State v. HollowayState v. Holloway
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- Before:
- Dupont
Lead Opinion
The two issues of this case are whether the trial court should have dismissed a charge of carrying a dangerous weapon as prohibited by
The defendant and the victim began a fight, during the course of which the defendant stabbed the victim with a knife which had a blade of three and one-half inches in length. The defendant’s testimony portrayed the victim as the aggressor of the fight, and the defendant claimed that he was forced, through fear for his own safety, to defend himself with his knife.
The defendant moved to dismiss the count of carrying a dangerous weapon on the ground that the knife did not fall within the proscribed weapons specifically *667enumerated in
The defendant argues that to construe the language of
The penal code’s definitions, as provided in
The context in which the words “or any other dangerous .... weapon or instrument” are used is in a statute entitled “Carrying and sale of dangerous weapons.”
The statute does not specifically enumerate all of the dangerous weapons which a person may not carry without a permit, but rather should be read to include, within its purview, the carrying of any dangerous weapon whether or not specifically listed. Several cases decided prior to the adoption of
The articles specifically mentioned in
We hold that the definition of
The defendant’s second claim of error is that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the state had the burden of disproving his defense of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.4 The evidence presented at trial supported the defendant’s request for a self-defense charge. The defendant properly requested that the court charge the jury on self-defense, and excepted to the court’s failure to charge the jury on the state’s burden of disproving the defense. He was entitled to *670have the jury properly and adequately instructed on that theory of defense. State v. Folson, 10 Conn. App. 643, 646, 525 A.2d 126 (1987). The defense of self-defense is raised by way of justification, and when such defense is asserted “the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
As the state has conceded and our review of the transcript has revealed, the trial court’s instructions did not specifically charge the jury that the state bore the burden of disproving the defense to the crime of assault in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. The state argues, however, that the charge read as a whole was adequate to instruct the jury on that burden of proof because the court charged the jury on the state’s burden in connection with the crime of carrying a dangerous weapon.5
*671“A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense. . . . This fundamental constitutional right includes properjury instructions on the elements of self-defense so that the jury may ascertain whether the state has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault was not justified.” State v. Miller, supra, 660-61; see also State v. Rouleau, 204 Conn. 240, 528 A.2d 343 (1987).
As the state concedes, self-defense is not a defense to the charge of carrying a dangerous weapon.6 It is a defense to the charge of assault in the second degree. The failure of the court to instruct the jury on the state’s burden of disproving the defense of self-defense on the charge of assault in the second degree left the jury without a knowledge of the law which it could apply to the facts relevant to that charge. That lack precluded the jury from considering whether the state had proved *672beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense had been disproved. Without such knowledge, the jury was left to determine for itself whether the instruction given by the court as to the state’s burden of disproving self-defense ill connection with the crime of carrying a dangerous weapon also applied to the crime of assault in the second degree. A particular offense and its justification, if any, must be considered together. State v. Cavros, 196 Conn. 519, 528, 494 A.2d 550, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904, 106 S. Ct. 233, 88 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1985). A jury must receive a proper instruction on justification in order for it to determine whether the state has met its burden of disproof. State v. Fletcher, supra, 708. It cannot make such a determination without the knowledge that the state has that burden.
The defendant here was charged with two separate and distinct crimes. The jury should not have had to imply that the charge on self-defense as to one crime was applicable to the other crime. The jury was left without a knowledge of the law applicable to the defendant’s claim of self-defense as to the charge of assault in the second degree. We conclude that it was reasonably possible that the jury was misled. See State v. Rouleau, supra; State v. DeJesus, 194 Conn. 376, 388, 481 A.2d 1277 (1984).
Theré is error as to the count of assault in the second degree, the judgment is set aside as to that count and the case is remanded for a new trial.
In this opinion, Hull, J., concurred.
Notes
The defendant was charged in a two count information with the crimes of assault in the second degree in violation of
The portion of the instructions to the jury which the state claims was adequate to inform the jury of the state’s burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt states as follows:
“You have to decide, ladies and gentlemen, based upon the evidence, upon the testimony, whether or not these exceptions apply, whether or not there is, as I defined the law of justification or so-called self-defense, whether or not that even applies in this case as has been testified, and within the definitions of the applicable law as I have given it to you.
“I want to go back to the second count for a moment which, as you know, charges Cassius Holloway with carrying a dangerous instrument. I want to make one thing clear.
“The evidence has been that the blade in question was, I don‘t recall the exact measurement, I am sure you will and you will consider that, but that *671the state is not claiming, as I understand it, that the knife is, per se, in and of itself a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon.
“So if the state does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cassius Holloway’s actions were not justifiable self-defense, then any use of a knife, and I believe that the testimony was the blade was 3 inches or so, any use of the knife in question, state’s Exhibit C, with this blade of approximately 3 inches, would not be a violation of
“The blade of the knife in question does not make it per se a dangerous instrument; it all depends on the use or attempted use of the knife in question. If the state does not prove [disprove] beyond a reasonable doubt that it was used for justifiable self-defense, then Cassius Holloway has not committed the crime as listed and set forth in the second count of the Information of carrying a dangerous instrument, in violation of
It was error for the court to charge on the defense of self-defense as to the charge of carrying a dangerous weapon. See
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I disagree with the majority to the extent that I feel that State v. Harris, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 551, 258 A.2d 319 (1969), is still good law and was not changed by the advent of the state penal code. The trial court should have dismissed the charge of carrying a dangerous weapon. I concur with the remainder of the majority opinion.