State v. HirschfelderState v. Hirschfelder
¶ 1 This case requires us to interpret the statutory language prohibiting sexual relations between a student and a school employee,
Facts and Procedural History
¶ 2 Matthew Hirschfelder was employed as a choir teacher at Hoquiam High School. He had sexual intercourse in his office with a member of the high school choir, A.N.T., several days prior to her graduation in 2006. At the time, Hirschfelder was 33 and A.N.T. was 18. Hirschfelder was charged with sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree under
A person is guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree when: ... the person is a school employee who has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual intercourse with a registered student of the school who is at least sixteen years old and not married to the employee, if the employee is at least sixty months older than the student.
¶ 3 Hirschfelder filed a motion to dismiss the charge pursuant to State v. Knapstad, 107 Wash.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986), arguing that because the statute criminalized sexual intercourse with “minors,” he committed no crime when he had sexual intercourse with an 18-year-old adult. Alternatively, he argued that the former statute was unconstitutionally vague and violated his right to equal protection. The trial judge denied the motion but certified the case for immediate review by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute was ambiguous but that legislative history indicated that the legislature intended to criminalize only sexual misconduct between school employees and students aged 16 and 17. State v. Hirschfelder, 148 Wash.App. 328, 199 P.3d 1017 (2009).1
¶ 4 The State filed a motion for review, challenging the Court of Appeals decision and arguing that the statute criminalized sexual intercourse with any registered student
Analysis
Statutory Interpretation
¶ 5 “The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Dep‘t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).
(1) A person is guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree when: (a) The person has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual intercourse with another person who is at least sixteen years old but less than eighteen years old and not married to the perpetrator, if the perpetrator is at least sixty months older than the victim, is in a significant relationship to the victim, and abuses a supervisory position within that relationship in order to engage in or cause another person under the age of eighteen to engage in sexual intercourse with the victim; (b) the person is a school employee who has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual intercourse with a registered student of the school who is at least sixteen years old and not married to the employee, if the employee is at least sixty months older than the student; or (c) the person is a foster parent who has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual intercourse with his or her foster child who is at least sixteen.
(2) Sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree is a class C felony.
(3) For the purposes of this section, “school employee” means an employee of a common school defined in
RCW 28A.150.020 , or a grade kindergarten through twelve employee of a private school underchapter 28A.195 RCW , who is not enrolled as a student of the common school or private school.
¶ 6 Hirschfelder argues that the former statute, entitled “[s]exual misconduct with a minor in the first degree,” was not intended to criminalize sexual intercourse between school employees and registered students age 18 or older because of the statute‘s use of the term “minor.” Alternatively, Hirschfelder argues that the term “minor” is ambiguous and that we should apply the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in his favor. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hirschfelder, concluding “that for the purposes of
¶ 7 In any question of statutory construction, we look to ascertain the intention of the legislature by first examining a statute‘s plain meaning. Campbell, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4. “`“Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.“‘” State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (quoting Davis v. Dep‘t of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 963, 977 P.2d 554 (1999) (quoting Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996))). “[I]f the statute‘s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Campbell, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4. “Plain meaning is discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.... Statutory provisions and rules should be harmonized whenever possible.” Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007) (citations omitted).
¶ 9 Hirschfelder argues that “minor” as it is used in the provision at issue must exclude students 18 or older because a separate statute,
¶ 10 The dissent‘s sole reason for rejecting our plain reading of the statute rests on a separate provision not raised by the parties,
¶ 11 However,
¶ 12 At most, even if the dissent were correct that the defense offered by
¶ 13 Hirschfelder, however, argues that
¶ 14 Hirschfelder argues that the report‘s statement and the bill‘s versions are rendered insignificant by other pieces of legislative history. He points first to a veto message written by Governor Gary Locke regarding House Bill 1091, in which Governor Locke noted that the proposed bill language would apply to “sexual conduct with a student between 16 and 18 years old.” 2 Legislative Digest and History of Bills, 57th Leg., at 34 (2d ed., Wash. 2001). The governor went on to veto the bill as too broad in that it lacked an age differential between the victim and perpetrator; a subsequent version of the bill, passed into law, required a 60-month age difference between the victim and the perpetrator. Id.; compare Substitute H.B. 1091 with Laws of 2001, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 12, § 357. Hirschfelder suggests that because the bill, as enacted into law, did not challenge the governor‘s interpretation by specifying an upper age limit, we should assume the legislature agreed that the law applied only to students between 16 and 18 years old. Pet‘r‘s Opening Br. at 10-12.4 Hirschfelder also offers legislative history surrounding an amendment to the law in question, which introduced an
¶ 15 Persuaded by these pieces of legislative history, the Court of Appeals concluded that the legislature‘s removal of the upper age limit from the bill as enacted into law was “mere surplusage.” Hirschfelder, 148 Wash.App. at 349 n. 15, 199 P.3d 1017. We do not agree, nor are we persuaded that the legislative history is inconclusive, much less favorable to the defendant‘s position, as Hirschfelder suggests. An explicit statement that the legislature intended the law to apply to any registered student over the age of 16 stands unchallenged in the legislative history. It is coupled with the affirmative deletion of an upper age limit in subsequent versions of the bill enacted into law, as highlighted by the contrasting language between subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b). In the face of this, the governor‘s veto message and statements interpreting the law made during unrelated amendments have little bearing on the question before us.
¶ 16 Hirschfelder argues finally that the statute is ambiguous because a separate clause of former subsection (1)(b) makes it a crime to knowingly cause “another person under the age of eighteen” to have sexual contact with a registered student of the school.
¶ 17 In the end, a common sense reading of
Constitutionality
¶ 18 Hirschfelder also challenges
¶ 19 “A statute is void for vagueness if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” State v. Glas, 147 Wash.2d 410, 421, 54 P.3d 147 (2002). Statutes are required to “define prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice of what conduct they must avoid, and the need to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement.” City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wash.2d 826, 844, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992). Here,
¶ 20 Hirschfelder next argues that the former statute is discriminatory. The former statute defines a school employee as an employee of a public or private kindergarten through 12 (K-12) institution.
¶ 21 Equal protection under the law is guaranteed by both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution.5 The aim of equal protection is “securing equality of treatment by prohibiting undue favor” or “hostile discrimination.” Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash.2d 1, 15, 138 P.3d 963 (2006). The appropriate level of scrutiny in equal protection claims depends upon the nature of the classification or rights involved. Am. Legion Post No. 149 v. Wash. State Dep‘t of Health, 164 Wash.2d 570, 608, 192 P.3d 306 (2008). Suspect classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 608-09, 192 P.3d 306. “Strict scrutiny also applies to laws burdening fundamental rights or liberties.” Id. at 609, 192 P.3d 306. “Intermediate scrutiny applies only `“if the statute implicates both an important right and a semisuspect class not accountable for its status.“‘” Id. at 609, 192 P.3d 306 (quoting Madison v. State, 161 Wash.2d 85, 103, 163 P.3d 757 (2007) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Runyan, 121 Wash.2d 432, 448, 853 P.2d 424 (1993))). Absent a fundamental right or suspect class, or an important right or semi-suspect class, a law will receive rational basis review. Id. at 609, 192 P.3d 306.
¶ 22 Understandably, Hirschfelder does not claim that K-12 school employees have a fundamental or important right to sexual relations with registered students. Nor does he contend that school employees constitute a suspect or semisuspect class. Thus, we apply rational basis review to his claim that
¶ 23 Our Court of Appeals has had occasion to consider the former statute at issue in light of the first and third of these requirements.
Here, the pertinent class is public school employees. There is nothing else in the text of [former]
RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) that distinguishes among the public school employees that are covered by the statute. The statute singles out public school employees because they have unique access tochildren, often in an unsupervised context, and can use that access to groom or coerce children or young adults into exploitive or abusive conduct. Given the important goals of providing a safe school environment for children and preventing the sexual exploitation of children, this distinction has a basis that is rationally related to those important and compelling government purposes.
State v. Clinkenbeard, 130 Wash.App. 552, 567, 123 P.3d 872 (2005). We agree with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in this regard.
¶ 24 Hirschfelder‘s argument, however, seems to focus on the second requirement for rational basis: that there be a rational basis for treating differently those within and without the class. But “[i]n order to defeat the legislation, the defendant must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no state of facts exists or can be conceived sufficient to justify the challenged classification, or that the facts have so far changed as to render the classification arbitrary and obsolete.” State v. Smith, 93 Wash.2d 329, 337, 610 P.2d 869 (1980). Hirschfelder has not carried this burden, and we decline to find that
¶ 25 Finally, amicus WACDL asserts that the former statute violates Hirschfelder‘s right to privacy under
Costs
¶ 26 Hirschfelder asks for “costs ... as allowed pursuant to RAP 14 and applicable case law.” Pet‘r‘s Opening Br. at 26. Under RAP 14.2, the party that substantially prevails on review is entitled to costs. Because Hirschfelder has not substantially prevailed before us, we deny his request.
Conclusion
¶ 27 We hold that
WE CONCUR: BARBARA A. MADSEN, Chief Justice, GERRY L. ALEXANDER, MARY E. FAIRHURST, and JAMES M. JOHNSON, Justices.
C. JOHNSON, J. (dissenting).
¶ 28 The majority analyzes one statutory subsection and fails to apply the determinative statutory provision. Perhaps more disturbing are the reasons why the majority does not apply other, determinative statutory subsections. The majority‘s conclusion is inconsistent with the statutory scheme, taken as a whole, and does not, ultimately make sense.
¶ 29 In this case, the issue centers on
(2) ... it is a defense which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the offense the defendant reasonably believed the alleged victim to be the age identified in subsection (3) of this section based upon declarations as to age by the alleged victim.
(3) The defense afforded by subsection (2) of this section requires that for the following defendants, the reasonable belief be as indicated:
....
(d) For a defendant charged with sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree, that the victim was at least eighteen, or was less than sixty months younger than the defendant.
¶ 30 The majority‘s explanation for ignoring
¶ 31 The majority disregards the affirmative defense expressly provided in
¶ 32 As additional support, the majority also applies a general rule of statutory interpretation, “When `statutes irreconcilably conflict, the more specific statute will prevail....‘” Majority at 881 (quoting Hallauer v. Spectrum Props., Inc., 143 Wash.2d 126, 146, 18 P.3d 540 (2001)). But the majority‘s analysis is flawed for several reasons. First, the majority states just half of the rule of interpretation regarding statutes relating to the same subject matter. Before looking to the “more specific statute,” both statutes “are to be read together as constituting a unified whole ... which maintains the integrity of the respective statutes.” Hallauer, 143 Wash.2d at 146, 18 P.3d 540 (quoting and citing State v. Wright, 84 Wash.2d 645, 650, 529 P.2d 453 (1974); Wark v. Nat‘l Guard, 87 Wash.2d 864, 867, 557 P.2d 844 (1976); Pearce v. G.R. Kirk Co., 22 Wash.App. 323, 327, 589 P.2d 302 (1979)). In this case,
¶ 33 Second, the majority appears to disregard the fact that a statutory interpretation limiting an affirmative defense is significantly different from a statutory interpretation limiting the reach of a criminal statute; an application that is more consistent with the general rule of interpretation that the majority relies upon. Tellingly, the majority does not cite to a single case in this state supporting the proposition that a statute providing an affirmative defense to a substantive crime “irreconcilably conflict[s]” with the statute establishing the underlying crime. Majority at 881. The majority fails to cite such precedent because no such precedent exists.
¶ 34 In sum, the majority‘s application of
WE CONCUR: RICHARD B. SANDERS, TOM CHAMBERS, and SUSAN OWENS, Justices.
Notes
[1] Following this decision, the legislature modified the former statute in 2009. Laws of 2009, ch. 324, § 1. It now provides:
A person is guilty of sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree when: ... the person is a school employee who has, or knowingly causes another person under the age of eighteen to have, sexual intercourse with an enrolled student of the school who is at least sixteen years old and not more than twenty-one years old and not married to the employee, if the employee is at least sixty months older than the student.
[2]
Each school district‘s kindergarten through twelfth grade basic educational program shall be accessible to all students who are five years of age, as provided by
The superintendent of public instruction shall require each school district in the state to insure an appropriate educational opportunity for all children with disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one, but when the twenty-first birthday occurs during the school year, the educational program may be continued until the end of that school year.
[3] We are also mindful of the fact that the defense provision was not altered when the legislature amended
[4] We note that if we adopted the interpretation of the law that Hirschfelder claims is set forth in the governor‘s veto message, it would do Hirschfelder little good, as this interpretation includes in its scope students who are 18 at the time of the incident, as A.N.T. was here.
[5] The
[6] Moreover, it is not clear whether non-K-12 employees are in fact treated differently.
[7]