State v. HoseltonState v. Hoselton
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Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Brian J. Hoch, for appellant.
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OSOWIK, P.J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas which sentenced appellant, pursuant to a statutory enhancement provision set forth in
{¶ 2} Appellant, Larry Hoselton, sets forth the following sole assignment of error:
{¶ 3} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPROPERLY SENTENCED APPELLANT TO A THREE (3) YEAR TERM OF INCARCERATION PURSUANT TO ORC §2950.99 BECAUSE IT IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED AN ATTEMPTED FAILURE TO REPORT CONVICTION OF ORC §2950.06 AS A PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR PURPOSES OF ORC §2950.99.”
{¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to the issue raised on appeal. As a result of a prior qualifying conviction, appellant was required to register as a sex offender and abide by the accompanying mandatory reporting requirements established by
{¶ 5} On December 16, 2008, appellant was released from incarceration. Appellant furnished a residential address as required. A subsequent verification check of the address furnished by appellant established that he was not residing at the address he had provided. Appellant failed to provide an accurate, current address as required due to his sex offender status.
{¶ 6} On March 30, 2009, appellant, represented by counsel, entered a plea of no contest to one count of failure to verify his address, in violation of
{¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial court erred in imposing the mandatory term of incarceration pursuant to the enhancement provisions of
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} In order to assess the propriety of appellant‘s claim that the enhancement provision is inapplicable to this case, we are guided by the plain meaning doctrine. The plain meaning doctrine establishes that courts have no authority to bypass or modify the plain meaning of unambiguous legislative language. The practical implication is that
{¶ 10} We are similarly persuaded by this line of reasoning in the instant case. The record reflects that appellant had no prior conviction of failure to report. On the contrary, the prior conviction was for the offense of an attempted failure to report. We note that the plain and unambiguous language set forth in
{¶ 11} Given the plain and unambiguous meaning of the relevant statutory enhancement language, in conjunction with the facts of this case, we find that appellant‘s conviction is not encompassed by the enhancement provisions for past violations given that his past conviction was for an attempted violation, thereby removing it from the
{¶ 12} Based upon the foregoing, we find appellant‘s sole assignment of error well-taken. The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. We remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this decision. Appellee is ordered to pay the cost of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J.
_______________________________
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
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JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.