State v. HuffmanState v. Huffman
The defendant, Earl Huffman, was charged by bill of information with aggravated battery in violation of
On December 11, 1982 at approximately 9:30 p.m., Officer Debbie Prеvost of the New Orleans Police Department responded to a call at the home of Dolores Sullivan. Upon her arrival, Officer Prevost discovered that Sullivan had received several stab wounds in her back. Officer Prevost found a broken knife and a blood-stained robe in the victim‘s apartment.
Dolores Sullivan testified that the defendant and his step-son, David Landauer, arrived at her City Park Avenue apartment on the evening of December 11, 1982. Sullivan, an acquaintance of the defendant, stated that the defendant offered to sell marijuana to her and that she told the defendant to go get the marijuana out of his car. She testified that when the defendant returned from his car, he had a knife and began stabbing her in her back and shoulder. According to Sullivan, the defendant stopped stabbing her only when the knife broke in her shoulder. Sullivan stated that the defendant told her that the reason for the stаbbing was that she had allegedly told the defendant‘s brother-in-law that she had seen the defendant steal his stereo. After the defendant stabbed Sullivan apрroximately four times, he then put his arm around her and threatened to break her neck. She finally broke away from the defendant and ran out into the strеet. The defendant followed her and punched her in the mouth. The defendant and Landauer then ran away.
David Landauer denied Sullivan‘s story and testified thаt he and the defendant went to Sullivan‘s apartment that evening
The defendant essentially reiterated Landauer‘s version of the story and аdded that Sullivan asked him where she could purchase the drug “dilaudid” and that he replied that he did not know. The defendant also testified that Sullivan appеared to be “loaded” that evening and that if Sullivan was stabbed, “it was strictly in self-defense” (Tr. p. 42).
A review of the record for errors patent reveals thаt although the docket master indicates that the defendant was present at arraignment and pleading, the minute entry does not. A patent error exists if the defendant was not present during this stage of the proceedings. However, a patent error is harmless unless prejudice is shown. State v. Charles, 450 So.2d 1287 (La.1984). Because a plea of not guilty was entered and because no prejudice has been alleged by the defendant on appeal, this error is harmless.
The record also reveals that the trial judge failed to wait twenty-four hours after the denial of defendant‘s motion for new trial before sentencing thе defendant. Again, such error is harmless unless prejudice is shown by the defendant. State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158 (La.1983). Because the defendant has not made any showing of prejudice or raised this issue on appeal, this error also appears to be harmless.
In the defendant‘s only assignment of error, he contends that the trial cоurt erred in imposing court costs or, alternatively, a thirty day jail sentence in addition to defendant‘s ten year hard labor sentence. Specifically, the defendant claims that because he received the maximum sentence and was later declared indigent by the court, the additional thirty dаy jail sentence would result in a sentence greater than the maximum set by the statute.
The leading case of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), states the rule that when the aggregate imprisonment exceеds the maximum period fixed by the statute and results directly from an involuntary non-payment of a fine or court costs, this constitutes an impermissible discrimination that rests on the ability to pay. This precedent was recognized in Louisiana in State v. Williams, 288 So.2d 319 (La.1974). Thus, an indigent defendant cannot be given a term of imprisonment in lieu of a finе when to do so would mean that the defendant would have a term of imprisonment longer than the statutory maximum. The State v. Williams case also noted that the necessity of appointing counsel from the Office of the Public Defender to represent the defendant sufficiently establishes indigency.
In all the cases enforcing the Williams v. Illinois rule, the defendant was found to be indigent at an early stage in the proceedings and the indigent defender represented the defendant throughout the trial procеss. In the present case, however, the defendant‘s pro se motion to proceed In Forma Pauperis was granted six weeks after sentencing. Prior to that time, the defendant had retained his own counsel.
Whether or not the Williams v. Illinois rule applies when a defendant is declared indigent after sentencing is an issue which hаs not been addressed by the Louisiana courts. However, in a case where the court found that the Williams v. Illinois rule did not apply because nothing in the reсord indicated that the defendant was
We conclude that the Williams v. Illinois rule applies to the instant situation. Therefore, the defendant‘s sentence is vacated and this case is remanded for resеntencing so that the defendant‘s indigency does not subject him to imprisonment beyond the maximum sentence stated in the aggravated battery statute.
The defendant‘s conviction is affirmed.
CONVICTION AFFIRMED
SENTENCE VACATED
CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Notes
Aggravated battery is a battery committed with a dangerous weapon.
Whoever commits an aggravated battery shall be fined not more than five thousand dоllars, imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than ten years, or both.
Battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another; or the intentional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another.