State of Ohio v. Travis Shantell-Duane Holloway
Court of Appeals No. WD-20-021
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY
Decided: May 28, 2021
2021-Ohio-1843
Trial Court No. 2017CR0076
Edward J. Stechschulte, for appellant.
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the motion to return seized property by appellee, Travis Shantell-Duane Holloway. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms, in part, and reverses, in part, the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} On February 16, 2017, a Wood County Grand Jury indicted appellee for trafficking in cocaine, a second-degree felony violation of
{¶ 3} Then on December 19, 2019, appellee filed a pro se “Motion to Return Property and Proceeds Seized in Case Dismissed by State.” Appellee argued he was entitled to the return of “all of the items of property, and money” seized by officers from the village of Bradner police department, located in Wood County, Ohio, in the now-dismissed criminal case. The trial court heard the motion on January 24, 2020. At the hearing appellant argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion because the underlying case was dismissed. Appellant also raised res judicata by informing the trial court that five months earlier the Bowling Green Municipal Court ordered the disposal of the disputed property. Bowling Green Municipal Court has territorial jurisdiction over the village of Bradner, and the Bradner police department applied to that municipal court for authorization to dispose of the property seized on January 31, 2017, among many other investigations. Appellant also argued the Bradner police department sent appellee written notice prior to the trial court‘s disposal order in compliance with
{¶ 4} As journalized on February 11, 2020, the trial court made a number of findings and granted appellee‘s motion. Appellant admitted at the hearing that the Bradner police department seized appellee‘s cell phone and cash as part of the arrest and investigation of appellee on January 31, 2017. Appellant further admitted, “it had dismissed the charges from that incident and had no intention of filing any further charges.” The trial court determined it had jurisdiction over “a motion filed in a dismissed criminal case, with a request to return seized property.” The trial court further determined it had jurisdiction because “the property had not been disposed of pursuant to any other order.” The Bradner police department‘s application to the Bowling Green Municipal Court was made pursuant to
{¶ 5} Appellant appealed the trial court‘s judgment entry pursuant to
{¶ 6} Appellant filed this appeal setting forth three assignments of error:
I. The trial court did not have jurisdiction or authority to order the return of property where the subject property was previously disposed of by order of the municipal court.
II. The trial court could not sit as a de facto appellate court by reviewing and effectively vacating the order of the municipal court.
III. The trial court could not render factual findings on disputed factual issues without holding an evidentiary hearing.
II. Jurisdiction
{¶ 7} In support of its first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate a valid order rendered by the Bowling Green Municipal
{¶ 8} In response, appellee argues the trial court had jurisdiction over the lawfully seized property. Appellee argues the municipal court‘s order allegedly disposing of the seized property pursuant to
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 9} “‘Jurisdiction’ means ‘the court‘s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’ The term encompasses jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person. * * * ‘If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void.‘” (Citations omitted.) Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11. Subject-matter jurisdiction, which goes to the power of the trial court to adjudicate the merits of a case, may be challenged at any time. Id. We review de novo the question of law whether a trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction. Cirino v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 153 Ohio St.3d 333, 2018-Ohio-2665, 106 N.E.3d 41, ¶ 17. Our de novo review gives no deference to the trial court. Sullivan v. Sullivan, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1022, 2010-Ohio-3064, ¶ 14.
{¶ 10} The Ohio Supreme Court “has long held that the common pleas court is a court of general jurisdiction, with subject-matter jurisdiction that extends to ‘all matters at law and in equity that are not denied to it.‘” (Citations omitted.) Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 20;
C. Motion for Return of Seized Property
{¶ 11} Appellee‘s pro se “Motion to Return Property and Proceeds Seized in Case Dismissed by State” states in its entirety that he “respectfully requests this Honorable Court to order the return and release [of] all of the items of property, and money that were seized by detectives in the above captioned case. This case was dismissed by the State of Ohio * * * on April 13, 2017.” We review appellee‘s motion in three ways.
1. Replevin
{¶ 12} The Ohio Supreme Court guides us that a civil action in replevin is “[t]he proper action to reclaim possession of property based on an unlawful seizure or detention.” State ex rel. Johnson v. Kral, 153 Ohio St.3d 231, 2018-Ohio-2382, 103 N.E.3d 814, ¶ 5, quoting State ex rel. Jividen v. Toledo Police Dept., 112 Ohio App.3d 458, 459, 679 N.E.2d 34 (6th Dist.1996); State ex rel. Blandin v. Beck, 114 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-4562, 872 N.E.2d 1232, ¶ 18; State ex rel. Harris v. Toledo, 74 Ohio St.3d 36, 38, 656 N.E.2d 334 (1995). “A writ of replevin enforces a legal right of
{¶ 13} Appellee‘s short motion filed in his criminal case is not a civil action in replevin under
{¶ 14} Even if we construe appellee‘s motion as a civil action in replevin, pursuant to
{¶ 15} We find appellee‘s motion in his criminal case does not constitute a civil action in replevin. “Replevin, however, is not the exclusive method for seeking the return of seized property.” State v. Castagnola, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29141, 2020-Ohio-1096, ¶ 15, citing State v. White, 2d Dist. No. 2017-CA-28, 2018-Ohio-2573, ¶ 21; State v. Housley, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2018-CA-4, 2018-Ohio-4140, ¶ 7, fn 3, citing White at ¶ 23.
2. Property Subject to Forfeiture
{¶ 16} Another method for seeking the return of seized property is through a statutory forfeiture process. The trial court‘s judgment entry specifically found that:
The property sought by Defendant is neither unclaimed nor forfeited. * * * Further, even if it is claimed that the property was subject to
R.C. 2981.13 , that section only applies to “property ordered forfeited as contraband, proceeds, or an instrumentality,” which equally does not apply to the property requested by the Defendant in this case. Therefore, the order of the Bowling Green Municipal Court has no application to the property sought by Defendant in this case.
{¶ 17} We agree with the trial court that no formal criminal or civil forfeiture proceedings are in the record. The indictment for trafficking in cocaine also did not contain a forfeiture specification pursuant to
State v. Brimacombe, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, 960 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.).
{¶ 18} This court has previously determined that the state does not exercise any jurisdiction over seized property where there is no evidence in the record of the state instituting a timely civil or criminal forfeiture proceeding. State v. McCoy, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-00-028, 2001 WL 42210, *2 (Jan. 19, 2001) (construing former
{¶ 19} We find appellee‘s motion was not in response to either a civil or criminal forfeiture proceeding. Appellee argues that the municipal court‘s judgment is not a valid judgment on the merits because the Bradner police department is not a political subdivision capable of initiating a
3. Postdismissal Motion
{¶ 20} A third avenue of review is as a postdismissal motion.
{¶ 21} “[C]ourts routinely address postconviction motions for the return of seized property, including in criminal cases after the charges have been dismissed.” Flores v. Kelsey, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-18-065, 2018-Ohio-3886, ¶ 4; White at ¶ 22; Castagnola at ¶ 16, citing State v. Harris, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-684, 2000 WL 249161, *2-3 (Mar. 7, 2000); State v. Bolton, 2d Dist. No. 27154, 2017-Ohio-7263, 97 N.E.3d 37, ¶ 17, citing State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, ¶ 33 and
{¶ 22} One type of postdismissal motion is pursuant to
{¶ 23} Since there is no evidence in the record that the property seized by the Bradner police department was done unlawfully, we are left to impermissibly speculate that appellee alleged ownership over lawfully seized property that became unlawfully detained after the trial court‘s dismissal of the criminal case against him. No speculation is required, however, because the trial court‘s dismissal of the criminal case was without prejudice, and
{¶ 24} Another type of postdismissal motion is pursuant to
{¶ 25} In its August 15, 2019 judgment entry, the municipal court merely stated, “The application is granted and within 14 days hereafter, you shall dispose of the property as stated in the application and make your return, all in accordance with Ohio law.” The Bradner police department‘s application to the municipal court sought “to dispose of the property on the attached list * * * that is related to property turned in as evidence. * * * Some articles of evidence belong to victims/owners and officers will attempt to locate the legitimate owner of the property and return it. If such return is unsuccessful, [the police department] will cause the disposition of the items pursuant to
{¶ 26} We disagree, however, with the trial court that
{¶ 27} In particular, “[u]nclaimed or forfeited property that is not described in [
{¶ 28} “Unclaimed property” is not defined by
To interpret
Dingess v. Hull, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 1734, 1989 WL 62868, *2 (June 2, 1989), quoting State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells, 18 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 481 N.E.2d 632 (1985). We agree. Despite appellee‘s current claim, the municipal court did not have a valid claim before it from appellee when it ordered the disposal of seized property pursuant to
{¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons we find the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over appellee‘s postdismissal motion for return of seized property.
{¶ 30} Appellant argues that the doctrine of res judicata applies to the trial court‘s ruling on appellee‘s motion. We agree, but that doctrine does not deny the trial court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction, as appellant argues.
{¶ 31} The Ohio Supreme Court instructs us that the doctrine of res judicata “is an affirmative defense that does not implicate a court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Lycan v. Cleveland, 146 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-422, 51 N.E.3d 593, ¶ 30. Res judicata does not divest the second tribunal of jurisdiction to decide the validity of that affirmative defense. Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 74 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 656 N.E.2d 684 (1995); State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Prob. Div., 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 655 N.E.2d 1303 (1995).
In Ohio, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two related concepts of claim preclusion, also known as res judicata or estoppel by judgment, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.” “Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions, by the same parties or their privies, based upon any claim arising out of a transaction that was the subject matter of a previous action,” whereas issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, “precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that had been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action that was based on a different cause of action.” (Citations omitted.)
{¶ 32} If the affirmative defense of res judicata is not timely raised, the party has waived it. Jim‘s Steak House, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 81 Ohio St.3d 18, 21, 688 N.E.2d 506 (1998). At the January 24, 2020 hearing on appellee‘s motion, appellant raised the issues of subject-matter jurisdiction and issue preclusion as a result of the municipal court‘s 2019 final judgment, and the trial court took the entire matter under advisement.
{¶ 33} We find that appellant‘s first assignment of error raises the res judicata doctrine through issue preclusion: that the trial court‘s order relitigated the issue of the disposal of appellee‘s property lawfully seized by a law enforcement agency that had been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in the prior municipal court action. “A judgment, in order to preclude either party from relitigating an issue, must be preclusive upon both. A prior judgment estops a party, or a person in privity with him, from subsequently relitigating the identical issue raised in the prior action.” Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. The privity requirement means, “collateral estoppel can only be applied against parties who have had a proper ‘full and fair’ opportunity to litigate their claims.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at 198. We “look * * * to the substance of the cause to determine the real parties in interest.” Id. at 200. The burden is on the party asserting res judicata. Id. at 198. This court has previously recognized that, “‘[a] valid, final
{¶ 34} We find that despite the trial court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction over appellee‘s motion for return of seized property pursuant to
{¶ 35} Both appellant, before the trial court, and the Bradner police department, before the municipal court, are “law enforcement agencies” under
{¶ 37} The record includes the August 13, 2019 disposal application made by the Bradner police department to the Bowling Green Municipal Court and the August 15, 2019 judgment entry by the municipal court granting the application and ordering “within 14 days hereafter, you shall dispose of the property as stated in the application and make your return, all in accordance with Ohio law.” The record shows that on August 20, 2019, the Bradner police department showed in its return that it had disposed of the property as ordered.
{¶ 38}
{¶ 39} We find the record shows no irregularities in the municipal court‘s proceedings, and the law enforcement agency, the Bradner police department, fully
{¶ 40} We reviewed the record de novo and find the trial court had jurisdiction to decide appellee‘s “Motion to Return Property and Proceeds Seized in Case Dismissed by State.” We further find the doctrine of issue preclusion was effectively raised at the January 24, 2020 hearing and acted to bar the trial court from granting appellee‘s motion where the municipal court had validly ordered the disposal of the disputed seized property in a final judgment.
{¶ 41} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is well-taken, in part, and not well-taken, in part.
III. Appellate Review
{¶ 42} In support of its second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction “to sit as a de facto appellate court to review and effectively vacate” the municipal court‘s determinations. Appellant argues the trial court erred when it decided “to review the determination of a municipal court that shares territorial jurisdiction with [it]” by “essentially adopting an appellate posture, reviewing whether the subject property was unclaimed, as well as effectively vacating and reversing the municipal court‘s order for disposition of that property.” Appellant argues the trial
{¶ 43} In response, appellee argues the trial court‘s “carefully crafted decision found that it had jurisdiction to reach a decision on the subject property.” Appellee argues the trial court had concurrent jurisdiction with the municipal court over the seized property and was free to exercise its jurisdiction after determining “that the municipal court judgment had not disposed of the subject property.”
There are various scenarios in which a court might have jurisdiction over an issue that provides the court with the opportunity to declare the judgment of any other court to be void. For instance, in a proper case, a court may refuse to enforce the void judgment of another court or prevent a party from executing upon the judgment. But a void judgment does not by itself create a justiciable controversy that a court may seize upon and resolve. To be subject to collateral attack, the judgment must be relevant to the relief sought or to the enforcement of some right in a controversy properly before the court. And the fact that a judgment might be void certainly does not give every court the authority to directly reverse, vacate, or modify that judgment. (Citations omitted.)
Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, 7 N.E.3d 1188, ¶ 47.
IV. Evidentiary Hearing
{¶ 45} In support of its third assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court could not develop the findings of facts necessary to support its order without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant argues that “without factual development” the trial court could not determine the seized property “was not unclaimed.”
{¶ 46} In response, appellee argues the trial court held a hearing on January 24, 2020. Appellee argues appellant attended the hearing and, in fact, presented evidence when it supplied the trial court with the August 15, 2019 municipal court order.
{¶ 47} We find the trial court held a hearing on January 24, 2020, and the hearing transcript is in the record. We previously determined that the record is devoid of any evidence that the seizure of appellee‘s alleged property was unlawful and that the issue before the trial court for the return of seized property was barred by the doctrine of res judicata per the prior, valid order of the municipal court.
{¶ 48} In light of our decision on appellant‘s first assignment of error, we find that appellant‘s third assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 49} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and remanded for the sole purpose of the trial court ruling on the appellant‘s motion to stay, filed on March 6, 2020. Appellant and appellee are ordered to equally pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
Judgment affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.