State v. HudsonState v. Hudson
O P I N I O N
Rendered on the 9th day of May , 2014.
FROELICH, P.J.
{¶ 1} In this reopened direct appeal, Rayshaun Hudson appeals from his sentence for two counts of felonious assault, two counts of tampering with evidence, one count of possession of drugs, one count of possession of criminal tools, and one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. Hudson claims that the trial court erred by
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, the trial court‘s judgment will be reversed to the extent that it requires Hudson to pay court-appointed counsel fees, and the matter will be remanded for resentencing on that issue. In all other respects, the trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed, as previously modified.
I.
{¶ 3} Hudson was convicted after a jury trial of the above offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 42 years in prison. At sentencing, the court did not mention court costs or court-appointed counsel fees, and the court‘s original judgment entry, filed on December 23, 2008, did not include a requirement that Hudson pay court costs or court-appointed counsel fees. On April 15, 2009, the court filed an amended judgment entry, which stated: “Defendant is ORDERED to pay all costs of prosecution, Court appointed counsel costs, and any fees permitted pursuant to law.”
{¶ 4} Hudson appealed from his convictions, claiming that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying him a continuance of the trial, (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him for firearm specifications in connection with each felonious assault, (3) his conviction for tampering with evidence was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (4) the trial court erred in failing to merge the felonious assault charges as allied offenses of similar import. We affirmed Hudson‘s convictions.1 State v. Hudson, 2013-Ohio-2351, 993 N.E.2d 443 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 5} In July and August of 2013, Hudson sought to reopen his direct appeal, claiming that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise seven claims on appeal, including the trial court‘s imposition of court-appointed counsel fees. On September 23, 2013, we ruled that Hudson‘s direct appeal would be reopened for the limited purpose of allowing him to raise the trial court‘s requirement that he pay court-appointed counsel fees. In addition, we modified Hudson‘s sentence to remove the possibility that he be required to perform community service should he fail to pay court costs. In all other respects, we overruled Hudson‘s motion to reopen his direct appeal.
{¶ 6} Hudson‘s supplemental assignment of error states: “The trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to notify the Defendant at sentencing that he would be required to pay court appointed counsel fees, or to orally inquire if he had the means to pay them.”
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} The State concedes, and we agree, that the trial court erred when it ordered Hudson to pay court-appointed counsel fees without notifying him of that requirement at
{¶ 9} Hudson‘s assignment of error is sustained.
II.
{¶ 10} The trial court‘s judgment will be reversed to the extent that it requires Hudson to pay court-appointed counsel fees, and the matter will be remanded for resentencing on that issue. In all other respects, the trial court‘s judgment will be affirmed, as previously modified.2
FAIN, J. and DONOVAN, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
Lisa M. Fannin
Joe Cloud
Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter