STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jim HOWARD, III, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 37627.
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise
Jan. 18, 2011.
248 P.3d 722
November 2010 Term.
A. Did the District Court Violate Rule 403 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence?
“[T]he Rules of Evidence generally govern the admission of all evidence in the courts of this State.” State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240, 220 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2009) (emphasis in original). “All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state.”
Morrison was nineteen years old and was described by one of the officers who testified as “[s]mall in stature, thin, blond hair, approximately five-five, five-six.” Evidence that he would avoid a mandatory three-year prison sentence by testifying against Ruiz was relevant to his credibility. The district court acknowledged that the evidence was relevant when it stated, “I think that once you talk about a reduction in sentence, the defense has the right to explore the extent of that reduction because I believe it goes to the credibility of the witness.”
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
The State has not argued that the error was harmless. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of conviction.
B. Did the District Court Infringe Upon Ruiz‘s Rights Under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?
Because we have vacated the judgment for the failure to comply with
IV. CONCLUSION
We vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case for further proceedings that are consistent with this opinion.
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON concur.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent. Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, argued.
BURDICK, Justice.
After a jury found Respondent Jim Howard (Howard) guilty of misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI), Howard proceeded to a bench trial on a felony enhancement charge for allegedly having two prior DUI convictions within ten years. The State submitted two copies of judgments of prior conviction for DUI. While the district court found the judgments admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, it found that one of the judgments was not entitled “full faith and credit,” as the judgment did not satisfy
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Howard was charged with driving under the influence and driving without privileges. The State sought to enhance the misdemeanor DUI charge to a felony DUI charge pursuant to
At the bench trial, held on July 9, 2008, the State offered as evidence the judgments of Howard‘s DUI convictions from Kern County, California (the “California Judgment“), entered on December 4, 2004, and from Kootenai County, Idaho, entered on December 10, 2003, to prove the felony DUI enhancement. After Howard objected that the prior convictions were not properly before the court, the State requested and was granted a continuance. When the trial resumed on July 15, 2008, the State again offered the two judgments, this time with different supporting documentation. To prove the prior DUI conviction from California, the State offered a copy of the California Judgment together with a seal and an attestation by the clerk of that court. Howard objected, arguing that the California Judgment did not comply with
On July 15, 2008, the district court ordered simultaneous briefing on the issue of whether
The State timely appealed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that double jeopardy barred Howard‘s retrial on the felony DUI charge and that the appeal was moot. The case comes to this Court on a petition for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As we wrote in Humberger v. Humberger, 134 Idaho 39, 41, 995 P.2d 809, 811 (2000):
In cases that come before this Court on a petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals, but directly reviews the decisions of the trial court. This Court will not set aside the trial court‘s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court exercises free review.
(internal citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The State contends that a prior judgment introduced to prove a DUI enhancement can be admitted into evidence and proved by satisfying the relevant I.R.E. provisions and does not also need to comply with
A. The district court erred in requiring the State to prove that the California Judgment satisfied
We first address which provisions govern the admission and proof of prior judgments of conviction in enhancement cases. See State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 536 P.2d 738 (1975) (considering State‘s appeal and finding that the lower court‘s dismissal was erroneous, even though ultimately holding double jeopardy prohibited retrying Defendant). This is an issue of first impression in this
To prove the felony DUI enhancement, the State put forth copies of judgments of conviction indicating Howard had been convicted of two DUIs within the past ten years. The district court stated that it was admitting both judgments into evidence, finding that they satisfied the self-authentication requirements of
The State does not challenge the district court‘s finding that the California Judgment fails to satisfy
1. The State did not waive this issue.
It is well settled that an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991). Howard argues that the State cannot raise this issue on appeal, because the State failed to argue why
When Howard objected to the State‘s admission of the California Judgment at trial, the State responded by arguing that compliance with the I.R.E. was sufficient. After trial, the State submitted a memorandum in support of admissibility of the California Judgment. The district court ordered simultaneous briefing on the issue of whether
2. If a judgment of prior conviction is admissible under the I.R.E., it does not also need to satisfy
The interpretation of a statute is a legal question over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007). The district court relied on State v. Prince, 64 Idaho 343, 132 P.2d 146 (1942), as precedent showing that a judgment of prior conviction submitted to prove an enhancement must comply with the I.R.E.,
Prince was decided before Idaho adopted the I.R.E.
The trial court should not have considered the admission of the out-of-court statements under
I.C. § 19-3024 . To the extent that this statute attempts to prescribe the admissibility of hearsay evidence and is in conflict with the Idaho Rules of Evidence, it is of no force or effect.I.R.E. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Idaho.“);I.R.E. 1102 (“Statutory provisions and rules governing the admissibility of evidence, to the extent they are evidentiary and to the extent that they are in conflict with applicable rules of Idaho Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect.“).
121 Idaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861, 864 (1992).
Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law of the United States or of this State, or rule prescribed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
(First emphasis in the original). The district court admitted the California Judgment under
If
The district court also erred in requiring the California Judgment to comply with
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any ... State ..., or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States ... by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
Numerous courts have held that
B. Due to the prohibition against double jeopardy, Howard cannot be convicted of the felony DUI enhancement.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall be “twice put in jeopardy of life or limb” for the same offense. Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” When a trial court enters a judgment of acquittal based on a determination that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a charge, the prohibition against double jeopardy bars retrying that charge. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144-46, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 1748-49, 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 121-22 (1986); State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 750, 536 P.2d 738, 745 (1975). The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent that it prohibits reexamination of acquittal by a jury. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467, 125 S.Ct. 1129, 1133-34, 160 L.Ed. 2d 914, 922-23 (2005).
Howard argues that the district court entered an acquittal on the enhancement charge based on its determination that the evidence, in the absence of the excluded California Judgment, was legally insufficient. The State argues that Howard was not “acquitted” of the enhancement for purposes of double jeopardy and that, if this Court rules in the State‘s favor, Howard can be convicted of the felony DUI enhancement without having to be retried in violation of double jeopardy.
1. The district court acquitted Howard of the felony DUI enhancement charge, triggering double jeopardy protection.
A trial court‘s order constitutes an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes if it “actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571,
Generally, double jeopardy is triggered even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were erroneous. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2178-79, 57 L.Ed.2d 43, 53-54 (1978) (“[W]hen a defendant has been acquitted at trial he may not be retried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were erroneous.“). However, there are certain cases, like State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003), where, as the result of an erroneous legal ruling, a defendant cannot be considered to have been “acquitted” for purposes of double jeopardy. In Korsen, the magistrate erroneously required the State to prove an additional element for trespass, and the magistrate dismissed the case upon concluding that the State failed to prove this additional, unnecessary, factual element. Id. at 717-18, 69 P.3d at 137-38. Due to this misapprehension of the law, the magistrate dismissed the case without resolving any factual element in the defendant‘s favor. Id. at 718, 69 P.3d at 138. Thus, on appeal, we held that the magistrate‘s dismissal did not constitute an “acquittal” that triggers double jeopardy. Id.
The State argues that Korsen is analogous to this case. According to the State, the district court erroneously required the State to prove the additional factual element that the California Judgment satisfies the requirements of
Korsen is distinguishable. The felony DUI enhancement charge under
The district court often used the term “full faith and credit” when referring to
A judicial record of this state, or of the United States, may be proved by the production of the original, or by a copy thereof, certified by the clerk or other person having the legal custody thereof. That of another state or territory may be proved by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a clerk and seal, together with a certificate of the chief judge or presiding magistrate, that the attestation is in due form.
(Emphasis added).
Furthermore, the district court used terms related to evidentiary issues when it discussed the “full faith and credit” issue. The district court framed the issue as follows:
Howard argues that because the State did not comply with either the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution or the Idaho Code, the State has not established the foundation necessary to admit the [California Judgment] and has therefore not proven [the] felony DUI conviction.... The State argues in order for an out-of-state judgment to be admissible in Idaho, Idaho courts cannot require more stringent rules than those found in
28 U.S.C. § 1738 , but instead, can allow judgments from sister states to be admitted with fewer requirements than that federal statute. The State argues admitting the California Judgment into evidence does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
(Internal citations omitted) (emphases added). The Order also states:
The burden on the State to present this proof in a form which satisfies not only the Idaho Rules of Evidence, but also
Idaho Code § 9-312 and28 U.S.C. § 1738 , is not onerous. State v. Martinez spells out how to provide the proper proof to the Court or to a jury.... It involves only a slight amount of effort.
(Emphases added).
For the State‘s argument—that the district court did not rule in favor of Howard on any of the factual elements—to be true, the State must be arguing that the district court‘s determination that the California Judgment did not satisfy
2. To ultimately convict Howard of the felony DUI enhancement would require retrying him in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy.
The State argues that even if double jeopardy has been triggered, Howard can still be convicted of the felony DUI without being retried. The State argues, in effect, that the district court already found Howard guilty of the enhancement; therefore, the district court‘s finding of guilt can be reinstated if we find that the California Judgment was properly admitted and proved by complying with
It is established that double jeopardy does not bar the appeal of an acquittal in cases where a jury first returned a guilty verdict. In Smith v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court explained:
When a jury returns a verdict of guilty and a trial judge (or an appellate court) sets aside that verdict and enters a judgment of acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a prosecution appeal to reinstate the jury verdict of guilty. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-353 [95 S.Ct. 1013, 1026, 43 L.Ed.2d 232, 246-247] (1975). But if the prosecution has not yet obtained a conviction, further proceedings to secure one are impermissible: “[S]ubjecting the defendant to postacquittal fact-finding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 [106 S.Ct. 1745, 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 122] (1986).
543 U.S. 462, 467, 125 S.Ct. 1129, 1134, 160 L.Ed.2d 914, 922-23 (2005).
In a bench trial, there is an analogous situation wherein double jeopardy does not bar the appeal of an acquittal. In United States v. Jenkins, the Court explained:
A general finding of guilt by a judge may be analogized to a verdict of ‘guilty’ returned by a jury. Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566, 584 (1st Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 658 [56 S.Ct. 383, 80 L.Ed. 468] (1936). In a case tried to a jury, the distinction between the jury‘s verdict of guilty and the court‘s ruling on questions of law is easily perceived. In a bench trial, both functions are combined in the judge, and a general finding of ‘not guilty’ may rest either on the determination of facts in favor of a defendant or on the resolution of a legal question favorably to him. If the court prepares special findings of fact, either because the Government or the defendant requested them or because the judge has elected to make them sua sponte, it may be possible upon sifting those findings to determine that the court‘s finding of ‘not guilty’ is attributable to an erroneous conception of the law whereas the court has resolved against the defendant all of the factual issues necessary to support a finding of guilt under the correct legal standard.
420 U.S. 358, 366-67, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 1011–12, 43 L.Ed.2d 250, 257-58 (1975), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (emphases added).
While the district court‘s statement strongly suggests that it would have found Howard guilty, this statement is not enough. It is not a general finding of guilt analogous to a jury verdict of guilty, nor is it a formal finding of guilt. Rather, it is dicta. The district court did not prepare special findings of fact on the elements of the felony DUI enhancement. Thus, even though the district court‘s statements strongly suggest that it would have done so, we are not able to determine that the district court actually resolved all facts necessary to support a finding of guilt against the defendant, and are not able to determine that the court‘s finding of “not guilty” is solely attributable to an erroneous interpretation of law.
In Jenkins, the United States Supreme Court held that the district court did not reach a general finding of guilt that could be reinstated if the government prevailed on appeal, noting that “[e]ven if the District Court were to receive no additional evidence, it would still be necessary for it to make supplemental findings.” 420 U.S. at 370, 95 S.Ct. at 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d at 259. Since Jenkins, the Court has continued to require a general finding of guilt by the trial court in order for this type of appeal to avoid the double jeopardy bar. In Lee v. United States, the Court found that strong statements of guilt made by the trial court did not amount to a general finding of guilt. 432 U.S. 23, 28 n. 4, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 2144 n. 4, 53 L.Ed.2d 80, 86 n. 4 (1977). The Court stated:
Both sides assume that the District Court‘s statements, made to justify denial of Lee‘s motion for judgment of acquittal, that he had been “proven (sic) beyond any reasonable doubt in the world” and that there was “no question about his guilt; none
whatsoever,” ... do not amount to a general finding of guilt. We agree that the court‘s comments, in the context in which they were made, cannot be viewed fairly as a general finding of guilt analogous to a jury verdict.
Id. (emphasis added). In Finch v. United States, the Court held that double jeopardy barred appealing the district court‘s dismissal for failure to state an offense even where the parties stipulated to the facts, because “no formal finding of guilt or innocence had been entered.” 433 U.S. 676, 676, 677, 97 S.Ct. 2909, 2910, 53 L.Ed.2d 1048, 1050 (1977). The Court explained that, “[a]bsent a plea of guilty or nolo contendere ... a verdict or general finding of guilt by the trial court is a necessary predicate to conviction.” Id.
We hold that double jeopardy bars Howard from being convicted of the felony DUI enhancement. The district court‘s order does not contain special findings of fact that enable this Court to determine that the district court entered a general finding of guilt on the felony DUI charge that could be reinstated on remand. If we were to remand to the district court with instructions that the California Judgment need not comply with either
IV. CONCLUSION
A judgment of conviction may be admitted and proved by satisfying the relevant provisions of the I.R.E. and does not also need to satisfy the requirements of
HORTON, J., concurring.
As there is only one aspect of the district court‘s opinion that is clear—the ultimate conclusion that Howard was not guilty of Part II of the Information—I concur with the majority opinion. I do not join in the dissent for only one reason: having repeatedly read the district court‘s Memorandum Decision and Order, I am simply unable to understand the reasoning underlying the conclusion that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that Howard had previously been convicted of two or more prior DUI offenses.
The dissent presents strong arguments why this case may be remanded without running afoul of Howard‘s constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy. In my view, this Court‘s inability to reach a unanimous decision is solely a product of our disagreement as to what the district court held. The district court‘s decision is internally inconsistent to the extent that the determination whether the district court reached its decision by implicitly ignoring the exhibits in evidence or reversing its decision to admit those exhibits without explicitly doing so (as the majority concludes) or whether the district court required the State to prove an additional element (as the dissent concludes) is almost a matter of conjecture. I join the majority only because the district court did not explicitly state that it was requiring the State to prove an additional element in order to find Howard guilty of Part II of the Information.
J. JONES concurring.
Chief Justice EISMANN, dissenting.
During the court trial on Part II of the information (alleging two prior convictions of driving while under the influence (DUI)) and on Part III of the information (alleging two prior felony convictions), the State offered Exhibit 7, which the district court described as “photocopies of what purported to be court records and court minutes (register of actions/docket) regarding an August 8, 2001, citation for DUI, and what appears to be a
At the continued trial, the State offered Exhibit 7B, which was a corrected Exhibit 7. As the district court stated in its memorandum decision: “At the continued trial on Part II and Part III, Exhibit 7B was admitted into evidence. Exhibit 7B comprises the same documents (in different order) as Exhibit 7, but with all the requirements of I.R.E. 902(4) and 902(1) having been met.”
Then, in the words of the district court, “At the conclusion of the evidence as to Part II of the Information, this Court ordered simultaneous briefing on July 22, 2008, by both sides on the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” The court then heard evidence regarding Part III and ruled that it had not been proved, but stated that it would revisit that ruling after considering the briefs regarding the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
With respect to Part II, the district court separately analyzed the Idaho Rules of Evidence and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In analyzing Part II under the evidence rules, the court held that Part II of the information had been proved. It wrote, “If admissibility under the Idaho Rules of Evidence were the end of the inquiry, Howard would be guilty of Part II, due to the admission of Exhibit 7B and Exhibit 8. However, that is not the end of the inquiry. This Court will discuss the Full Faith and Credit issues next.”
The district court then analyzed the requirements of
Thus, during the court trial, the district court admitted into evidence the California conviction. The court then ordered post-trial briefing “on the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” After reviewing the briefing, the court adhered to its prior ruling that the California conviction was admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. In fact, the court wrote that “If admissibility under the Idaho Rules of Evidence were the end of the inquiry, Howard would be guilty of Part II ....” (Emphasis added.) After upholding the admission of the California judgment into evidence, the court conducted its full-faith-and-credit analysis. During that analysis, the court stated, “In the instant case, because of the State‘s failure to follow either
Nowhere did the court state that the California conviction was inadmissible under its full-faith-and-credit analysis. It did not reverse itself on the admissibility of the evidence. Rather, it held that for Howard to be guilty of felony DUI, the California DUI had to be both admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence and entitled to full faith and credit under
By holding that Howard was not guilty of Part II based upon its “Full Faith and Credit
W. JONES concurs.
BURDICK, Justice.
Notes
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any ... State ..., or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States ... by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.
A judicial record of this state, or of the United States, may be proved by the production of the original, or by a copy thereof, certified by the clerk or other person having the legal custody thereof. That of another state or territory may be proved by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a clerk and seal, together with a certificate of the chief judge or presiding magistrate, that the attestation is in due form.
The district court found that the State‘s certificate complied withA copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this rule or complying with any law of the United States or of this State, or rule prescribed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any state, ... or of a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.