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State v. Huebler
275 P.3d 91
Nev.
2012
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*1 claim that the foreclosure proceed alleged cannot based on viola- tions of NRS 107.086 and the merit. FMRs lacks ex- parties pressly agreed to the foreclosure in the event that the short did sale Therefore, take the district place. court did not abuse its dis- cretion refusing against sanctions impose SunTrust. Accord- ingly, we affirm the district court’s order.5

Saitta, C.J., Douglas, Cherry, Pickering, Hardesty, Parraguirre, JJ., concur. NEVADA, Appellant, THE STATE OF Respondent. HUEBLER,

CHARLES EDWARD No. 50953 April 275 P.3d 91 [Rehearing denied August 2012] brief, opening 5In their request judicial Joneses court take this no order, Department tice of a Industry of Business and which does not involve Also, brief, parties appeal. answering in this in its SunTrust asks this court portions opening Having to strike requests, brief. considered and in light 27(a)(1), requiring of NRAP application an for an order or other relief to motion, deny be made we requests. both Masto, General, Attorney City; Catherine Carson Cortez Gammick, Hatlestad, Attorney, H. Gary Richard District County, Chief District Appellate Attorney, Washoe Deputy Appellant. *2 Forsman, Defender, A. John

Franny Federal Public C. Teicher, Defenders, and Lori Lambrose C. Assistant Federal Public Vegas, Respondent. Las

OPINION Court, Douglas, By the J.: untimely This case arises from an for a post-conviction petition conviction, writ of habeas corpus stemming pursuant from with a child under 14 of In guilty plea, years age. lewdness his Charles that he had petition, respondent alleged good Huebler delay cause for his because the State filing petition improp- which erly exculpatory, withheld surveillance that were videotapes The district court re- guilty plea involuntary. granted rendered his Huebler, lief to and the State appeals. under required

In this we consider whether the State is appeal, (1963), material ex- Brady Maryland, 373 U.S. to disclose within its to the defense before the culpatory possession entry required of a We conclude that the State is to dis- the State guilty plea. close such evidence before When disclosure, may challenge the defendant fails to make the required succeed, the de- *4 validity guilty the of the on that basis. To plea the three viola- components fendant must demonstrate in the that the evidence at is ex- guilty plea: tion context of issue evidence, that the State withheld the and that the culpatory, materiality evidence was material. As to the in component partic- ular, we hold that the test is whether there is a reasonable proba- bility or on whether there was a dis- possibility (depending specific the covery that but for the State’s failure to disclose request) the defendant would have refused to and plead would have trial. failed gone to Because Huebler to demonstrate that he would have refused to and would have plead guilty gone to trial had the evidence been disclosed before the we reverse plea, the district court’s order.

FACTS A fellow resident of Huebler’s viewed Hue- apartment complex bler with children in the swimming complex’s believed Hue- pool, children, acting bler was with the and called inappropriately the A police. seven-year-old girl who resided at the told the complex that her police vagina they Huebler touched buttocks and while swimming. were The child victim also stated that Huebler touched her occasions while in the inappropriately multiple swimming touching and that the occurred underwater. The pool police col- lected surveillance that showed Huebler and the videotapes girl to- in the gether days. on three pool

Huebler arrested and charged was lewdness with a child Huebler, under the age of 14. Counsel was appointed represent and counsel filed a motion discovery. Counsel also asked the attorney’s district office if it would provide access to surveil- lance yet had not received a videotapes; prosecutor copy from but police told defense counsel that the videotapes would be the public sent to defender’s office when the district attorney’s of- fice received them. Soon after the for the surveillance request arrest, only one month after his Huebler entered videotapes, a guilty to lewdness with a child under the of 14. age Huebler did file a direct appeal. conviction, than years judgment

More two after Huebler, counsel, with the aid of filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of in the corpus habeas district court. In his petition, that, alleged among things, Huebler other he had good cause for delay filing his petition because State had violated that, withholding surveillance He videotapes. alleged but for evidence, the State’s failure to disclose he would have refused arid to trial. The plead proceeded opposed State the peti- tion, arguing Huebler failed to demonstrate and preju- cause dice. The evidentiary hearing district court conducted an relief, granted determining Huebler that the evidence excul- was patory, had been withheld material to Hue- bler’s defense because lack of access diminished his counsel’s “ability provide sound defense.”

On the State appeal, argues district court did not use the materiality standard in appropriate deciding Huebler’s claim good delay was sufficient to demonstrate cause for his and to granted. agree warrant the relief We and reverse.

197

DISCUSSION delay petition a good filing between cause relationship for the test a violation petition the time in which a post-conviction NRS 34.726 limits a of convic- challenges judgment habeas corpus for a writ of within a must be filed may petition be filed. Such tion or sentence or, timely if a of conviction year judgment one after of after this court judgment, year taken from the within one appeal remittitur, delay. a of cause for the showing good its absent issues 1084, State, P.2d 34.726(1); v. 114 Nev. 967 NRS Dickerson 34.726(1) direct (1998) timely that NRS refers to (holding 1132 he filed his did not a direct pursue appeal, Huebler appeal). 26, 2006, years judgment more than two after the May petition 24, Thus, 2003. Huebler’s was entered on October of conviction a barred absent untimely procedurally filed and petition delay. for the good demonstration of cause 34.726(1), NRS delay petitioner cause for under good To show delay is not the fault of things: demonstrate two must “[t]hat “unduly preju will be petitioner and that petitioner” the first re untimely. dismissed as Under if the petition dice[d]” external to must show that an impediment “a quirement, petitioner with the state complying him or her from prevented the defense 248, 252, State, v. 119 Nev. Hathaway default rules.” procedural State, 349, 503, 110 (2003) (citing 506 v. Nev. 71 P.3d Lozada 944, 353, (1994)). “An external to impediment 871 P.2d 946 ‘that the factual or showing demonstrated defense be counsel, available to or reasonably a claim was not legal basis for officials, made compliance impractica interference that some ” Carrier, 478, v. 477 U.S. 488 Murray Id. (quoting ble.’ omitted)). (citations requirement, Under the second quotations underlying in the proceedings must show that errors a petitioner dis actual and substantial petitioner’s worked to judgment 952, 959-60, 710, Warden, 860 P.2d 109 Nev. Hogan v. advantage. court’s factual find (1993). deference to the district give 716 We cause, applica we will review court’s good but ings regarding Mueller, v. 304 de novo. See Lott tion of the law to those facts 2002) findings that district court’s (9th (stating Cir. F.3d error, re of law are questions clear but facts are reviewed for of 682, 686, Warden, 121 Nev. novo); also Lader v. viewed de see reasoning for review of (2005) (using similar P.3d counsel).2 ineffective assistance of claims of 235, 236, Colley 773 P.2d recognize 2We regarding the existence of (1989), court’s determination states that district however, discretion; an abuse of good disturbed absent cause will not be good To demonstrate cause delay, for his Huebler claimed below evidence, Brady by that the State violated withholding exculpatory withholding State’s evidence caused the *6 delay, and that the of the withholding preju- by diced him making involuntary. his good- Huebler’s showing cause therefore intertwined with Brady the merits of his claim.

“ ‘Brady and its a progeny require prosecutor to disclose evi- dence favorableto the defense when that evidence is material either ” Bennett, 589, 599, guilt or to v. punishment.’ State Nev. 119 1, (2003) Warden, 48, 66, 81 P.3d 8 (quoting v. 116 Nev. Mazzan 25, violation, (2000)). 993 P.2d 36 To a prove Brady the accused (1) must make three showings: the evidence is favorable to the accused, either because it (2) or impeaching; evidence, State withheld the intentionally either inadvertently; or “ ” ensued, i.e., and ‘prejudice the evidence was material.’ Id. Mazzan, 67, 116 Nev. at (quoting 37). 993 P.2d at When a Brady claim is in an untimely raised post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner has burden of and pleading prov- ing specific facts that demonstrate both of the components good- 34.726(1). cause showing required by NRS Id. components Those the second and third parallel prongs Brady of a violation: estab- lishing that the State withheld the evidence demonstrates that the delay defense,3 was caused an impediment external to the establishing that the evidence generally was material demonstrates would petitioner unduly be if the prejudiced petition is dis- Therefore, missed as untimely. Id. Huebler must establish both the second and third Brady of a prongs violation order to overcome the procedural time bar. claim Because a that the State committed a Brady violation requires consideration of both factual circum- issues, stances and legal we conduct a de novo review of the dis- Mazzan, trict court’s decision resolving Brady claim. Id. (citing 66, 36). 116 Nev. at 993 P.2d at

Guilty pleas Brady violations claim,

Before addressing the substance of Brady Huebler’s we must address a may threshold issue: a defendant challenging statutory under the current mandatory, scheme the time bar in NRS 34.726 is (Riker), 225, 231, 1070, discretionary. State v. Dist. Ct. 121 Nev. 112 P.3d Haberstroh, (2005); 173, 180, 676, 1074 State v. 119 Nev. P.3d 69 681 State, (2003); 860, 885-86, Pellegrini 519, (2001). v. 117 Nev. 34 P.3d 536 Brady 3Wenote that a claim still must be raised within a reasonable time after the withheld evidence was disclosed to or discovered the defense. See State, 248, Hathaway (2003). v. 71 P.3d 503 It is not clear whether Brady Huebler that he demonstrated raised his claim within a reasonable time discovering after it.

199 claim? arises be- validity guilty plea Brady of a assert This issue trial, guarantee the due of a fair process cause evolved from 86-87, Brady, 373 U.S. at and therefore has been described as a 263, Moussaoui, (4th 2010), 285 trial U.S. v. 591 F.3d Cir. right, guilty, but when a defendant he waives several constitutional pleads trial, a fair guarantees, including right any the due process Henderson, Tollett v. entry errors that occurred before 469, (1973); Nev. 538 P.2d 164 411 U.S. 258 Webb v. 91 (1975). never in a whether a published opinion We have addressed claim plea.4 can survive federal circuit courts of have held that a appeals

Several challenge validity guilty plea. violation be asserted to U.S., 1448, (9th 1995); 50 F.3d 1453 Cir. White E.g., v. Sanchez U.S., 416, (8th 1988); Angliker, v. 858 F.2d Cir. Miller v. 848 Marshall, (2d 1988); v. Campbell F.2d 1319-20 Cir. (6th 1985); Sturgeon, F.2d Cir. accord State (Wis. 1999). Ct. But see Matthew v. John- App. N.W.2d son, (5th 2000) (holding 201 F.3d 353 Cir. that failure to disclose *7 render entry guilty evidence before of does not exculpatory plea Circuit, violation). The Ninth involuntary Brady or constitute plea “ that ‘a defendant’s decision whether has reasoned example, heavily appraisal is often influenced his plead guilty or not ” waiver to trial “can- right case’ and a of prosecution’s if ‘entered without ‘intelligent voluntary’ not be deemed ” withheld knowledge prosecution.’ of material information Miller, Sanchez, 1320). A 848 F.2d at (quoting 50 F.3d at 1453 Circuit, decision, to the Ninth could contrary according tempt information as deliberately “to withhold prosecutors exculpatory Id. guilty of an to elicit part attempt pleas.” challenge guilty to a allowing those decisions validity The of called into fol- Brady question violation have been based on a plea decision in United States the United States Court’s lowing Supreme Ruiz, to date (2002)—the only Court’s decision 536 U.S. 622 v. context. See U.S. Brady guilty-plea addressed in the that has Danzi, 120, (D. 2010) (discussing F. 2d 127 Conn. 726 Supp. Ruiz). In that circuit based on challenge precedent government case, require the Constitution does not Court held that Supreme in- information related to impeachment to disclose prosecution entering agreement a plea other witnesses before formants or Ruiz, ad- Court did not 536 U.S. at 625. a defendant. Ruiz information; as a re- obligation exculpatory dress the to disclose sult, en- whether the Court’s decision also courts have as to split entry guilty agree claim survives the of parties here that a 4The that rule opening in its brief particular, “[t]o In the State observes gamesmanship unacceptable of into an level otherwise could introduce litigation.” compasses exculpatory Compare information.5 U.S. v. Conroy, 174, (5th 2009) 567 F.3d 178-79 Cir. (rejecting argument that Ruiz implied evidence must be exculpatory guilty disclosed before entered), plea with McCann v. Mangialardi, F.3d 787- (7th 2003) Cir. (reasoning that “it highly likely” based on language in indicating significant “a distinction between im- Ruiz peachment information and evidence” that exculpatory Supreme Court would require prosecution exculpatory disclose Moussaoui, entered). before plea is See also 591 F.3d at 285-86 (discussing differing opinions regarding scope Ruiz dicta but leaving issue unresolved prosecutor because did not with- evidence). hold exculpatory We are persuaded by language in Ruiz and due process may considerations that a defendant challenge the validity of a guilty based on the plea prosecution’s failure to dis- close material exculpatory information before of the plea.6 holding

In that the Constitution does not require prosecution to disclose information before a impeachment is en- tered, the Court focused on the nature of infor- impeachment Ruiz mation and its limited value in deciding whether to plead guilty. The Court first looked to the requirements for a knowing and vol- “[ejvidence 5“Exculpatory tending evidence” is defined as to establish a (9th criminal Dictionary 2009). defendant’s innocence.” Black’s Law ed. “Impeachment evidence” is defined as used to undermine a wit “[e]vidence credibility.” ness’s Id. recognize piece 6We that the same of evidence be characterized as both Greene, impeachment evidence. Strickler v. 527 U.S. Cf. (1999) (rejecting argument 282 n.21 that withheld inculpatory evidence was and therefore did fall under because Court’s “cases make clear that Brady’s that, requirements disclosure extend to materials whatever their other characteristics, may witness”). impeach be used to Before this distinc Ruiz made types tion little difference because both of evidence were treated as fa subject vorable to the Brady. defense and to disclosure under See United Bagley, States v. 473 U.S. (explaining impeachment ev idence well as as evidence falls under and that “Court has *8 rejected any . . . impeachment distinction between evidence exculpatory and evidence”). case, purposes For of this we need not address whether leaves Ruiz open possibility types the that certain impeachment of information must be dis entry guilty (Thomas, J., closed before plea, see 536 U.S. at 633 con or, curring judgment), any in if challenge does foreclose based on Ruiz information, impeachment withheld recognize greater whether we pro should Constitution, tections under the Due Process the Clause of Nevada Roberts cf. State, (1994) (relying 110 Nev. 881 P.2d 1 process guar on state due adhering antee materiality in to different tests for depending claims specific request, whether there was a despite contrary Supreme Court deci sions), grounds by overruled on other Foster v. 13 P.3d Pleas, (2000). Disclosure, McMunigal, Guilty See also Kevin C. and Convictions, Wrongful (discussing Case W. Res. L. Rev. 651 flaws reasoning). in Court’s The State not precludes Ruiz has asserted that the Ruiz granted by relief the district court impeach because evidence at issue is evidence; therefore, ment exculpatory evidence rather than are those issues for day. another The that difficult untary explained particularly Court plea. “[i]t as critical information of impeachment to characterize information always guilty be aware to prior pleading which the defendant must not, may, may in which information or way the random such given the value in- impeachment a defendant” because of help particular own upon independent formation “will defendant’s depend case—a matter that the knowledge potential of the prosecution’s ’ Ruiz, 536 does not to disclose.’ require prosecutors Constitution limited value of evi- impeachment U.S. at 630. Because of dence, im- distinguish being the Court was reluctant to it as more may igno- which a defendant be than other information of portant voluntary a Id. at 630-31. knowing plea. rant but still enter Court then turned to the due considerations process Ruiz in the nature of the Brady, weighing private that led to its decision stake, any ad- safeguard, interest at the value of the additional gov- would have on the safeguard verse that the additional impact Id. at 631. the Court Specifically, repeated ernment’s interests. value the nature of information limited the added of impeachment And the guilty. a that information before Court right pleading to have added value right the idea that the additional would rejected reducing plead guilty, in the chance that innocent individuals would in that agreement pros- in because the case stated part plea establishing the factual “provide ‘any ecution would information ” in- Against private the defendant.’ Id. the limited innocence of value, an obligation added the Court determined that terest and a guilty plea information before of impeachment provide interest in se- seriously interfere with Government’s “could by de- factually justified, that are desired curing guilty those pleas fendants, justice.” the efficient administration of to secure help considerations, held that “the Constitu- the Court Id. Given these material im- to disclose does not Government require tion a agreement a entering plea prior peachment Id. at 633. criminal defendant.” in that led to the decision In our the considerations opinion, Ruiz it to material ex- conclusion when comes do not lead to same informa- impeachment While the value of information. culpatory into come primarily on innumerable variables depend tion it than critical infor- arguably and therefore make less at trial play ex- cannot be said of entering guilty in same plea, mation information, in relation to special just which is culpatory to whether a plea fairness of a trial but also relation reason, the due calculus also process valid and accurate. For this State to dis- safeguard requiring in favor of the added weighs enters before the defendant material information close a crime accused of day person that an innocent every It is not enter- information before right but a pleads guilty, that innocent persons diminishes the ing guilty possibility *9 202 See Kevin C. guilty.

accused of crimes will plead McMunigal, Pleas, Disclosure, Convictions, Guilty Brady and Wrongful 57 L. (discussing Case W. Res. Rev. 651 reasons that innocent might defendant plead guilty how disclosure in the context reduce guilty-plea helps pleas). risk of such The distinction between exculpatory impeachment information in this respect recognized in the Court’s focus on the Ruiz implicitly disclosure case, in the in that requirement plea agreement which that provided the prosecution “any would disclose establishing information the factual innocence the defendant.” 536 U.S. at 631. Unlike in Ruiz, it is information that could the establish factual innocence of turn, information—that is at defendant—exculpatory issue. In government adverse on the of an impact obligation to provide significant information is not as as the impact of an ob- ligation to provide information. And impeachment importantly, “ the added safeguard comports the prosecution’s ‘special ” Greene, Strickler v. role ... in the search for truth.’ 527 U.S. 263, see also (1999); 610, 618, Jimenez (1996) (“The 918 P.2d prosecutor represents state duty and has a to criminal justice see that is done in a prosecu- tion.”); Justice, ABA Standards for Criminal Prosecution Function 3-1.2(c) (3d 1993) (“The Standard duty ed. of the prosecutor is to id. cmt. justice, merely convict.”); (“[f|t seek is funda- mental that the prosecutor’s obligation is protect innocent as well as to convict the guilty, guard rights of the accused as well rights as to enforce the of the We public.”). therefore hold that a defendant challenge validity of a based failure to material prosecution’s disclose information 3.8(d) before of the RPC (providing “prose- Cf. “[mjake cutor in a criminal timely case shall” disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the' prosecutor that negate guilt accused”). tends to context, however, The guilty-plea a requires different approach to the prejudice of a component Prejudice violation. for pur- poses violation requires showing that the withheld ev- idence is “material.” Normally, evidence is material if it “creates Mazzan, a reasonable doubt.”7 at Nev. 993 P.2d at 41. That standard of materiality is not in the helpful guilty-plea context because the defendant guilt. has admitted In a materi- fashioning explained 7Wehave request only gen that when there was no defense or evidence, request eral defense for withheld evidence “creates a reasonable doubt” when probability “there is a reasonable that the result would have been Mazzan, different if the evidence had been disclosed.” 116 Nev. at evidence, specific request P.2d at 41. But after a withheld evidence “cre ates a reasonable “there possibility doubt” when is a reasonable undisclosed evidence would have affected the outcome.” Id.. context, we must be mindful that ality pleas test in that also valid and that the defendant therefore bears are presumptively *10 validity guilty plea. when the See heavy challenging burden 185, 190, 533, State, (2004). P.3d 537 Molina v. 120 Nev. 87 considering this issue have a standard of applied Other courts the withheld evidence materiality that is based on the relevance of “whether there is a rea- plead guilty: to the defendant’s decision to that the failure to sonable but for disclose probability material, the defendant would have refused to and would plead Sanchez, materiality have trial.” 50 F.3d at 1454. This test gone to ineffective- is similar to the test that is used to evaluate prejudice Hill by guilty. assistance claims a defendant who has pleaded Cf. Lockhart, (1985) 474 52 that to establish (holding preju- v. U.S. claim, defendant who pleaded dice of ineffective-assistance prong that but for coun- guilty probability must demonstrate reasonable guilty deficient he would not have performance pleaded sel’s trial). that this ma- going would have insisted on to We conclude for claims teriality materiality test best test used parallels are ensuring guilty pleas in the trial context while also that not set forth materiality set aside. We therefore test lightly adopt U.S., 1448, (9th 50 F.3d 1454 Cir. the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez State, in Roberts v. 110 Nev. 1995), but we adhere to our decision 1121, (1994), grounds by P.2d 1 overruled on other Foster v. 881 State, 1088, (2000), materi- 116 Nev. 13 P.3d 61 to use separate there was a ality specific request tests on whether depending Thus, made a specific request, defense. when the defendant has evidence material in the context if there is guilty-plea withheld the evi- a that but for the failure to disclose possibility reasonable have and would have plead dence defendant would refused going insisted on to trial. bar, Kentucky, Padilla v. materiality high test is cf. test as (describing U.S. 371 ineffective-assistance bar”), objective compo

“high subjective that involves both matter, affirmatively a defendant must assert nent. As threshold to trial. guilty going that he would have not and insisted on pleaded Hill, claim at 60 ineffective-assistance be (rejecting See U.S. that, had allege petition in his habeas petitioner cause “did not date, eligibility he correctly parole informed him about his counsel trial”). guilty going have not and insisted on pleaded would validity But the and reasonableness subjective That is a assertion.8 summarily the State petition asserts that failure of 8Huebler’s “[b]ut evidence, pled guilty pro have turn over this would not [he] determine whether this assertion ceeded to trial.” We have not been asked to evidentiary hearing. Hargrove v. warrant an See as sufficient to (1984). 686 P.2d 222 of that assertion evaluated subjective through objective must be an analysis considering totality of the circumstances. See Ostran Green, (4th 1995) der v. (discussing 46 F.3d Cir. preju observing analysis dice of Hill and that prong “[ojbjective only workable prejudice prong probably applying means Netherland, Hill”), grounds by overruled on other O’Dell v. Sanchez, (4th 1996); F.3d 1214 Cir. see (ex also 50 F.3d at 1454 in plaining materiality test for violation con guilty-plea text is “an objective likely one centers on ‘the persuasiveness ” of the withheld information’ with to decision whether to respect Miller, 1322)). 848 F.2d at plead (quoting Accordingly, the court objective must consider factors to determine whether a rea sonable defendant the same circumstances as petitioner would have pleaded and insisted on going to trial. See Ostrander, 46 F.3d at 356.

Cases from other jurisdictions guidance useful eval- provide for that, uating whether there is a probability/possibility reasonable but evidence, for the failure to disclose the exculpatory defendant would have refused to and plead guilty would have insisted on trial. going to In the particular, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, which the adopted materiality has same for inquiry claims context, based on withheld in exculpatory evidence the guilty-plea has the developed following list of factors to consider in applying materiality the test:

(1) the relative strength and weakness of the State’s case and case; (2) the defendant’s the persuasiveness of the withheld evidence; reasons, (3) the if any, by the defendant expressed choosing guilty; (4) to plead the benefits obtained the defendant in exchange for the and the plea; thoroughness of the plea colloquy. Sturgeon, (Wis. 1999).9

State v. 605 N.W.2d Ct. App. considerations, We agree these are relevant but we also em- an phasize this is not exhaustive list and that particular “[t]he case other relevant present considerations.” Id. With these mind, in considerations we turn to the district in court’s decision this case. held, Sturgeon, Supreme light 9Since the Wisconsin Court has in of the Ruiz, Supreme process require Court’s decision that “due does the not dis exculpatory impeachment closure of material information before a defendant Harris, bargain.” (Wis. 2004). enters into a State v. N.W.2d Sturgeon

But the court declined an invitation to overrule deter has not process mined requires purely exculpatory “whether due the disclosure of in prior plea bargain.” formation ato Id. at 750 n.15. ruling district court’s in this case The that the State withheld exculpatory The district court concluded the evidence was mate (the surveillance and that tapes) “ability affected trial counsel’s adversely rial because its absence On the State has focused on appeal, a sound defense.”10 provide of the court’s decision. We do so materiality component the district that the evidence was not material.11 as well and conclude the conclusion that Huebler failed to support The relevant factors a reasonable that he would have refused possibility demonstrate gone tapes and would have to trial if surveillance plead entry delivered to counsel before plea. had been granted suggests that the district court also relief based on 10Huebler recording alleged police an of his inter State’s failure to disclose audio-video this The district court’s order does not mention view before alleged recording, we not failure to disclose this are convinced recording ground the district court’s decision provides an alternative to affirm therefore, First, interview, and participated Huebler in the for three reasons. any Brady claims related to the interview or ineffective-assistance-of-counsel timely recording reasonably petition. in a were available to be raised and Second, therefore, had no vi exculpatory, and Huebler the interview was not alleged good-cause allegation on the State’s failure claim or based able recording any recording. finally, assuming had ex And even to disclose value, it was material. culpatory Huebler failed to demonstrate materiality compo 11Although appeal primarily on the the State’s focuses decision, regarding are in order court’s a few observations nent of district components of Huebler’s the district court’s decision on other two withheld evidence. claim: that the State it because court determined that the evidence district entirely tapes tend charged.” It clear that to show the crime “fails that Huebler because the victim indicated to establish Huebler’s innocence what vagina tapes and the do not show her underwater touched buttocks description of the questions the district court’s occurred underwater. The State *12 argument is not that the evidence exculpatory in the context of its evidence as argue exculpatory and therefore that the evidence is not material but does not challenged the dis- duty the State has not disclose it. Because there was no to pre- exculpatory, question that is not evidence is trict decision that the court’s and we do not answer it. sented here withheld that the evidence had been court also determined The district that it considered from the district court’s order the State. It is not clear through diligent videotapes have been uncovered whether the surveillance could 479, 495, P.2d 960 investigation by the defense. See Steese v. 321, (1998) (“Brady require the State to disclose 331 does not sources, including diligent in from other which is available to the defendant defense.”). support in the record to vestigation by the There are some facts evidentiary hearing, trial counsel ac Huebler’s a conclusion. At the such of the surveillance video knowledged that she was informed of the existence Also, report, Huebler’s guilty plea. police which tapes prior to Huebler’s police the name of the de acknowledged possession, in her stated counsel relating videotapes. of the to the collection questions to tective contact challenge decision that the district court’s Again, the State does not because withheld, resolve this issue. we need not the evidence was 206

First, there guilt was substantial evidence of Huebler’s given victim’s statements and Huebler’s statements regarding touching the victim and molestation past allegations involving young girls. Second, the withheld evidence is not particularly persuasive; the underwater, surveillance tapes any did not record events and there- fore, Thus, do not refute the victim’s claims. as noted in the mar- above, gin it is questionable whether the were tapes at Third, all. testimony presented evidentiary at the hearing demonstrated that Huebler insisted on entering guilty Trial plea. testimony counsel’s indicated that she told they Huebler that “needed to look at the discovery” before he pleaded guilty and why they she told him needed to do that but that he insisted on Fourth, moving forward guilty with the plea.12 Huebler received a benefit from entry guilty of the as the plea charges were reduced any and investigation into additional potential charges ended. Fi- nally, Huebler indicated by signing the guilty plea agreement that he entered the plea voluntarily and knowingly. Based on these factors, it is clear that pre-plea disclosure of the surveillance tapes would not have caused him to refuse to plead guilty and instead in- sist on going to trial. Because Huebler fails to demonstrate mate- fails, law, riality, he as a matter of to demonstrate that any errors in the disclosure of the tapes prejudiced him. The petition therefore procedurally barred pursuant 34.726(1). to NRS Accordingly, we reverse district order.13 court’s Pickering, Hardesty, and JJ., Parraguirre, Shearing, J., Sr. concur. 12Wenote there was little time requested for counsel to obtain the video tapes. charging alleged document that the offense occurred on or between , July 27 and 2003. preliminary The waiver of ap examination was filed later, proximately August three weeks arraigned on 2003. Huebler was in later, guilty days district court and entered August his ten 2003. Thus, just than elapsed more four weeks between last date on which the of fense occurred and of the suggests 13Huebler that the district court’s can decision be affirmed based on a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim—that trial counsel was ineffective for failing investigate copy to tapes. disagree obtain a of the surveillance We First, for two timely reasons. this claim could have petition been raised in a Second, delay. explain assuming Huebler failed to his even that the claim reasonably was not timely petition, available to be raised Huebler cannot instance, prejudice. demonstrate inquiry In this is the same as the materi ality prong claim: whether pleaded Huebler would not have Lockhart, going and would have insisted on trial. Hill v. U.S. (1985); Frye, see also Missouri v. (explaining S. Ct. applies that Hill standard when complains “a defendant that ineffective assis trial”). tance led him to accept plea opposed proceeding offer as ex As plained opinion, in this showing. Huebler failed to make that For these rea sons, Huebler’s procedurally ineffective-assistance claim is barred under NRS 34.726. *13 J., Gibbons, J., Cherry, with agrees, dissenting: whom held district court Charles Huebler had respondent demonstrated cause and prejudice untimely filing to excuse his for a writ post-conviction petition of habeas based on a corpus Brady Maryland, (1963), violation of 373 U.S. 83 that made his guilty involuntary and that Huebler therefore entitled plea guilty withdraw his The court now concludes that even as- suming by that the evidence was withheld the State and is excul- (two embrace), entirely court does not Hue- patory points failed bler to demonstrate that the evidence was material and therefore district court’s order must be reversed. I would con- clude that the evidence exculpatory by and was withheld State, but then remand for district court to the correct apply (as court). materiality test for set forth a agree I with court that claim survives the of a in that the State duty has constitutional disclose material information that is within the State’s posses- See, with entering plea agreement e.g., sion before a defendant. (7th 2003). McCann v. 337 F.3d 787-88 Cir. I Mangialardi, also find no fault in the court’s articulation of the com- prejudice claim, of such a that withheld evidence is material if ponent the defendant probability possibility demonstrates reasonable or evidence) on whether there was a (depending specific request that but for the failure to disclose the evidence he or she would going have refused to and would have insisted on plead I company my colleagues trial. Where must with part apply- claim the three to the facts and circum- ing prongs stances in this case. presented starting

-The is whether the evidence at issue is point exculpa- tory. suggests margin The court in the of its decision that the sur- may veillance not be because the victim de- videotapes scribed the lewd as underwater and the occurring videotapes acts what I agree do not occurred underwater. cannot this depict view, my are In suggestion videotapes exculpatory. they tend to establish Huebler’s innocence because videotapes an adult and child in a appropriate show interactions between any individ- swimming and show no conduct or reactions pool suggest any ual’s that would there had been lewd or lascivious part involving acts Huebler and the victim. the evi-

The next consideration is whether the State withheld decision, that suggests, again margin dence. The court in the of its ev- in the a conclusion that the support certain facts record would through diligent the defense idence could have been uncovered defense counsel have been able to contact investigation. While (the in- the videotapes police report law enforcement to obtain cluded the name of the detective who could be contacted with *14 duty related to the collection of the the questions videotapes), under is the and defense counsel had prosecutor’s, requested prosecutor the and been told that the would videotapes provide (albeit at some later time after unspecified them to defense counsel State, v. had been to the Jimenez they provided prosecutor). Cf. 610, 620, (1996) (“[Ejven the 918 P.2d if de- without the prosecutor’s knowledge, tectives withheld their reports and attorney charged knowledge ‘the state is with constructive law agents, of evidence withheld other state such as possession State, Gorham v. 2d (quoting enforcement officers.’” So. see also Allen (Fla. 1992))); 854 So. 2d (Fla. 2003) (stating duty defendant’s to exercise “[t]he reviewing in material after the diligence applies only due the State discloses it” therefore State obtained the re- “[o]nce analysis, sults of the hair it was to disclose them to the required defendant”).

The final is whether the evidence material. consideration On the this it is clear that district court did not the correct point apply materiality, instead that the focusing impact test for on video- had tapes’ “ability absence on defense counsel’s provide circumstances, sound Under the I would remand for the defense.” my district court to the correct test in the first instance. In apply view, a remand appropriate many because of relevant factors credibility involve factual and determinations that should be made by the district court. sum,

In while I applaud recognition court’s State has duty a constitutional to disclose material information within before with a de- possession entering plea agreement its fendant, agree I cannot with its of the law to this case. application Rather, I with the agree district court that the evidence at issue is and was withheld the State and would remand for apply materiality. district court to correct test for

I must also comment on footnote 13 and the discussion preced- ing footnote 12 in the I have reviewed the tran- majority opinion. evidentiary hearing of the in the court below and the testi- script mony at the and it provided hearing factually demonstrates both legally why Huebler should have been allowed to withdraw his and that the guilty plea ruling. district court was correct in its Trial counsel had defended clients with charged misdemeanors weeks, only began two and then representing charged clients year felonies. She had less than one of when she experience Huebler. This case was the first time counsel had represented rep- resented a defendant charged with a sexual offense and the first time one of her clients faced a life sentence. The record possible suicide, further reveals that Huebler had attempted on suicide watch, incredibly and was Huebler waived a depressed. prelimi- lewdness, nary hearing to to one count of and the second plead discovery had but requested count would be dismissed. Counsel recording did not receive either the video surveillance or video of existed, interrogation. Huebler’s Counsel knew these videos but had not received them. evidentiary at the that if she had re- hearing

Counsel testified videos, entering ceived these she could have Huebler from stopped enlightening Even more is counsel’s revelation plea. profound that after reviewed the she would have thrown finally tapes, she herself into traffic to Huebler’s prevent matter, Looking totality at the of circumstances in this contested I remand apply would this case back to district court to cor- whether Hue- materiality hearings rect test for for further can, fact, bler show so that his ineffective assistance prejudice In Court’s light Supreme claim is not barred. procedurally right recent landmark decision emphasizing importance *15 during bargaining, to effective assistance of counsel see plea Lafler (2012), it Cooper, imperative 132 S. Ct. a finding instant case be remanded to the trial court order that counsel, en- be made as to whether trial who allowed to be ineffective. discovery, tered without the benefit of crucial SCHETTLER; SCHETTLER, T. T. VINCENT VINCENT TRUST, of VINCENT T. SCHETTLER LIVING Trustee CORPORATION, v. RALRON CAPITAL Appellants, Respondent. Corporation, Nevada

No. 56508 3,May 275 P.3d 933

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Huebler
Court Name: Nevada Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 26, 2012
Citation: 275 P.3d 91
Docket Number: 50953
Court Abbreviation: Nev.
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