State v. HoustonState v. Houston
Rendered on September 16, 2010
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, for plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee.
Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and David L. Strait, for defendant-appellee/cross-appellant.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
McGRATH, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal by plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio (“the state“), from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting in part and denying in part a petition filed by defendant-appellee, Brett D. Houston (“Houston“), to contest his reclassification under Senate Bill No. 10 (“S.B. 10“), Ohio‘s “Adam Walsh” law. Houston has filed a cross-appeal.
{¶2} In 1990, Houston pled guilty to one count of a child rape under 13 without force and was sentenced to an indefinite sentence of 8 to 25 years. In May 2000, the trial
{¶3} The General Assembly amended
{¶4} In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (“Adam Walsh Act“), P.L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, codified at
{¶5} With the enactment of S.B. 10, Houston received notice from the office of the Ohio Attorney General that he would be designated a “Tier I offender” under the provisions of the AWA. On August 8, 2008, Houston filed a petition to contest reclassification under S.B. 10, asserting various constitutional challenges to the newly enacted provisions of the AWA, including a separation of powers challenge. The state
{¶6} On appeal, the state raises the following assignment of error:
THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN RULING ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 1,000-FOOT RESIDENCE RESTRICTION IN
R.C. 2950.034 , AS SUCH RESTRICTION WAS NOT A “NEW REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT” THAT COULD BE CHALLENGED IN DEFENDANT‘S PETITION CONTESTING RECLASSIFICATION UNDERR.C. 2950.031(E) .
{¶7} Houston raises the following seven cross-assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that retroactive application of all provisions of S.B. 10 violates the Retroactivity Clause contained in
Section 28, Article II, of the Ohio Constitution .SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that retroactive application of all provisions of S.B. 10 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of
Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution .THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that S.B. 10 violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Ohio Constitution.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that retroactive application of S.B. 10 violates the Double Jeopardy Clauses
of the Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution andSection 10, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution .FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that the lifetime reporting and registration requirements imposed upon the Petitioner under S.B. 10 violate procedural due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution andSection 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution .SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that S.B. 10‘s residency restrictions violate the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution andSection 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution .SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in failing to find that S.B. 10 violates
Section 16, Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution as it invalidated the terms of a valid contract – the plea agreement – which involved a lesser classification, ten years of reporting, fewer restrictions on conduct, no residential restrictions, and substantially reduced impact on his life.
We will begin by addressing Houston‘s cross-assignments of error, which, together, assert certain portions of the AWA are unconstitutional. Because disposition of Houston‘s third cross-assignment of error resolves his appeal, we first address it. We then address the state‘s sole assignment of error.
{¶8} Houston‘s third cross-assignment of error asserts the trial court erred in denying his petition to contest reclassification because application of the AWA‘s tier system of classification to offenders who were judicially classified under former versions of
{¶9} Statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and a party seeking to have a statute declared unconstitutional must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Brayden James, 113 Ohio St.3d 420, 2007-Ohio-2335, ¶13; State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 171. An appellate court‘s review of the constitutionality of a statute is de novo. See State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404.
{¶10}
{¶11} After the trial court denied Houston‘s petition to contest reclassification and he appealed, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued its decision in State v. Bodyke, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-2424. In considering a challenge to the constitutionality of the AWA, Bodyke concluded ”
{¶12} As part of its decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the history of Ohio‘s sex offender registration laws, emphasizing the importance of separation of powers and
{¶13} As Houston was no longer in prison at the time he received notification of his reclassification under the AWA, the attorney general used
{¶15} In Bodyke, the Supreme Court held the attorney general‘s reclassification of a sexual offender whom a trial court order previously had classified under prior law violated the separation of powers doctrine. As part of its conclusion, the court severed
{¶16} More recently, the court clarified the effect of the severance remedy in Chojnacki v. Cordray, ___Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-3212, which involved an offender whom the trial court had classified as a sexually oriented offender. The offender subsequently filed a petition challenging his reclassification by the attorney general, along with a request for appointment of counsel for purposes of the hearing on his petition. The Twelfth District Court of Appeals held that the order denying his request for appointed counsel was not a final appealable order and dismissed the appeal. On a certified conflict, the Supreme Court considered whether the order denying appointment of counsel constituted a final appealable order.
{¶17} The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the appeal as moot based on its earlier Bodyke decision that severed the statutory provisions governing petitions
{¶18} In this case, the only issue the state raises in its appeal arose from
{¶19} Accordingly, the state‘s assignment of error is moot.
{¶20} Having sustained Houston‘s third cross-assignment of error pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Bodyke, rendering moot his six other cross-assignments of error, and having rendered moot the state‘s assignment of error, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and dismiss the state‘s appeal.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and state‘s appeal dismissed.
BRYANT and BROWN, JJ., concur.