632 N.E.2d 993 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1993
On November 29, 1992, appellee, Calvin Horton, was arrested and charged with receiving stolen property (R.C.
On December 11, the state filed a petition for forfeiture of appellant's 1989 Chevrolet truck pursuant to R.C.
The state appeals from the court's motion to dismiss the forfeiture action and asserts a single assignment of error:
"The trial court erred in dismissing the state's petition and denying forfeiture upon the facts since R.C.
Appellant first points out that the crimes under which appellee was originally charged are felony offenses. Appellee was charged under R.C.
In the case sub judice, it is apparent that the property seized was determined to be contraband due to its relationship to the underlying criminal offense. Although appellee's truck itself could not be classified as contraband pursuant to R.C.
"If the property seized was determined by the seizing law enforcement officer to be contraband because of its relationship to an underlying criminal offense * * *, no forfeiture hearing shall be held under this section unless the person pleads guilty to or is convicted of the commission of, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit, the offense or a different offense arising out of the same facts and circumstances * * *."
Appellant construes R.C.
In State v. Casalicchio (1991),
"In holding that R.C.
Appellant argues that the statement in Casalicchio, supra, is dictum and, therefore, stare decisis does not require this court to hold that a felony conviction is required in order for property declared contraband under R.C.
"[A]ppellant submits that even if it had filed a forfeiture petition on the very day that appellee was arrested, forfeiture proceedings could not have proceeded until the appellee was convicted of a felony. While appellant's assertions may becorrect [emphasis added], this does not justify the delay infiling [emphasis sic] a petition for forfeiture for five and one-half months." Id. at 202,
We believe that this conflict was correctly resolved by the Sixth District Court of Appeals in State v. Lawson (1992),
In reaching its decision, the Sixth District Court of Appeals first undertook an analysis of the dictum pronounced by Justice Resnick in Baumholtz, supra, in light of her subsequent dissenting opinion in Casalicchio, supra, stating:
"It must be pointed out that even though the Supreme Court inBaumholtz, supra, stated the goal of the legislature in enacting R.C.
"`* * * R.C.
"The justice who authored the Baumholtz opinion, however, dissented in Casalicchio, supra, but stated nevertheless that `* * * R.C.
The Lawson court additionally conducted an independent statutory analysis of the pertinent portions of R.C.
"While R.C.
The court then stated the applicable rules of statutory construction as follows:
"In Wingate v. Hordge (1979),
"`It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the statute should be applied without interpretation. Provident Bank v.Wood (1973),
"In addition, R.C.
In Casalicchio, supra, at syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that forfeiture under R.C.
Appellant additionally claims it was error for the trial court to dismiss the forfeiture action because the municipal prosecutor, rather than the county prosecutor, initiated the plea agreement which allowed Horton to plead guilty to the underlying charges, reduced in degree from felonies to misdemeanors. Appellant apparently argues that, because the county prosecutor filed the petition for forfeiture and took no part in the plea arrangement reducing the underlying charges to misdemeanor offenses, the forfeiture action should not be barred. However, "[p]olitical subdivisions of States — counties, cities or whatever — never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have *469
been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions." Reynolds v. Sims (1964),
Appellant's assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
BAIRD and DICKINSON, JJ., concur.