203 Mo. 600 | Mo. | 1907
From a conviction of burglary in the criminal court of Jackson county at Kansas City, the defendant appeals.
The prosecution was commenced November 1,1905, by information filed by the prosecuting attorney. The burglary for which defendant was prosecuted was committed on the 21st of October, 1905, by opening a transom in the building known as 509 West Eighth street, Kansas City. Miss Annabelle Beamguard rented and occupied a room in this house and worked for a restaurant near by. Her custom was to go to work about ten o’clock each morning and work until two-thirty in the afternoon. On the 21st of October, Miss Beamguard had in this room a black suit, a silk petticoat and a grip, with her initials on it, which were of the value of thirty-five dollars. When she.went to work that morning, she locked her door and window and when she returned in the afternoon, she found the door and window still locked but the transom up. She identified her clothing and satchel in the possession of the police, and they were offered in evidence on the trial. The evidence on the part of the State tended to show that the
The information is in proper form and no objection is made to it by the defendant. The court instructed fully on the facts necessary to constitute burglary and also instructed fully upon the presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property. The court also gave the usual ins4 mictions on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt and the credibility of witnesses, and refused the following instruction asked by the defendant: 4 4 The court instructs- the jury that if you find from the evidence that the officer, Bowling, who made the arrest of the defendant in his house, had no warrant for the defendant, and did not know that defendant had committed a felony, then .you will consider the evidence relative to breaking in defendant’s house, because defendant did not come out of the house. ’ ’
Various errors are assigned to reverse the judgment.
1. As to the objection that the testimony was insufficient to establish a burglary, the evidence, viewed in the light of the presumption of guilt from recent possession of stolen property, was amply sufficient to justify a conviction. The stolen goods were fully identified by the owner and were shown to have been safely deposited in her room when she went to work at ten o ’clock, and were found in the possession of the defendant on the succeeding night and a portion of them had been pawned by him on the very afternoon that the room of Miss Beamguard had been burglarized. The explanation given by the defendant and his witnesses of his possession of these goods was entirely a matter for the jury, and that they did not accept his story of
2. The learned counsel for the defendant has devoted much time both in the oral argument and in his brief to his objection that the police officers had no warrant to arrest the defendant at the time they entered his house and discovered the stolen property in his possession. There is no issue of unlawful. arrest or false imprisonment involved in this case. Whether or not the officer exceeded his lawful powers in breaking into the house in which he found the defendant in possession of the stolen property of Miss Beamguard, is wholly immaterial for the purposes of this case. The material facts which this evidence disclosed were the finding of the stolen goods in the possession of the defendant and his explanation of how he came by them. His story was that he had bought them in St. Joseph at a second-hand store three weeks before the night they were found in his possession. The objection that the officer had no warrant-was without merit so far as the issues in this case were involved.
3. It is next insisted that the court erred in permitting the prosecuting attorney to ask immaterial, impertinent and insolent questions. Not only is this assignment too general to call for a discussion by this court, but we have read the whole evidence and we find no reversible error on this account.
4. Finally, it is insisted that the remarks of the prosecuting attorney were such as to grievously prejudice the rights of the defendant. We have carefully read the remarks attributed to the counsel for the State in connection with the evidence in the cause and we find no such deviation from the evidence as to bring
It is sufficient to say that the explanation of these two witnesses of the- manner in which defendant came into possession of this stolen property was so utterly unreasonable as to call for the severest criticism by the counsel for the State. A careful examination of this whole record discloses no substantial error, but on the contrary it would have been strange had the jury reached any other conclusion than the one they did. The judgment is affirmed.