70 Conn. App. 4 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2002
Opinion
The defendant, Major Holmes, appeals from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation and imposing a twenty month term of incarceration. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion to dismiss count one of the state’s long form information charging him with violations of probation
During his probation, the defendant was arrested on two separate occasions
As a result, the state charged the defendant in a three count, long form information with violating his probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32 (a). The court held hearings on October 27, 2000, and November 1, 2000, and concluded that the defendant had violated all three counts against him.
The defendant claims that the court improperly found that he violated the special conditions of his probation as alleged in counts two and three of the state’s long
We first set forth the legal principles that govern our resolution of the defendant’s claim. “A revocation of probation hearing has two distinct components and two purposes. A factual determination by a trial court as to whether a probationer has violated a condition of probation must first be made. If a violation is found, a court must next determine whether probation should be revoked because the beneficial aspects of probation are no longer being served.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hill, 256 Conn. 412, 425, 773 A.2d 931 (2001). Because the defendant challenges only the court’s factual determination that he violated the special conditions of his probation, we review only that determination.
“In making its factual determination, the trial court is entitled to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence. . . . Our review is limited to whether such a finding was clearly erroneous. ... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. ... In making this determination, every reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 425-26. “This court defers to the trial court’s discretion in matters of determining credibility and the weight to be given to a witness’ testimony.” State v. Garuti, 60 Conn. App. 794, 797, 761 A.2d 774 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 931, 767 A.2d 102 (2001).
Framing the issue squarely, the defendant asks this court to review the evidence on which the trial court made its factual findings and to conclude otherwise.
At the probation revocation hearing, the court heard testimony from, among others, the state’s primary witness, Frances Wilhoite, coordinating supervisor for the domestic violence and psychological education program at Project Search.
On the basis of the evidence before it, the court believed that it was more probable than not that the defendant had failed to comply with the attendance requirements of Project Search insofar as he failed to attend, or remain for the required time in, the mandated rehabilitative sessions on two or more occasions and that such absences were unexcused. The court acted properly in finding that the defendant violated the specific special conditions of his probation. As a result, the court’s factual findings cannot be said to be clearly erroneous because the record contains evidence to support such findings. Moreover, on the basis of the entire evidence, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The state’s information alleged three counts. Count one accused the defendant of violating criminal laws of this state on two occasions. Counts two and three accused him of failing to comply with the special conditions of his probation concerning substance abuse evaluation and treatment, as well as domestic violence and anger management counseling, respectively.
We need not address the defendant’s first claim on appeal because sufficient evidence establishes that he violated his probation as alleged in counts two and three, thereby rendering harmless any judicial error that might otherwise be present.
At oral argument, the defendant further claimed that because the court found that he had violated his probation as alleged in all three counts of the state’s long form information, it improperly enhanced his tenn of incarceration by reinstating the remaining twenty months left on his original suspended sentence. We decline to address that claim on the basis of the well established rule, which is in need of no citation, that this court does not have to entertain claims that have been inadequately briefed. The defendant’s brief is devoid of any claim whatsoever regarding sentence enhancement and, therefore, we decline to address it because it was presented to this court for the first time at oral argument.
The defendant does not claim that he was unaware of or misunderstood the terms of his probation.
Facts concerning the defendant’s arrests, which are not reviewed by this court, are set forth only for the purpose of providing a complete factual background of the defendant’s appeal.
The defendant was also arrested and charged with breach of the peace based on the same incident on April 18, 2000.
See footnote 2.
The court had ordered the defendant to comply with substance abuse evaluation and treatment sessions at Project Search, and to cooperate with domestic violence and psychological testing and evaluation sessions at Project Moore, a program within Project Search. For purposes of clarity, all sessions required by the defendant’s probation are referred to as being at Project Search.
At the initial orientation session, the defendant signed an agreement with Project Search that stated in relevant part: “Attendance Requirement: [The defendant] ... is expected to attend every session. [The defendant]
Project Search was required to inform the office of adult probation of any of the defendant’s absences. Project Search satisfied that requirement according to the testimony of Elisa D’Aniello, the defendant’s probation officer.