70 Iowa 442 | Iowa | 1886
Lead Opinion
I. It is provided by statute that, “upon trial of an indictment for murder, the jury, if they find the defend-
II. It is insisted that the defendant was insane at the time of the homicide, and that the instructions of the court
It is proper that the material facts should be stated. The defendant lived some fifteen miles east of Oskaloosa, and, a day or two preceding the homicide, he learned that the deceased and his sister had gone to Oska-loosa; and he assumed, perhaps justly, that their conduct towards each other was not what it should he, and that improper relations existed. He followed them to Oskaloosa, but he was not able to find them, and, they having returned in the direction of home, he followed. They separated, and he stated to more than one person that he intended to shoot the deceased. He met or saw the deceased walking along a road, and the defendant told him to “halt,” and pulled a revolver out of his pocket, and started towards the deceased; and the latter hallooed, “For Grod’s sake, don’t shoot me!” The defendant shot at the deceased, who ran, and the defendant after him, and then he shot again. The deceased ran behind an oak tree, and the defendant, who was two or three steps therefrom, told the deceased to come out, and tell what he had done. The deceased came from behind the tree, kneeled down, and said: “Eor G-od’s sake, don’t shoot me!
The actions and conduct of the defendant in pursuing the deceased, after the homicide, together with the brutality exhibited, and his acts and conduct, are relied on as sustaining the defense of insanity. It is also claimed that there was evidence showing that, when the defendant was about three years old, he had fits while teething, and that his grandmother was insane at one time, brought on by menstrual difficulties, when the change of life occurred. She recovered, however, three or four months before she died. The instructions on the question of insanity are quite lengthy. We do not think it necessary to set them out in full, but will notice the objections urged by counsel.
First. It is said that, the court, “over and over again instructed the jury that, although the defendant was insane at the time of the homicide, that would not be a defense.” This is a grave mistake, inadvertantly made, we will assume.
Second. “The court took the theory, in effect, that the defendant might be insane on one subject, and not another.” What the court did say is as follows: “It does not necessarily follow that, if defendant was insane, the alleged killing *. * * was the result of such insanity; or, if'lie is jiossessed of an insane impulse, that he could not have successfully resisted it. The insanity which absolves one for acts which otherwise would be criminal must be of that character which caused the act, and irresistibly compelled it. If
III. The defendant introduced several witnesses as medical experts, and lengthy hypothetical questions were put to
The objections urged by counsel are — -First, that the “expert evidence was not made up of mere theory and speculation, but respectable physicians gave their opinions, based upon well-established principles of medical science.” The respectability, knowledge and honesty of the jihysicians is conceded, but their evidence, was largely mere theory and speculation. They, we feel satisfied, would not claim otherwise. No man can look into the body of another, and tell certainly, if he is diseased, what caused the disease. Expeidence and knowledge may enable him to tell, with reasonable certainty, the nature and character of the disease, but, after all, it is theory and speculation. When, however, a physician is called on to determine whether the mind is diseased to such an extent as to make the person an irresponsible being, the task is much more difficult. Especially is this true where the opinion must be formed and based upon a hypothetical question alone. In such case, it seems to us that the opinion must, of necessity, be mere theory. This is not the fault of the profession, but because more than human
IY. In the fourth instruction the court, among other things, said: “It is not necessary that premeditation or
Y. The court in the eighth instruction, in defining murder in the second degree, among other things, said: “When
YI. The state introduced one Hackley, and proved by him that he was present on the evening when the deceased was shot. Tie was still living when he saw him, and he went after a physician, and when he came back he saw the body. This witness was with the deceased and the girls that day, and the day previous, when they were at Oskaloosa. Tie was asked by counsel for the defendant: “Where did you
TIL The defendant introduced several witnesses who testified that his general reputation and character as a “peace-
VIII. The defendant’s .mother, when on the stand as a witness in his behalf, testified that he had fits when - he was
The same witness testified that .the defendant came to her house on the evening of the day the deceased was shot, but
IX. Tetta Kinney, a witness introduced by the defendant, was with his sister and the deceased at Oskaloosa, at a
X. The court instructed the jury as follows: “In ordei to establish insanity, it is not necessary that the proofs shall
XI. The court instructed the jury as follows: “If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
XII. The court instructed the jury as follows: “No mere words, however abusive or insulting, will justify an assault,
Lastly, it is said that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence. This question is simply stated by counsel without argument. "We are clearly of the contrary opinion. Because of the importance of this case, we have noticed each point made by counsel in the same order as argued by them, and have endeavored to state fully each objection made to the action of the court, with such brief reasons as we deem necessary to indicate our views; and the result is that the judgment must be
AeKIRMED.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. — While I think that the evidence shows that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree, I can but think that the instruction in relation to premeditation and deliberation contains reversible error. There is a portion of the instruction which seems to me to hold that if the intent to kill, or, what is the same thing, the formed and determined design to kill, existed at the time of killing, there would be such premeditation and deliberation as the statute contemplates as necessary to make the homicide murder in the first degree. I think that the court misconstrued the decisions. They hold, clearly enough, that no particular time need elapse between the formation of the intent to kill and the act of killing, but none hold that there need be no time, or that there could be murder in the first degree where there was no intent, except such as was practically concurrent with the act. Premeditation and deliberation necessarily involve the idea of time.