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State v. Hollis
633 A.2d 1362
Vt.
1993
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*1 its conclusion that the services actually were reason- provided able.

The trial court’s reflect a findings detailed examination of the experience and credentials of assigned those to work with termination, Prior 5.5. SRS worked intensively with S.S. to her improve parenting skills. Both parent educators were well limitations, aware of S.S.’s and both used methods that teaching the court found appropriate, such as repetition focusing on instruction basic skills. They ab- nothing dealt with more stract training, than toilet appropriate discipline, and basic nu- In trition. of its light findings, the trial could reasonably court conclude SRS had made appropriate, reasonable efforts assist S.S. in her attempt parental resume duties. educators,

Based evidence from well-qualified parent case- workers, an protective worker, adult service and the team eval- uating reunification, potential family the trial court concluded that there had been no improvement in the ability her improve 5.5. skills toor provide safe environment and care for H.S. The properly findings in support stagnation are evidence, well supported and we will not disturb the court’s conclusion based on those H.A., In re findings. 153 Vt. at 515, 572 A.2d at 890.

Affirmed.

State of Vermont v. Thomas Hollis

[633 1362] No. 92-462 Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Present: Johnson, Morse and JJ.

Opinion Filed October *2 Attorney, Carroll, State’s County Deputy R. Windham Karen Brattleboro, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Nelson, Ap- A. Allen, General, and William Defender

E.M. Defendant-Appellee. Montpelier, pellate Attorney, order con- Morse, suppressing from an appeals The State J. police following at barracks by traband discarded defendant marijuana during discovered possession custodial arrest we address is question search of his vehicle. The an unlawful error of the discarded contraband was suppression but did not authority had the considering police that (DLS). license arrest, defendant for with driving suspended affirm. We on a the Police informed the

Acting tip, Department Windsor individuals, 8,1991 specified on that includ- state March police defendant, cocaine into transporting would Vermont ing the A described vehicle that the sus- day. computer printout driving and indicated defendant’s license pects would be information, this state police had Based on two suspended. after it shortly officers the vehicle entered Vermont. stopped driver, Defendant, displayed Louisiana driver’s license. in the ran a li- placed One officer cruiser and check, his cense confirmed that license had been sus- pended Hampshire for failure in New appear Vermont charge. motor vehicle Further revealed that the investigation licenses, occupants suspended other three had vehicle defendant, and that all of occupants, resided including Windsor. marijuana, that he smelled other officer searched

Stating Marijuana A at tape the vehicle. was discovered. made arrest scene indicates that first officer informed de- towed, fendant as follows: vehicle is to be going “[Y]our Barracks, going search continue the State Police West Brattleboro. I’m to issue for DLS.... going you citation I’m placing you possession marijuana.” under At the barracks, in a placed defendant was conference room him- self. At one point, officer entered the room and discovered a bag containing cocaine and marijuana the floor. A short time later, defendant was cited and released.

Defendant charged possession cocaine, felony misdemeanor of marijuana, and DLS. At hearing on defendant’s motion suppress, the State conceded that the marijuana found the vehicle had to be suppressed because *3 the search of the vehicle was argued, unlawful. State how- ever, that the drugs discovered at the barracks police should not be suppressed because defendant had been ar- lawfully rested DLS. The State out pointed that ar- may rest a person a misdemeanor if the person’s ties to the community are not sufficient to assure that the person will re- citation, to spond or if the person has previously failed to ap- in pear to response or citation other court order. The State argued that defendant was arrested for properly DLS because he coming state, from out of he presented a license from a state, different and he had failed to at a court appear proceed- ing yet another state.

Defendant conceded that the stop legal, but argued the evidence police discovered at the barracks was the “tainted fruit” an illegal arrest that directly resulted from an unlawful search. The district court ruled that the evidence must be sup- (1) pressed because despite the officer’s testimony that he ar- rested for possession defendant marijuana DLS, the ground actual for the as stated the officer at the time the made, arrest was was possession (2) of marijuana; and as- suming defendant had also DLS, been arrested for a custodial the officer’s doubts because improper have been would arrest minimal. community were ties to the defendant’s concerning to the facts known that the argues the State On appeal, take to police of the arrest permitted the time officer at him a and then release police state barracks Defendant community. his ties to the confirming citation after ar defendant was that that, finding the court’s given responds DLS, marijuana, rested for Therefore, according for DLS is irrelevant. arrested have been discov defendant, evidence the arrest was unlawful tainted must suppressed barracks police ered dis the contraband agree arrest. that fruit We suppressed. station must be carded at outset, trial court’s that we cannot affirm the we note At DLS, intended, an arrest for even if ground decision on the that a the court concluded Although not have been lawful. would the officer’s improper because arrest would been custodial community min- ties to the concerning defendant’s doubts custodial imal, argument it did not address State’s under V.R.Cr.P. proper for DLS would have 3(c)(2)(E) that defendant had because the officer was aware an- to a citation before response failed to previously appear that a arrest for DLS would court. conclude custodial other We 3(c)(2)(E), per- Rule here under appropriate have been or for a misdemeanor when the mits arrest continued to a cita- appear has failed “person previously response in con- tion, summons, order of court issued warrant other nection the same or another offense.” allowing police is to make custodial arrest it true that

While failure to prior for a misdemeanor because the defendant’s rationale most based on the same as the one appear likely allowing an arrest the defendant’s ties the community where doubt, not subsume Compare are in the latter does the former. *4 3(c)(2)(E). 3(c)(2)(D) effect, In a prior V.R.Cr.P. with V.R.Cr.P. factors, regardless enough failure to other creates appear, would respond doubt about whether the defendant to citation Further, to allow a custodial fact that ulti- arrest. released on citation mately was would somehow invalidate an arrest for could have a custodial ar- police DLS. made to previous rest for DLS based defendant’s failure appear, and then released him when satisfied that he they would 3(c)(1) (citation See V.R.Cr.P. must be issued once rea- appear. exist). longer sons for custodial arrest no Our determination that the have arrested de fendant DLS does not end our inquiry, however. We must address whether the officer’s arresting actual motives stated grounds the arrest may considered determining the arrest broke the link causal between the unlawful search and discovery of the contraband at the station. Although of the recently majority we followed federal circuits, which limit Fourth Amendment analysis examining objective arrest,” Towne, “the legality State v. 158 Vt. 607, 628-30, 615 484, 496-97 (1992), A.2d we have not addressed this issue in the precise context presented here. Towne,

In the defendant his argued that warrantless arrest charge federal firearms pretext interrogat was mere ing him regarding suspected murder of committing, and therefore regardless was unlawful. We held that of the offi cer’s underlying motive for the the arrest was valid be (1) cause the officer had believe defendant carrying a firearm in law, (2) violation of federal and warrantless arrest was authorized by state law. Id. at A.2d at 497. We this objective followed two-part test because we recognized that it was more consistent with United States Su Court preme precedent than the test followed the Tenth Circuits, Eleventh which seeks determine whether an arrest or stop would have been made absent the allegedly improper Id. n.3, motive. at 630 615 A.2d at 497 (citing n.3 Scott v. United States, (1978)).* 436 U.S. Scott,

In the defendants sought suppression of all evidence gathered as the result a wiretap grounds on the that the offi- cers admitted they made no attempt comply with statutory requirement that the number intercepted calls be minimized. The defendants argued that the government’s post-hoc expla- * The suggest defendant in Towne pretext analysis did not that a would differ Constitution, under the Vermont we did not reach that issue. See id. at n.4, Similarly, parties at 497 n.4. here do not invoke the Constitution, Vermont and we do independent not consider analysis un- our der constitution.

92 calls most of the intercepting of of

nation the reasonableness “having the law because compliance with not show using and attorney a by the fact Government after prepared of the indicative not which were categories terminology explana- interceptions, [the at the time thinking agents’ the state of and mental perceptions not the reflect does tion] at Scott, 436 wiretap.” U.S. conducted actually agents who 135. play of an motives officer acknowledged

The Court exclusionary of determining application in part some estab- violation has been or constitutional statutory rule after a violation lished, that the existence such but determined light of the officer’s actions objective on an assessment turns acted, re- officer at the time the the facts and circumstances Id. or motivation the officer. intent gardless underlying officer does not the state fact that the “[T]he at 135-38. provide reasons mind which is hypothecated action invalidate for the officer’s does justification legal circumstances, objectively, viewed as the long action taken action.” at 138. justify that Id. and commentators accepted by has been courts principle

This n.12; at 1 W. See id. 138 in a wide circumstances. variety 1987) (2d LaFave, 83 ed. 1.4(b), § at (princi- Search Seizure in resolving suppression should control ple set forth Scott rule). instance, For exclusionary from this Court arising issues disregarded underlying courts have generally and other legal motives of the officer cases where there is arresting Towne, 158 justification grounds. for arrest on the stated See therein). (cases 628-30, 615 A.2d at 496-97 cited Vt. arrests on this upheld principle Courts have also based where no arrest on the but probable ground there was cause to stated See, cause to arrest for another offense. probable there was 1981) v. Lester, States Cir. e.g., United (even unlawful, if arrest for detoxification was cause probable assault); Carr, existed to arrest defendant for United States v. (D. Conn.) 1383, 1387 (existence 445 F. cause Supp. defendant for of firearms justified despite testimony warrantless search officer’s that arrest was endangerment, for reckless for which there was no probable (2d cause), 1978); State, 584 F.2d 612 Hamm v. aff’d, 1326, 1330-31 (Md. 1987) Spec. (assuming Ct. App. did not have to arrest for stated ground use of automobile —he had probable —unathorized violation); cause to arrest for weapons cf. State v. Klevgaard, (N.D. (because 1981) burglar N.W.2d suspected could have been arrested for reckless initial driving, arrest was *6 legal despite arrest); failure for ground of officer state State (S.C. (fruits 471, 1981) Retford, v. 281 S.E.2d 472-73 of search incident to arrest properly probable admitted where theft, existed to arrest defendant for though auto stated ground automobile). was tampering with These cases stand that the proposition validity of hinges an arrest upon whether the officer had cause to probable arrest, not whether the officer articulated the correct basis for Thus, the arrest. an when officer’s properly arrest is supported by probable cause to offense, arrest for a particular neither subjective officer’s reliance on an offense for which there is no cause, probable nor the officer’s verbal announcement of the offense, wrong vitiates the v. People arrest. Kincy, 435 N.E.2d 831, 834-35 (Ill. 1982) Ct. App. (although officer’s stated ground for arrest —unlawful use of weapons not supported by —was cause, probable there probable cause to arrest defendant for aggravated assault); Bonds, see Richardson v. 860 F.2d (7th 1427, 1430 1988) (“While Cir. an subjec arresting officer’s tive knowledge oí sufficient to constitute probable cause is facts central to evaluation of the of propriety an we do not believe that the officer’s of view the legal basis for the arrest is

important.”).

Nevertheless, while the courts generally an employ ob jective standard in assessing the legal basis for an arrest, they will not in ex “indulge post extrapolations all of crimes facto that might have been charged given set of facts at the moment of arrest.” United Atkinson, States v. 835, 838 F.2d (5th 1971). Cir. In order to prevent post-hoc justifications for arrests, otherwise invalid Atkinson limited two-part objec tive test holding that probable where cause does not exist for offense, articulated there is a valid only if of fense, and the offense for which there probable cause, are related. Id. court, to the According arrest is valid when there for which and the crime charged the crime is a nexus between po- force rule would “[a]ny other because cause exists taken into citizen charge every routinely officers lice held for.” Id. thought could they every offense See, e.g., Atkinson rule. have followed courts Several 1986) Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1294 Cir. States v. United de could have arrested (contraband because admissible statute, an offense undesirable-guest violating fendant conduct); disorderly charged offense closely related to 1972) (2d Martinez, (agents v. 79, 82 United States mari transferring arrest for crime cause to had related to form, is closely order juana without written Lake, Horn City C-1 v. selling marijuana); charged crime 1990) (insufficient nexus (N.D. 940, Miss. 945-46 Supp. 775 F. trespass disorderly offense offense of conduct between 1992) (Ga. Sparks, v. App. Ct. ing); State S.E.2d violation littering officer arrested defendant (though arrest; seized ordinance, did not custodial authorize county tree because officer not fruit drugs poisonous state stat under illegal dumping defendant for arrested 1990) Smith, (N.D. (even if v. ute); 89-90 *7 State N.W.2d con felon, eventually who was stop no cause existed probable violation, firearms, for open-container an possession victed refuse). felon for deposit officer could have unlawful stopped “the conduct that served offenses are related when Generally, probable for the for there no charge as the basis which situated offi could, in the of a reasonable eyes similarly cause cer, charge for a there also served as basis which Perez, 482, Trejo v. 486 probable cause.” Smith, (unlawful 1982); v. at State deposit see N.W.2d refuse, justifiable, open-con arrest was and offense which upon arrest, violation, related the stated for the grounds tainer from same of factual circum offenses because arose set they Bonds, (court Richardson v. stances); may 860 F.2d at 1431 re ex rationale for arrest ject as unreasonable an facto “which post extravagant novel, or or is based on ‘stale’ facts that is v. People arrest”); formed the for an earlier could have basis 1985) (ex 140, 144 (Ill. Corrigan, N.E.2d facto App. post Ct. if grounds for arrest known to officer at time of arrest proper to, with, if occurring interrelated and contemporaneously officer). grounds stated by

The law considered thus far be summed as may follows: up (1) arresting the motives of officers are is irrelevant when there probable cause and legal justification for the offense stated as (2) the basis or is no when there justification or legal to arrest grounds based stated by the officer but the stated offense and the offense for which there is cause and justification legal reasonably are related.

Neither present situation is In case, here. this the ar resting officer was aware that defendant had been operating vehicle a suspended license but chose not to him on arrest Rather, charge. that charge arrest was based drug from an stemmed search. district court relied on the of the transcript arresting officer’s statement concluding that the officer’s sole basis for the arrest was the drug charge from that resulting search. This finding sup ported evidence. More importantly, conduct served the basis for the of contraband— charge — could not have served as the basis charge. DLS See Perez, v. Trejo 693 F.2d at 486.

Therefore, the fruit the tainted search ar subsequent rest must be suppressed. Badger, See State v. 141 Vt. 439-40, (1982) (evidence 450 A.2d suppressed must be un less causal nexus between illegal police conduct and procure ment of has evidence become so attenuated by intervening taint). events toas dissipate The State may employ post-hoc rationalization for stemming from an illegal search to break the causal link between the illegal conduct and discovered evidence. v. See Scott United subsequently States, (“In 436 U.S. 135-36 view the purposes deterrent rule, exclusionary consideration of official motives may some play part in determining whether application the exclu rule sionary is appropriate statutory constitutional after established.”). violation has been *8 Finally, we need not consider whether the apparent abandon- ment of the contraband at the police station was a voluntary abandonment that the taint purged illegal argument was never raised by the State. Cf. Lawrence v. Hen- derson, (5th 1973) (where Cir. illegal arrest prompted defendant to conceal narcotics in paraphernalia po- Commonwealth voluntary); vehicle, was not abandonment lice decision, 1980) (in (Pa. court 4-3 Harris, 421 A.2d 199, 202 v. in incriminating evidence abandonment held that defendant’s act intervening, independent an was not toilet station’s arrest). taint of purge to sufficient free will Affirmed. C.J., majority’s conclusion agree I with

Allen, dissenting. been custody appropriate would have continued that arrest 3(c)(2)(E), but to V.R.Cr.P. pursuant the facts presented under a different result. requires this conclusion believe that indicating that in of information The was Following stop, suspension. was under defendant’s license the officer per- to exit his vehicle while defendant asked defendant had a check to determine whether formed a license license; that check that the license officer learned from valid Hampshire. in New appear for failure to suspension was under community be- defendant’s ties to He was concerned about had a resident but claiming was be Vermont cause defendant from coming was Massa- driver’s license and Louisiana had believe officer clearly chusetts. and could presence had committed his a misdemeanor determin- for the purpose custody continue to assure his ties were sufficient ing community his 3(c)(2)(D),(E). The officer testified that appearance. V.R.Cr.P. driving suspended his for with li- custody defendant was in (DLS), § cense 674. violation V.S.A. United States v. line beginning

The evil that the of cases Atkinson, 1971), prevent F.2d 835 seeks to is totally sham arrest at the unrelated to the crime outset which The facts here do not cause to arrest exists. suggest post-hoc justification for otherwise invalid arrest condemned Atkinson. It is in this case con- unnecessary an Atkinson duct as to whether the officer “could have” inquiry DLS; arrested for related crime. The initial detention the continued the purpose determining 3(c)(2) whether the A exceptions applied. ap- Rule citation pear possession marijuana, was issued for both DLS and charged ultimately defendant was with both. While the arrest *9 unlawful, for marijuana possession may have been continued 3(c)(2) exceptions to determine whether the V.R.Cr.P. I DLS offense was lawful. would reverse. applied Department Appli- Respecting Petition Public Service cation and Rule General Order 65 4.100 Small Power

Projects of 100 KW Less

[632 1373] No. 90-043 Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley Morse, Present: JJ.

Opinion Filed October Thanhauser, S.R. se, pro Newbury, Appellant. Picton, Rutland,

Kenneth C. for Appellee Central Vermont Public Service Corp. Commons,

Geoffrey Special Counsel, Montpelier, for Appel- lee Department Public Service.

Morse, J. Power, White Oak Water small power producer, appeals from an order of the Public Service Board rejecting White Oak’s claim that the Board failed to give sufficient notice of a rule providing for annual 10% decreases in the minimum rate that utilities small pay power producers. We affirm.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Hollis
Court Name: Supreme Court of Vermont
Date Published: Oct 15, 1993
Citation: 633 A.2d 1362
Docket Number: 92-462
Court Abbreviation: Vt.
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