22 P. 99 | Nev. | 1889
Lead Opinion
The facts are stated in the opinion. Appellant was the treasurer of Eureka county during the times mentioned in the complaint, and as such officer collected revenue of the state payable in his county. He failed to pay over the amount collected to the treasurer of the state within the time required by law. This action was accordingly brought to enforce payment of the sum of seven thousand nine hundred and eleven dollars and seventy-nine cents, that being the amount he had received for the state, together with a penalty of twenty-five per cent, upon this sum, amounting to the further sum of one thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven dollars and ninety-four cents, and for interest and costs. The principal sum was paid before the trial of the action. Judgment was rendered for the amount of the penalty. The only question made is upon the correctness of this ruling.
The provisions of law relating to the penalty are contained in an act of the legislature approved February 24, 1866, entitled "An act defining the duties of state controller." (Gen. Stat. 1807-1831.) This statute at its eighth and ninth sections, inter alia, requires the controller to state an account against any officer who has received moneys belonging to the state, and failed to make a settlement thereof within the time prescribed by law, adding thereto twenty-five per cent, as damages; and if such officer fail to settle, the controller shall direct the attorney general to institute an action at law for the recovery of the amount of the account. Appellant contends that so much of the statute as attempts to impose a penalty conflicts with section 17 of article 4 of the constitution, which provides: "Each law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one subject; and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title." The question is, does an act entitled "An act defining the duties of state controller" express, by its title, the subject of the imposition of a penalty against other officers for delinquencies in making settlements? Judge Cooley, in his "Treatise on Constitutional Limitations," discusses the subject of the evils intended to be remedied by similar constitutional provisions, and summarizes as follows: "It may, therefore, be assumed as settled, that the purpose of these provisions was — First, *319 to prevent hodge-podge or `log-rolling' legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might, therefore, be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire." (Const. Lim., 4th Ed. 175.) The purpose of a title is to give notice of the subject of the law. The title of the act in question sufficiently expresses its subject, so far as it relates to the duties of the state controller, but it gives no intimation of an intention to impose a penalty or damages upon officers delinquent in their settlements. In this latter respect the act is obnoxious to the objection mentioned by Judge Cooley of misleading the legislature and the people by failing to express in its title the subject contained in the body of the bill. This is the character of legislation against which the constitutional provision is directed. Again, the act contains two subjects —First, that of the duties of state controller; and, second, the imposition of a penalty against other officers. In this respect it disregards the requirement that "each law shall embrace but one subject." For these reasons we are of opinion that the law in question is unconstitutional in so far as it undertakes to impose a penalty against the appellant. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
If the act under consideration contains two distinct and separate subjects, having no connection with each other, then the conclusion arrived at by the court is correct. There can be no difference of opinion upon the point that a statute cannot have any force beyond the purpose expressed in the title. The vital question is whether there are two separate and distinct subjects specified in the act. To determine this question the whole act, its object and purpose, must be considered. If upon such investigation the matters therein contained are found to have a reasonable or natural connection with the subject expressed in the title, and are appropriate to the object sought to be accomplished by the act, then such matters are "properly connected *320 therewith" and should not be held to be in conflict with the provisions of the constitution. What is the object of the statute? Clearly to define the duties of the state controller. Now, without looking closely at the provisions of this act, and considering the full scope of his duties, it might be said that the imposition of a penalty upon county officers, for a failure upon their part to perform their official duties, is a matter wholly foreign to the duties pertaining to the office of state controller. It is apparent without argument, that under an "act defining the duties of state controller" no penalty could be imposed upon a county recorder for a failure upon his part to file and record a declaration of homestead or a notice of mechanic's lien presented to him by individuals for that purpose; because such matters bear no relation whatever to, and have no connection with, any of the duties properly pertaining to the office of state controller. Other illustrations could be given in reference to certain duties of every county officer. No such general question, however, is involved in this case. The question here is whether the particular penalty imposed in section 8 has any relation to, or is in any manner properly connected with, any of the official duties of the state controller. In order to correctly determine this question it must constantly be borne in mind that the provisions of the constitution under review are to be liberally, and not strictly, construed by the courts. (Cooley, Const. Lim. 178, and numerous authorities there cited.)
The state controller is the chief financial officer of the state, and as such should be, and he is, clothed by law with the authority and duty to take all necessary steps in order to secure the prompt payment of all moneys due and owing to the state. He is required to keep the accounts of all parties, whether public officers, private individuals or corporations, having any money in their possession belonging to the state. In brief, his office and duties pertaining thereto, are such, in their very nature, as to invest him with the responsibility of keeping at all times a watchful eye over all moneys belonging to the state. His duties extend to the methods of collecting such money as well as to the disbursement of money by the state. It therefore follows that all parties having any money belonging to the state are bound to examine and ascertain what his duties are, and especially to take cognizance of the power and authority given to him by law to enforce the collection of money due or *321
owing to the state. It was to secure the prompt collection of such money that the legislature deemed it necessary, or at least advisable, to impose a penalty upon all delinquents having money belonging to the state, who failed to pay the same within the time prescribed by law. The penalties are not criminal in their nature. It is true there is a punishment if the parties fail to pay the money when required so to do; but the punishment is not a crime, and is not solely penal in its character. The statute should be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the legislature, "without any reference to strictness upon one side, or favor upon the other." (State v. Cal.M. Co.,
In my opinion the title of the act does give notice of the subject of the law, and the matters contained in the body of the act are germane to the subject expressed in the title. The matters contained in an act of the legislature must be homogeneous in order to come under the general head as expressed in the title; but "the unity of object is to be looked for in the ultimate end designed to be attained and not in the detail or steps leading to the end." (State v. County Judge,
In Kurtz v. People, this provision of the constitution is said to be "a very wise and wholesome provision, intended to prevent legislators from being entrapped into the careless passage of bills on matters foreign to the ostensible purpose of the statute as entitled. But it is not designed to require the body of the bill to be a mere repetition of the title. Neither is it intended to prevent including in the bill such means as are reasonably adapted to secure the object indicated by the title." (
In a recent case in Michigan, where it was claimed by counsel that the title of the act contained two subjects — one "to provide for reporting mortgages for assessment purposes," and the *324
other "prescribing the duties of the register of deeds relative to the recording of mortgages" — it was held by the supreme court that there was nothing in the title or in the act in conflict with this provision of the constitution. Sherwood, C. J., said: "The object of this act, and the only object, is to bring property in mortgages on real estate to the knowledge and attention of the assessor. This, of course, is for the purpose of listing it, that it may be valued in the assessment roll. This constitutes but a single subject, and anything germane to this object, and necessary to its accomplishment, may be contained in an act having this object expressed in its title. The object expressed and intended in this title is certainly beyond cavil or question. It is to bring into the assessment roll mortgage property for taxation; and, if all the means by which it was to be done were expressed in its title, the object could not be obliterated and obscured, nor would it be adding a new object. The law prescribes that the register of deeds shall not record a mortgage unless it contains a statement of the place of residence of the grantee. This is of very great importance in carrying out the object of the act, and the services of the register and the books of his office are very largely used in carrying this law into effect. And the statement in the title that the act is to prescribe `the duties of registers of deeds relative to the recording of mortgages' does no more than state a part of the means by which the object of the act is to be carried out, and is not subject to the objection made to it." (Attorney-General v. Supervisors,
In O'Leary v. County of Cook, the court upheld the constitutionality of an act to amend an act entitled "An act to incorporate the Northwestern University," which contained sections prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors within four miles of the university, under a special penalty to be recovered by the county of Cook. The court, in determining that the act embraced but one subject, said: "The object of the charter was to create an institution for the education of young men, and it was competent for the legislature to embrace within it everything which was designed to facilitate that object. Every provision which was intended to promote the well-being of the institution or its students was within the proper subject-matter of that law. We cannot doubt that such was the single design of this law. Its purpose was to keep far away from the members of the institution the *325
temptation of intemperance and its attendant vices. Although this provision might incidentally tend to protect others residing in the vicinity from the corrupting and demoralizing influences of the grog-shop, yet that was not the primary object of the law, but its sole purpose was to protect the students and faculty from such influence. It was designed for the benefit and well-being of the institution, and this is the touchstone of the constitutionality of the enactment. If its design was foreign from the subject of the law, which was the creation of, and to provide for the well-being of, an institution of learning; if the design was to protect the community, generally, from the bad influences of a particular temptation, without a particular reference to the institution — then it might be said, with much propriety, that it was foreign and not germane to the subject of the law. It is not a valid objection that the prohibition designed for the benefit of the institution is guaranteed by a public penalty, or, as in this case, one going to the county. It was competent to select any mode of enforcing the prohibition which might be thought the most efficacious." (
In Board v. Allen, the court, in construing the "act in relation to the county treasurers of the counties of Monroe and Seneca," said: "The provisions authorizing the supervisors to designate the banks in which such treasurers shall deposit the state moneys, and directing such banks to give bonds, pay interest, and keep accounts with the state treasurer, are all parts of the system established by the act for the custody and disposition of the state funds collected by the treasurers designated in the title of the act, and are connected with the same subject." (