STATE OF OHIO v. JOSEPH HUBER
No. 98128
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
January 17, 2013
[Cite as State v. Huber, 2013-Ohio-97.]
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
vs.
JOSEPH HUBER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-548567
BEFORE: Keough, J., Boyle, P.J., and Jones, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 17, 2013
Susan J. Moran 55 Public Square Suite 1616 Cleveland, OH 44113-1901
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor BY: Marc D. Bullard Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Justice Center, 9th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, OH 44113
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Joseph Huber, appeals from the trial court’s judgment, rendered after a bench trial, finding him guilty of harassment with a bodily substance in violation of
{¶2} Huber was indicted on one count of harassment with a bodily substance in violation of
{¶3} State’s witness attorney Rick Ferrara testified that on February 23, 2011, he met with Huber, his then-client, in a holding cell on the 23rd floor of the Justice Center prior to a resentencing hearing for Huber on another case. Huber and Ferrara were seated across from each other at a table. Ferrara testified that he and Huber were discussing his sentencing recommendations when Huber suddenly turned to him, narrowed his eyes, and spit at him across the table. Ferrara said some of the spit entered his mouth. According to Ferrara, Huber then stood up, said “I ain’t taking no f—ing 25 years from no judge,” and knocked on the door of the cell. The guard appeared almost instantly and opened the door, and Ferrara left the cell. Ferrara immediately advised the prosecutor what had happened and that he would withdraw as Huber’s lawyer.
{¶5} At the close of the state’s evidence, the trial court granted Huber’s Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal with respect to
[no] person who is confined in a detention facility, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm another person, shall cause or attempt to cause the other person to come into contact with blood, semen, urine, feces, or another bodily substance by throwing the bodily substance at the other person, by expelling the bodily substance upon the other person, or in any other manner.
A violation of
{¶6} The trial court then took a short recess pending its decision. Before the verdict was announced, defense counsel informed the court that Huber had advised him during the recess that he wanted to testify at trial; counsel explained that it was trial strategy not to have Huber testify.
{¶7} The court found Huber guilty of violating
{¶9} A decision regarding whether to call a defendant to testify on his own behalf during the course of trial is a matter of trial strategy. State v. Harrison, 8th Dist. No. 57617, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4522 (Oct. 18, 1990); State v. Adkins, 144 Ohio App.3d 633, 646, 761 N.E.2d 94 (2001) (noting that “the decision whether to call a defendant as a witness falls within the purview of trial tactics”).
Although the ultimate decision whether to testify rests with the defendant, when a tactical decision is made not to have the defendant testify, the defendant’s assent is presumed. This is so because the defendant’s attorney is presumed to follow the rules of professional conduct and is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance” in carrying out the general duty “to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution.”
A defendant who wants to testify can reject defense counsel’s advice to the contrary by insisting on testifying, communicating with the trial court, or discharging counsel. At base, a defendant must “alert the trial court” that he desires to testify or that there is a disagreement with defense counsel regarding whether he should take the stand. When a defendant does not alert the trial court of a disagreement, waiver of the right to testify may be inferred by the defendant’s conduct. Waiver is presumed from the defendant’s failure to testify or notify the trial court of the desire to do so.
(Citations omitted.) Gonzales v. Elo, 233 F.3d 348, 356-357 (6th Cir. 2000).
{¶10} Here, defense counsel’s decision to advise Huber not to testify was a tactical one based on trial strategy. Although after trial Huber may have regretted his decision to
{¶11} In his third assignment of error,2 Huber contends that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the state failed to prove the mens rea element of the offense. Specifically, Huber contends there was no evidence that he spit at Ferrara “with intent to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm” him, as required by
{¶12} In reviewing a claim challenging the manifest weight of the evidence,
[t]he question to be answered is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In conducting this review, we must examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the [factfinder] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. (Citations omitted.)
State v. Goss, 8th Dist. No. 97348, 2012-Ohio-1951, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 81.
{¶13} Here, Ferrara testified that as he and Huber were discussing Ferrara’s recommendations regarding the resentencing hearing, Huber suddenly turned and spit at
{¶14} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR
