practices. Hughes' primary argument voluntarily is that "merely she did not consent but acquiesced" to what Kurth stated she was there to do. persuaded. Hughes' suggests We are not behavior simply going along. actively she was cooper- not She lifting being ated search, with the her skirt without (as State) perhaps suggested by so, to do directed pre- a calculated effort to take control of the search to discovering vent the officer from the cocaine she knew hiding person. goes she was on her Such behavior beyond acquiescence." "mere Hughes' during

¶ 45. behavior the search also argument contradicts her that she was intimidated acquiescence. By testimony, into tially yelling her own ini- she was police actively disobeying

at the Hughes' boyfriend officers' orders. Michael testi- Webb Hughes "going police fied that was off' on the as apartment. Hughes frightened searched the If into by authority part police, submission show of on the been, as she claims to have it seems she would have likely quietly by actively been more to sit than to diso- bey verbally Hughes' assault them. actions at the speak time of the search louder than her words now. any argument Her behavior contradicts that she felt compelled by to consent to the search. Hughes particular

¶ 46. asserts that her charac- teristics made her vulnerable to coercion. She cites regularly determining factors considered courts in including age, voluntariness, education, her emotional prior experience police. state, and However, Hughes, years at 20 old, was not a minor at time Phillips, the search. See 218 Wis. 2d at 202. She had completed grade, presented the eleventh and has no average intelligence evidence of below or abilities. See *20 Although Hughes prior id. record, herself had no she year building had lived for over a in a that was often subject drug by sweeps of Police Milwaukee Department. completely She could not have unfa- been police. persuaded miliar with the We are not that Hughes unusually susceptible to coercion. Hughes argues

¶ 47. also that the failure officers' right to inform her that she had the to refuse consent to particularly the search made her vulnerable to invol- untary acquiescence Although in it. this factor

303 voluntary against weighs generally of a determination analysis only in the factor consent, it is not finding involuntariness. of mandate does not (1973). 218, 227 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. v. Schneckloth case, this factor is not circumstances of Under the finding against enough tip significant the balance voluntary consent. of therefore, officers'

¶ hold, 48. We Hughes' apartment entry search for Vanessa into by supported marijuana possession was of evidence by exigent justified circumstances. cause and upon actions, that her words find, based We also per- voluntarily Hughes of her to the search consented Hughes' properly denied Thus, court the circuit son. suppress, the court of the decision of motion to appeals is reversed. appeals

By the court of decision of the Court.—The is reversed. (dissenting). BRADLEY, J. 49. ANN WALSH purport- 1996, 4, officers afternoon of June

In the late barged edly guns into two-bedroom drawn they City apartment because of Milwaukee marijuana. They have, did could but smelled odor Instead, fearful that the not, a search warrant. obtain possession of a first offense evidence entry. might destroyed, made a warrantless be "physical is the chief of the home 50. The wording against Amend- of the Fourth which the evil v. United States Dist. United States ment is directed." (1972). setting is the In no Court, U.S. clearly privacy than when defined more "zone unambiguous physical dimensions bounded *21 Pаyton an individual's home." v. York, New 445 U.S. (1980). Accordingly, 573, 589 warrantless searches and "presumptively seizures inside a home are unreasona- ble." Id. at 586. heightened protection by

¶ 51. The afforded generally requires Fourth Amendment the issuance of magistrate police a warrant a neutral before the may enter the thresholds of our residences. This consti- requirement formality. tutional is not a mere ‍​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‍magistrate right privacy neutral decides when our yield must to the need A for intrusion. warrant- entry, negates here, less as the role of the neutral magistrate protections. and circumvents constitutional recognized

¶ 52. This court has the limited exceptions including exigent searches, to warrantless circumstances based on the destruction of evidence. Kiper, 69, State v. 89-90, Wis. 2d 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995). Unfortunately, majority's validation of the present exigent facts of the case as circumstances by relaxing threatens to swallow the rule the restraint embodied in the Fourth Amendment. The destruction marijuana upоn justified which the officers their Hughes's search of home does not rise to the level of exigency required presumption to rebut of the search's unreasonableness.

¶ 53. In Wisconsin, Welsh v. 466 U.S. (1984), Supreme explained the United States Court application exigent circumstances exception exclusionary to the rule the context of rarely home entries should be sanctioned where there only cause to believe that a minor offense majority's attempt distinguish has occurred. The precedential importance and dismantle the isWelsh unconvincing. *22 distinguish attempt Welsh, the

¶ In to 54. its acknowledges majority does not stand that Welsh first per types proposition are of offenses that certain the for entry, but minor invalidate a warrantless so as to se minor offense at rule that the for the rather stands Majority justify the search. in that case did not issue majority Op. that the Welsh ¶ observes Then, the at 30. defining precise guidance the on offered scant Court only meaning in a mentioned minоr offense and of a attaching particular penalty to a the that footnote gravity provided indication of the best offense Majority Op. ¶at 31. that offense. ignores ample discus- This 55. observation determining gravity in on the method of

sion Welsh to which In addition to the footnote an offense. Payton points, majority in refers to the Court Welsh felony importance recognition limita- its Welsh, into the home. intrusions tion on warrantless at 750 n.12. 466 U.S. amplifies the defi- further Court Welsh approval by quoting from with

nition of "minor offense" in McDonald v. United Jackson's concurrence Justice (1948): 451, 459-60 States, 335 U.S. necessity afor search

Whether there is a reasonable certainly a warrant waiting to obtain without of the offense upon gravity somewhat depends as the hazards of in as well thought progress to be reach it.... It is to me attempting method of to homes, even private that shocking proposition indiscriminately tenement, may in a be quarters any suspicious police at the discrеtion of invaded that following up offenses engaged officer .When an or threats of it... involve no violence magistrate, he act as his own officer undertakes to byit justify pointing ought position to be some real immediate and serious if consequences he postponed get action to a warrant. added.)

(Emphasis ¶ 57. Welsh also restricts focus on the first-time particular knowledge commission of a offense absent suspect repeat subject ais offender penalties. enhanced n.6, 466 U.S. at 746 754. Consis- Welsh, tent other courts have also evaluated exigency by focusing simple on first offense or mari- juana possession aggravating when cause of *23 present. e.g., circumstances has not been See State v. (N.J. Super. App. Holland, 92231, 2000 WL *6 Div. 2000); Wagoner, 26, Jan. State v. 966 P.2d (N.M. 1998). App. Contrary majority's Ct. conclu- Supreme sion, the United States in Court Welsh provides determining sufficient in direction con- what stitutes a minor offense. present undisputed

¶ In case, 58. it is only probable the officers had cause to believe that the occupants Hughes's apartment committing of were a marijuana possession, having first offense of the State point during argument. conceded that oral The crime for which cause existed to obtain a search marijuana possession, warrant, the first offense of felony involving neither a nor crime violence or analysis, of it. threats Pursuant to the Welsh "relatively offense is minor." majority sidesteps ¶ 59. The the breadth of dis- cussion the Fourth Amendment case of Welsh case, instead resorts to Sixth Amendment Blanton v. City (1989), Vegas, North Las 489 U.S. 538 for determining gravity marijuana instruction on possession in the Fourth Amendment context. In Blan- although penalty ton, the Court noted that for an may probation, primary offense include a fine and gravity emphasis of the determination potential placed the maximum should be on offense pro- a fine or Id. at 542. That is because incarceration. severity approximate loss "cannot bаtion liberty prison Indeed, the term entails." Id. that a $1,000 fine and the that a Blanton Court concluded driving privileges, in addition to six revocation of "petty" incarceration, did not transform the months driving influence of alcohol into a under the offense Id. at 544-45. serious one. majority Having Blanton, the nev- invoked the case because of its focus on

ertheless dismisses majority single particular states that it offense. The upon "a instead broader evaluation wishes to embark potentially chargea- of a number of of the seriousness majority Majority Op. ¶at 33. The . . ." ble offenses. authority leap into the examination of cites no for its marijuana- penalty scheme for a host of the entire related offenses. leap represents 61. This unwarranted impor-

majority's precedential effort to dismantle the depict gravity attempt of first- tance of Welsh. Its opaque light by marijuana possession in an exam- time directly ining penalties for other offenses *24 mandatе that the focus be on contravenes Welsh knowledge aggravating circum- first offense absent of range Furthermore, the evaluation of a of stances. ignores completely the State's concession that offenses only probable in had cause to the officers this case being committed. that a first offense was believe majority's Hughes's myopic of 62. The criticism recognize that it is focus on the first offense fails to precisely myopic the United States view that contemplates Supreme when officers do Court Welsh suspect other offenses. 466 not have cause to attempt n.6, at 746 The U.S. 754. to deflect attention possession marijuana from the first of offense an potential penalties of elaborate recitation marijuana for other potential penalty offenses and enhancers controlling precedent. evades simple posses- ¶ 63. The truth is that first-time marijuana period sion of carries a maximum of 961.41(3g)(e). § incarceration of six months. Wis. Stat. parties generally charged concede that it can be as a either criminal misdemeanor or as a civil forfei- may ture. For offenders, first-time a court even conditionally discharge place pro- the defendant on any adjudication guilt. without bation Wis. Stat. 961.47(1). § shortly transpired Indeed, after the events City case,

in this Milwaukee enacted an ordi- decriminalizing possession grams nance of 25 marijuana. less of See of Ordinances, Milwaukee Code (1997). provides 106-38 This 1997 ordinance for a civil penalty appears as forfeiture penalty consistent with the possession quantities for of small other suburbs of Milwaukee and Wisconsin cities.1 appeals,

¶ 65. Before the court of the State even marijuana posses- made a concession first offense citing is a sion minor offense. After to Welsh in its court, initial brief to State then noted that it apparent "concedes that the offense to the in this possession marijuana, case, is 'minor' since the maxi- only jail. penalty mum six Wis. months Stat. (1995-1996)." 961.41(3g)(e) subsequent § The State's e.g., City 11-2-11; City 1See Glendale Ord. Greenfield § 10.161.41(3); City 23.20(6); Madison §Ord. Ord. Menomonee § City 1031(q); 11.01(5); City Falls Ord. Waukesha Ord. § § West 6.02(3). City Allis Ord. §

309 by claiming temper that it this concession endeavor to separate argument made in the context of a was unpersuasive. gauge Allowing

¶ 66. law enforcement officers to by considering severity the entire of an offense range penalty a a related offenses sets scheme for of Any dangerous precedent. in that is a offense included graduated penalties thereby would be ren- scheme would even include the dered serious. ‍​‌​​‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​‍This rationale (DWI) driving first while intoxicated at issue offense of impose subsequent Welsh, in a DWI would because potential penalties period stricter and a incarceration year. U.S. at of one 466 explicitly Court, however, 67. The Welsh heightened repeat

rejected penalties on focus prior knowledge offenses without of the defendant's or father that the arrests convictions. Indeed it is ironic actually repeat defendant in offender Welsh yet required police presume specifically Court to knowledge repeater first offense without further his Hughes prior However, case, status. had no history yet majority criminal sanctions presumption repeater as status as well an intent majority marijuana. This deliver cannot do. faithfully 68. Several courts have adhered limitations on entries into the Welsh warrantless Wag e.g., Holland, *6-*7; home. See 2000 WL 92231 at Ramirez, 344, oner, 182; 966 at P.2d P.2d State v. (Wash. 1987); App. Curl, Ct. State v. 869 P.2d (Idaho 1993). 226-27 courts have not encoun These difficulty applying tered Welsh invalidate on the destruction of evi warrantless searches based simple possession. dence first offense without resort to an Furthermore, have done so *26 penalty mari- scheme for of the entire examination marijuana. juana possession deliver or the intent to recognizing of drunk ¶ the first offense In 69. "relatively driving minor," the issue Welsh as at addressing Supreme Court was United States legal, consequences Like- of the offense. societal, not marijuana possession recognizing as first offense wise, legal status of that offense. minor addresses the drug driving illegal use ¶ Both drunk 70. blights represent Yet, the United on our communities. allowing Supreme refrained from Court has States legal reality judgments to obscure the moral driving, against lie some violations on drunk battle gravity. spectrum The same is true end of the lower drugs. has mandated that The Court for the war on only exigent excuse a in serious offenses circumstances entry in the home. warrantless Supreme States the United 71. Consistent with unwilling majority be directive, the should Court wary sanctity of so the home and be sacrifice easily diluting constitutionally guaranteed free- our Today's entry. decision relaxes dom from warrantless protections justification the Fourth without exigent to be Amendment circumstances allows major- exception. Because rather than the the rule upholds controlling precedent ity aside casts constitutionally search, I dissent. infirm that CHIEF JUSTI I to state am authorized WIL- and JUSTICE S. ABRAHAMSON CE SHIRLEY dissenting opinion. join BABLITCH LIAM A.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Hughes
Court Name: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Date Published: Mar 17, 2000
Citation: 607 N.W.2d 621
Docket Number: 97-1121-CR
Court Abbreviation: Wis.
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