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State v. Howes
432 A.2d 419
Me.
1981
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*1 419 stock, 1285, (6th 1976); ing prosecutrix. 546 F.2d 1291 Cir. Yet several defense 57, Cooper, N.J.Super. Virginia State v. A.2d witnesses testified that indeed did 702, (1979) (quoting Greenberg making up charges involving v. Stan- admit 503, ley, 485, 833, 30 N.J. 153 A.2d prosecutrix. counsel, defense (1959)). Virginia, his carefully cross-examination of referring any alleged avoided incident say We cannot the error here that involving Darlene. guilt, harmless. The while evidence suf- conviction, ficient to sustain a is far from argues The also State later call- overwhelming. solely witness, It ing consists es- Darlene as defendant sentially testimony of uncorroborated any holding waived error. Such would prosecutrix.5 presented The defense evi- put strategically impossi- defendant in a dence which prosecutrix indicated position; jury ble was wrongfully once the had been up told her mother to make her incident, made aware of the other the de- story, prosecutrix evidence that had nothing fendant (hoping could either do for story admitted that her was not true. a reversal appeal), try could by explaining avoid conviction the circum- summary, In exposed prior charges, thereby stances of the taking extremely prejudicial testimony which was appellate the risk that the court would treat any not theory; prose- admissible under having objectionable him as “adopted” cutor, though the danger, aware of failed to testimony purposes. strategic We it; take steps prevent the defendant put refuse to that choice. promptly mistrial; moved for immediately was not disregard instructed to entry is: testimony; evidence supporting Judgment vacated. the conviction overwhelming. was far from Remanded to the Court for fur- comparable situations, it has been held proceedings ther opinion consistent that a mistrial have only would been the herein. appropriate remedy. See United States v. Carney, (3d 1972); 461 F.2d 465 Cir. State All concurring. Colvin, (R.I.1981). v. 425 A.2d 508 We need go so far. We do not decide whether prompt might instruction of have

removed the prejudice unfair in this case.

We simply conclude that on the record be- us,

fore did not receive a fair

trial. STATE of Maine further two “waiver” ar

guments First, made the State. argues that the defendant was aware John Francis HOWES. Virginia Goodrich’s retraction involved Supreme Judicial Court Maine. charges involving (the Darlene oth girl), er by questioning Virginia and thus Argued 1981. Jan. about her retraction he ran the risk of the July Decided jury hearing in rebuttal about those charges. argument assumes that de

fense Virginia counsel knew that in fact

had not any retracted statements concern- argues problem pros- 5. The State ear arose what could or of have ecutrix, e., (f. alleged sometime the date of caused it to the ear could a blow have infection, rape, it). only testimony had an ear corroborates her caused that blow testimony prosecutrix. that the defendant struck her on the struck came from the testimony ear. There is of either when the *2 appealed

Maine has entered favor of the defendant justice presiding John Francis Howes. The ordered such entered notwith- standing verdict which found *3 guilty defendant of the crime of arson com- of mitted in violation 17-A 802. M.R.S.A. defendant, against The indictment re- Superior turned March 1979 to the (Penobscot County), charged Court that the on April crime of arson had been committed a connection with fire that de- house, stroyed an uninhabited barn and shed situated in Patten and owned Gramling. Thomas Defendant was accused having arson, accomplice been an to the that, by having driven automobile at the fire, vicinity time had picked up people allegedly who several set the fire.2 trial, At State concluded its presentation evidence, defendant moved judgment acquittal ground for that the State’s evidence was insufficient beyond a establish reasonable doubt either that the fire result arson or that legally defendant accountable as an denied, accomplice. This motion was proceeded present defendant evidence in his own behalf. At the close all the Cox, Atty., Christopher David M. Dist. R. renewed his defendant motion for Almy, Gary (orally), F. Thorne Dist. Asst. judgment presiding jus- of acquittal. Attys., Bangor, plaintiff. for response tice made to the motion. After Anderson, Zendzian & Paul Zendzian finding returned its verdict de- (orally), Bangor, for defendant. guilty charged, fendant counsel for the reminded the McKUSICK, J., Before C. and WER- pre-verdict for NICK, GODFREY, that the motion NICHOLS, ROBERTS CARTER, acquittal ruling for be remained a to made. JJ. however, jus- appears, presiding It WERNICK, Justice. making ruling. tice continued avoid a Relying day, next filed a motion on the authorization set forth in 2115-A(2),1 M.R.S.A. State of stating that provision resulting prose- of the statute reads: trial or termination of the accused, ap- cution peal favor when may Appeals “2. after trial. An permitted by of the order would be taken from State jeopardy provisions double tion of the United States and of the Constitu- or the District Court to the law court after Constitution finding by jury trial and after a of Maine.” granting court from the motion trial, judgment, new from arrest of from dis- allegedly people set 2. None who these other requiring missal from orders a new other prosecuted. have been fire ever judg- “makes and renews his motion for cause defendant had moved at the close of acquittal ment of made at the close of all evidence, all the when no verdict had the evidence” returned, been for an order that asks, alternative, and also context, for a new be entered. In this trial. defendant, says notwithstanding that Rule motion, holding hearing presiding jus-

After M.R.Crim.P. authorizes the on this presiding justice granted defendant a tice to new trial contrary because “the verdict was “reserve the decision on . . . mo- [such] weight to the of the evidence.” Soon there- tion, submit the case to the after, asking filed a motion decide the . motion . . after it returns a justice to reconsider his order of a new trial ”, ... since, State, according ground ordered after the justice referred to proper is not a *4 jury guilty return of a verdict of must be ground granting under the law of Maine for held to “relate back” to the time before the appealed a new trial. Thé State also to the jury case went to grant Law Court from the the when defendant had of a new trial. moved, evidence, at the close of all the for a Subsequently, request par- at the of both judgment Thus, here, acquittal. of defend- ties, the Law Court remanded the case to maintains, jeopardy ant issue double Court for “such action as the approached to be presiding justice on the basis that necessary.” deems On re- mand, presiding justice judgment vacated his or- acquittal ordered entered entry der of a new trial and directed jury before the return of the verdict of judgment ground on the view, guilty. argues, On this “the contrary weight verdict was to the law of Maine makes United v. Wil- States 3 the evidence.” son, 332, 1013, 420 U.S. 95 S.Ct. 43 L.Ed.2d (1975) inapplicable, 1. 232 and causes Burks v. States, 2141, discuss, first, United 437 U.S. 98 S.Ct. We ap- whether the State’s peal is authorized under 15 M.R.S.A. L.Ed.2d 1 precedentially become A(2). precise issue is whether controlling require and to the conclusion 2115— judgment the State’s of ac- in this case cannot quittal, upon pre- entered the order of the 2115-A(2) lie under 15 because M.R.S.A. § after, siding justice notwithstanding, expose jeopar- it would defendant to double guilt, return of a verdict of dy. ground inadequate that the evidence was in defendant’s “relation back” conviction, law to sustain a would be con- conception option of the effect of the Rule protection against sistent with the double gives to reserve jeopardy by afforded the Fifth Amendment decision on a motion for of ac- to the Constitution of the United States4 quittal after the decide motion I, Article 8 of the Constitution of guilty. has returned a verdict of Maine.5 explaining Our discussion this conclusion argues jeopar- Defendant that the double violated, here, dy protection begins points. would be be- with two foundational presiding justice’s authority ordering Jeopardy 3.The 4. The Double Clause of the Fifth entry arises from Amendment to the federal Constitution states: any subject person Rule 29 M.R.Crim.P. Under that rule “nor shall for the same acquittal may put jeopardy “if be ordered the evi- offence to be twice of life or limb; dence is insufficient to sustain a conviction . . . .” Hence, we, parties agree, . . . .” as do presiding justice’s phraseology I, 8 of Article Section the Constitution intended legally him to provides person, mean that evidence was for the same Maine offense, that “[n]o support insufficient conviction. put jeopardy shall be twice of life or limb.”

First, interpret we appealability the double bar to is automatically avert- provision jeopardy of the (emphasis added) Constitution ed ...” where neither protection essentially Maine to afford like second trial nor guaranteed by jeopardy the double least, “at ‘further proceedings of some Amendment, binding clause the Fifth as sort, devoted resolution of factual through process on the states the “due going to the issues elements of the of- Amendment, of the law” clause Fourteenth charged . . .’” fense to the Constitution of the States. United will be a “successful “necessitate[d]” Hence, we heed the decisions of the Su governmental reversing . . . preme of the United States double acquittal.” Thus, [judgment] as held jeopardy respects: in two we them follow Wilson, supra, United exist- precedentially controlling delineating ence of a automatical- binding effect on the the fed states of ly appealability bar averts a protection eral Constitution’s against dou government arising from the constitutional jeopardy, ble and we them upon look protection because, against jeopardy double helpful guides regarding scope most adverting characterization in Martin protection against af Co., supra, Linen Supply at at 97 S.Ct. by the forded Constitution of Maine. 1354 of the critical facet of the Wilson Second, provisions we construe the holding: conferring ap of M.R.S.A. § verdict, “restoration peal rights on the cases criminal *5 trial, a necessarily new would if result manifesting the intendment of the Maine prevailed.” Id., 570, the Government at legislature to be at least as as broad was 97 S.Ct. at Congress that of of the United States distinguishable In our view Wilson is not when it enacted 18 3731. We so § U.S.C. because, there, government’s appeal light conclude “liberal post-verdict was an from a dismissal of construction” mandate in but whereas, here, appeal indictment State’s also because the language textual is post-verdict entry judgment 2115-A(2) is even comprehensive more acquittal insufficient to scope language than the of the stat federal warrant conviction. We so not conclude ute. therefore legislative pur take the withstanding jeopardy double conse pose be to right to make the State’s quences assigned judgment to such a appeal plenary constitutionally per as as is States, acquittal by Burks v. United 437 objective, missible. in United stated 1, 2141, 98 57 L.Ed.2d 1 U.S. S.Ct. Wilson, 337, 332, v. 420 States U.S. 95 S.Ct. prosecution, was a which there federal 1013, 1019, 43 (1975), L.Ed.2d 232 is binding on the further held states in Greene statutory “to remove all barriers 24, 2151, 19, v. 98 57 Massey, 437 U.S. S.Ct. appeals appeals Government and to allow (1978); cf. also Hudson v. State L.Ed.2d 15 per- whenever Constitution would — Louisiana, 970, U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. mit.” (1981). 67 30 In none these L.Ed.2d also, United See States v. Martin Linen cases a verdict of was there Co., Supply 564, 568, 1349, 430 U.S. 97 S.Ct. restored, thereby to ne could be avoid the 1353, (1977). 51 L.Ed.2d 642 govern cessity of second trial should the Proceeding from these foundational prevail appeal. ment propositions to the of the circumstances bar, regard case we crim at as definitive the the fact alone that a point Wilson, acquitted v. established United inal defendant has been for insuf States supra, ficiency and reaffirmed in United States v. of evidence does not suffice that, Co., jeopar Supply supra, protection against Martin in the double Linen make the Co., 570, Supply dy operative, thereby Martin Linen at to bar the words of 2115-A(2). 571, 1354, jeopardy 97 at “the 15 S.Ct. double under M.R.S.A. § 424 proposition expressly stated in dic- must defendant’s “re- —we Jenkins, tum in approach United States v. lation U.S. back” to the “reservation”

358, 365, 1006, 1011, 95 S.Ct. 43 L.Ed.2d 250 of provision decision of Rule 29 M.R.Crim.P. (1975), as follows: We think categorically unacceptable it attach a “relation proce- back” fiction to a jury,

“When a case has been tried to a dural primarily, authorization calculated Jeopardy pro- the Double Clause does not explained Supply Co., in Martin Linen su- appeal by pro- hibit an the Government pra, 574, at U.S. at S.Ct. viding that a retrial would not be re- quired judge in the event the Government “to is afford trial the maximum opportunity appeal. pend- successful in its United v. to consider with care a States Wilson, ante, 344-345, ing acquittal motion.” at 352-353 [95 1022-1023, S.Ct. at When 1026-1027]. regard In this we see no sound reason for applied principle this is to the situation pretending to return to a time past in the guilt where the returns a verdict of ignoring reality of the actual exist- but the trial court thereafter enters a ence of a that can be acquittal, per- restored should the State’s be suc- mitted. In that situation a conclusion simply impose cessful. We refuse to appellate court that the upon legislatively limitation contem- improper require does not plated plenary scope of the State’s criminal defendant to submit to a second appeal that would arise from so artificial a trial; the error can be on re- corrected technique permitting entry mand aof play appeal. come into to bar the State’s verdict.” short, agree fully pungent we com- ment Supreme Court of the United message conveyed also most co Jenkins, supra, States United gently, indirectly, even if in Martin Linen 420 U.S. at at S.Ct. 1011: Supply Co., supra. Justice Stevens there sure, “To prefer would wrote concurring opinion taking posi permitted Government not be tion that the fact alone *6 or that the of conviction acquitted in a criminal case was bars an entered, not be but this interest the appeal by government judg the from the defendant is not one that the Double acquittal. justice, ment of No other how Jeopardy designed pro- Clause was to ever, agreed Further, position. with that tect.” analysis majority opinion the of the treated as point determinative the that over We decide that in the circumstances above the insufficiency fact of for of this appeal, case the State has a evidence, jury agree the had failed to on 2115-A(2), under 15 from the M.R.S.A. § verdict; hence, a finding verdict Supe entered in the restored, existed to be rior Court. thereby automatically to avert the bar of jeopardy arising necessity from the government

of a new trial in the event the We turn to the State’s contention prevail appeal. should See also United presiding justice wrong that the Blasco, (7th F.2d 681 Cir. concluding that the evidence was insuffi 1978); Clemones, United States v. 577 F.2d support cient to defendant’s conviction. (5th 1978); Cir. United States v. Dre legal insufficiency The test of such itzler, (9th 1978). 577 F.2d 539 Cir. whole, whether on the evidence as a as light impor- favorably State, the critical substantive sessed most a acting tance thus rationally having attributed to the existence of a could not avoid a automatically guilt. it reasonable doubt as to defendant’s —that govern- agree averts a double bar to a that mental even from a the was insufficient evidence this case foreclose the reasonable could say existence a whether the fire was caused by doubt that defendant had been an accom- being a the dam- human “with intent to plice to arson. age destroy property”, or or disregard of “in a conscious substantial To convict the defendant of arson on endanger any risk conduct will that his accomplice the accountability rationale of destroy person damage property the or or required beyond the prove State was a another”, reasonable doubt that the crime of arson was committed someone that the required by 17-A M.R.S.A. rather defendant, otherwise, example, by than accident. promoting the intent of or facili- “[w]ith The evidence summarized above is insuf- tating crime, the . commission . . prove beyond ficient as a matter law agree[d] attempted] aid or aid[ed] that crime reasonable doubt of arson person to aid such planning other only had been committed. The evidence of committing the crime.” 17-A M.R.S.A. presented by arson Mr. was the conclusion 57(3XA) generated by Stevens. The conclusion was analysis, process evidence one that fire method of of elimi- Gramling nation, here, at property and, resulted from applied ar that method testimony Stevens, son was the of John legally must be deemed deficient in conse- investigator for the State quence Fire Marshall’s investigator’s inability to lo- opinion office. He his stated as origin cate the fire’s his con- failure to fire awas “human element fire.” He sider possible all causes. opinion by

reached his applying process principal source of the evidence on which generated elimination to evidence investigator’s conclusions were based investigation his of the fire site and his was an examination of fire site over conversations Gramling with Mr. concern year after the fire occurred.

ing presence fire-causing or absence of if Even we evi assume agents in the barn. Mr. Stevens first visit sufficient, dence on issue of arson ed the scene of fire fourteen months the record contains no evidence to show after it occurred. He described the area as participated way in any completely overgrown, burned out and support crime. There was evidence to he admitted that he was unable deter jury finding that defendant was with sever mine origin. the location of the By fire’s al friends in a car at the scene of the crime process of he indulged elimination the as apparently and that driver sumption the fire started in barn. the ear when it left the scene of fire. assumption, however, was contradicted However, showing a defendant’s Mitchell, neighbor Ernest of Mr. *7 presence mere at the scene of a crime is Gramling apparently and the first witness inadequate prove accomplice him fire, gave to reach the scene who of the crime. Ger commission State v. testimony uncontroverted that the fire vais, Me., (1978). 394 A.2d 1183 in the Mr. started house. Stevens’ testimo ny knowledge no reveals of the contents of The other evidence offered cross-examination, alleged house. State on the issue of defendant’s acknowledged Mr. investi with Stevens that no involvement the fire the testimo- gation regarding had ny concerning been made several of Mr. Stevens interview incendiary present materials were he and Officer with Police Hunt conducted addition, 15,1978, despite the barn. his conclu June almost defendant on fourteen sion fire was “human element months the fire. defendant was The fire”,6 acknowledged rights Mr. Stevens that he and con- advised of his Miranda way fer to have started there other a fire that fire or was no 6. Mr. Stevens what he understood explained somebody respon- except being the term “human element fire” to mean: “a sible.” or to have person persons responsible had been precise versation with Mr. Stevens Officer issue is whether the State’s tape. Testifying Hunt was recorded on appeal acquittal, en- conversation, memory to his of that Mr. upon presiding tered the order of the Stevens said that defendant had told him justice after, notwithstanding, return that he knew at the time he [defendant] guilt, ground Gramling arrived at property that sev- inadequate the evidence was in law eral companions of his fire intended set conviction, to sustain a would be consist- However, buildings. when Mr. Ste- protection against ent with transcription vens was shown the accurate afforded the Fifth Amend- tape of the recorded and was asked to lo- ment to the Constitution of the United transcript cate in the the statements of I, States and Article 8 of Consti- memory, had described from tution of Maine. Mr. point Stevens could to no such state- Defendant, transcript. ments in the a men- omitted). (footnotes To Majority op. at 422 adult, tally handicapped young testified in majori reach these constitutional issues the his own behalf. He stated that he knew of ty legislative pur first determines that the plans Gramling proper- to set fire to the 2115-A(2) pose in enacting 15 M.R.S.A. § ty either at the time he arrived at the scene right was “to make the State’s picked up companions or at the time he his permissible.” plenary constitutionally as is leaving as he was the fire scene. Majority op. legislative pur at 423. This Thus, the record contains no evidence ca- pose is declared to be same as that of pable being beyond proof a reasonable enacting a Congress the United States solicited, aided, doubt statute, 18 U.S.C.A. totally different agreed attempted to aid or to aid in the 3731,1 supported said to be commission of arson with the “intent of “liberal mandate of section construction” promoting facilitating the commission of 2115-A(6). majority Id. I inter 57(3)(A). the crime.” 17-A M.R.S.A. § I pretation of section because correctly acted in di- nothing legislative history find in the recting acquitted. that defendant be suggest purpose statutory remove all “to The entry shall be: whenever appeals barriers” and “to allow denied; permit.” quoting Id. constitution would 332, 337, Wilson, United 420 U.S. is affirmed. 1013, 1019, (1975). 43 L.Ed.2d 232 S.Ct. McKUSICK, J., GODFREY, C. legislature originally granted Our CARTER, JJ., concurring. NICHOLS and very rights limited in crimi- ROBERTS, dissenting separate opin- J. P.L.1969, prosecutions. nal ch. 547.' As ion. enacted, provided first 2115-A section ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting. appeal prior subsection limited decision, to trial “from a order or agree majority While I view on ..., suppressing court al- expressed merits in this case as in Part opinion, lowing indictment, II of the Court’s I would reach a motion to dismiss an appeal, neither the merits the State’s nor information, complaint quashing an ar- the constitutional issues discussed in Part I. suppressing rest or search warrant or *8 juris- appeal I would dismiss the for lack of P.L.1971, confession or admission.” ch. 215 diction. quotation ruling added to the above “or against any pretrial in order.” In majority identify jurisdictional

The State original issue as follows: version of section pertinent except part, (Supp. jeopardy 1. In 18 U.S.C.A. 3731 ... ... where the double 1981)permits by government prohib- appeal “from clause of the United States Constitution decision, judgment, prosecution.” or order of a district its further dismissing court an indictment or information appeals after were Supreme trial limited to cross States Court has ever con- found appeals. jeopardy protection any sistent with double permitting procedure conviction after original legislation The repealed trial court has entered a ac- of replaced by P.L.1979, ch. 243. The new quittal of evi- based an evaluation 2115-A(1) provided for expanded section an relating guilt dence to or innocence. right appeal prior of to trial while subsec- Against persuasive such indications provided (2) tion as follows: meaning (2) narrow of subsection is there Appeals after trial. An legislature the action of the in in may be taken the State from the (6) amending subsection as follows: or Court the District provi- 6. Liberal The construction. the law court after trial and find- liberally sions of this section shall be con- ing guilty by jury of or the court from purpose, pur- strued to effectuate its or granting trial, of motion for a new poses, insuring of tho is State able judgment, from arrest of from dismissal proceed to trial with all it tho evidence is or from other orders requiring a new trial te-introduee, legally entitled of view resulting or prose- in termination of the ability the limited of the State to have accused, cution in favor an when error reviewed after trial. appeal of the order permitted would be change originated, explanation without the double provisions of the debate, part of Committee Amend- Constitution United States and the ment “A” to regular L.D.1925 the second Constitution of Maine. Legislature. session 109th L.D.1925 (6) Subsection stated: proposed by an omnibus bill the Crimi- provi- 6. Liberal construction. Commission; Advisory major nal Law its of this liberally sions section shall be con- component complete was a revision purpose, pur- strued effectuate its dealing post-conviction statutes with review poses, insuring that the State is able to post-conviction (formerly corpus). habeas proceed to trial with all the it There are references in either the state- legally introduce, entitled to in view of ment of facts or the Commission an notes to ability the limited of the State to have expansion of the right appeal. State’s error reviewed after trial. original Given the fact that subsection accompanied statement of fact which (enacted P.L.1979, 243) ch. described the legislation this declared that the act “delin- legislative purpose narrowly even more pretrial rulings eates the and orders which explicit language than the of section 2115- may appealed by be the State and clarifies A, I would view the 1980 amendment as timing and nature cross-appeals by merely eliminating inconsistency rather criminal cases.” L.D. No. expansion than as an “to make the State’s Leg., (1979) (emphasis 109th 1st Sess. add- right plenary as is constitution- ed). ally permissible.” I would wait until persuaded I am original legisla- legislature unmistakably manifests such purpose quite tive modest. The broad parameters intent I before would define the language (2) granting in subsection by the Fifth Amendment mandated I, State a “from other orders United States Constitution or Article requiring resulting a new trial or in termi- of the Constitution of Maine. Section 8 prosecution nation of the existing legislation favor does I find that Since interpreted accused” must being appeal, limit- I would authorize ed, preceding immediately as were the cate- dismiss it. gories, dispositions involving adjudica- sufficiency

tion issues other than the interpre-

the evidence. I find that limited persuasive particularly light

tation

fact that this nor neither the United

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Howes
Court Name: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Date Published: Jul 17, 1981
Citation: 432 A.2d 419
Court Abbreviation: Me.
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