The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The primary question in this appeal is whether an off-duty police officer who conspires with the private security manager of a store to engage in shoplifting may be found guilty of official misconduct. On the facts of this case, we hold that the officer’s
I
We accept generally the recital of testimony set forth in the defendant’s Appellate Division brief. Of course, defendant disputes much of the testimony, but it could have formed the basis for the jury’s verdict.
In December 1990, John Hinds was employed as the security manager of a Caldor department store in Holmdel. Co-defendant Michael T. Borsari was a twenty-one year member of the Holmdel police force who had reached the rank of detective sergeant and was in charge of the Detective Bureau. Borsari and Hinds had known each other for twenty years. Borsari admitted having taken merchandise from the Holmdel Caldor on three occasions— December 13,1990, December 16,1990, and one other date that he could not specifically recall. He denied that he committed theft on any other days. Borsari also denied that Hinds was aware of his activities, that Hinds conspired with him, or that Hinds received any money or merchandise as a result.
Thomas Keenan, the store manager, however, suspected that Borsari and Hinds were jointly involved in theft. Keenan noticed that Borsari was often in the store with Hinds for long periods of time. On one occasion, Keenan saw Borsari, who had a blue Rubbermaid container in his shopping cart, hold up two items of merchandise in Hinds’ direction. He then saw Borsari leave the store with the merchandise in the cart and Hinds behind him. The manager knew that Borsari had not purchased the merchandise. Keenan alerted the Operations Manager of the store to the purported activities of Hinds and Borsari. The Operations Manager herself had noticed that Borsari was frequently in the store
Two other employees described Borsari as being in the store almost “on a daily basis” to speak to Hinds. Shortly before Christmas in 1990, one employee observed Borsari in the parking lot with a cart filled to the top with merchandise that was neither “bagged nor tagged.” He informed Hinds, who responded, “He better not have or I’ll kick his ass.” But Hinds took no steps to pursue Borsari or to see what was in the cart. When another employee mentioned to Hinds that Borsari had left with unpaid merchandise on a separate occasion, Hinds responded, “It can’t be true and if it was [I] would punch Mike [Borsari] in the nose.”
Ultimately, Caldor’s Loss Prevention Department contacted the New Jersey State Police'Corruption Department. An investigator for the State Police arranged for a security investigator from Caldor, not known in Holmdel, to perform a surveillance of the store. This investigator testified that he saw Hinds and Borsari pacing back and forth in the vestibule of the store with Borsari eventually pushing a cart loaded with merchandise out of the door without stopping at a cash register. Borsari conceded that he had taken merchandise from the store on that date but denied that Hinds was in the area of the vestibule when he left.
On another date, the Caldor investigator observed Hinds and Borsari standing together near the appliance department. Bor-sari then pushed a cart through the store, took various items, and placed them within a Rubbermaid container with items on top of it. Next, Borsari entered the shoe department out of the investigator’s sight, with the merchandise no longer visible. Eventually Borsari reappeared in the parking lot with a shopping cart loaded with unpaid-for Caldor merchandise.
The jury convicted Hinds and Borsari of conspiracy, official misconduct, theft, and theft by receiving stolen property. On Hinds’ appeal, the Appellate Division reversed his conviction of official misconduct. It also reversed the other convictions for trial errors and remanded those matters for a new trial. It held, however, that Hinds could not be re-tried on the charge of official misconduct because Borsari himself could not have been found to have committed an act of official misconduct on these facts. While we originally denied the State’s petition for certification, 140
N.J.
276,
II
Prior to the 1979 adoption of N.J.S.A 2C:30-2, official misconduct was both a statutory crime and a common law crime.
State v. Maioranna,
225
N.J.Super.
365, 368,
[T]he term “misconduct in office” is sometimes used in a generic sense to refer broadly to ail official wrongdoing, thus including in its sweep the more particularized crimes of extortion, bribery and the like, as well as in the special sense, as here, to designate an offense which bears no other name and is comprised of elements differing in some particulars from those of the related crimes. Distinctions have become shadowy and labels imprecise and somewhat non-exdusive. There are many situations, like that before us, where essentially the same factual situation could properly ground a prosecution for more than one of these offenses.
[State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 45,167 A.2d 161 (1961).]
1) any act which is wrongful in itself — malfeasance, or 2) any lawful act performed in an unlawful manner — misfeasance, or 3) omission to do any act which is required of him by the duties of his office — nonfeasance. However, the precise sub-labeling is not always found and is not requisite. The gravamen of the charge of misconduct is malfeasance — the doing of an act which is positively unlawful or wrong.
[Maioranna, supra, 225 N.J.Super. at 369,542 A.2d 510 (citation omitted).]
The 1979 Code of Criminal Justice abolished common law crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2 now defines official misconduct as follows:
Official Misconduct. A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with purpose to obtain a benefit for himself or another or to injure or to deprive another of a benefit:
a. He commits an act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that such act is unauthorized or he is committing such act in an unauthorized manner; or
b. He knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon him by law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office.
Official misconduct is a crime of the second degree. If the benefit obtained or sought to be obtained, or of which another is deprived or sought to be deprived, is of a value of $200.00 or less, the offense of official misconduct is a crime of the third degree.
The 1971 Commentary of the Criminal Law Revision Commission explains:
This is Section § 195.00 of the New York Code. It is intended to consolidate the law as to malfeasance and non-feasance by public servants____
Subsection a, which condemns aggressive action, requires that the “act” relate to the public servant’s office and that it constitute an unauthorized exercise of his official functions. In addition, the public servant must know that such act is unauthorized ... because it is declared to be such by statute, ordinance, rule, regulation or otherwise.
Subsection b, the “omission to act” phase of this offense, has reference to a public servant who consciously refrains from performing an official non-discretionary duty, which duty is imposed upon him by law or which is clearly inherent in the nature of his office. In addition, the public servant must know of the existence of such non-discretionary duty to act. Thus, such duty must be either one that is imposed by law, or one that is unmistakably inherent in the nature of the publicservant’s office, i.e., the duty to act is so clear that the public servant is on notice as to the standards that he must meet. In other words, the failure to act must be more than a mere breach of good judgment. In the absence of a duty to act, there can be no conviction.
The kind of culpability required by this Section is stated alternatively, i.e., the public servant’s intent must be either (a) to obtain a benefit, or (b) to injure another person or to deprive another person of a benefit.
[Cannel, Criminal Code Annotated, Comment N.J.S.A 2C:3-2J
The indictment charged the defendants with violations of section 2(b), the failure-to-act prong of the statute. While no special or private law prescribes the duties of police officers, such duties are inherent or implicit in the nature of the office.
Maioranna, supra,
225
N.J.Super.
at 371,
We have had occasion in recent cases to consider official misconduct among off-duty officers. In
Moore v. Youth Correctional Inst.,
119
N.J.
256, 270,
The acts of the off-duty officers in
Johnson
and
Bullock
were sufficiently related to the officers’ official status to constitute official misconduct because they made calculated use of an office to avoid suspicion and to instill in unsuspecting victims a false sense of security. Borsari’s conduct and statements to Caldor employees demonstrate that the jury could find that Borsari too used his office to instill a false sense of security and to avoid
Defendant has relied principally upon the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Weintraub in
State v. Cohen,
32
N.J.
1,
[A police officer] is indictable for nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance only if, with the requisite criminal mind, he fails to perform or improperly performs his public duty.
If his act, thus criminal when committed by a private citizen, does relate to the performance of his duty of office, ... he would be guilty at least of nonfeasance with respect to his specific duty____
But I cannot agree that a policeman is guilty of the common-law crime by reason of his every infraction of the penal laws. A police officer is not appointed to prevent himself from committing offenses, nor to detect and arrest himself. Rather, his official role is to deal with others. It is much too attenuated and unrealistic a thought that a man be his own policeman____ I do not see how a line could be drawn short of such absurdities if it were held that a policeman has the public duty to prevent himself from violating the law and to detect his own infractions.
[ 32 N.J. at 13-14,158 A.2d 497 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).]
Defendant thus argues that a police officer who commits a crime unrelated to his office and while off duty does no more than commit the underlying crime. Because Hinds’ conviction as an accomplice is predicated on the substantive guilt of Borsari, he argues that “the principal’s guilt would consist essentially of the failure to apprehend himself, a clearly untenable result under common law.”
This is a sophisticated argument, but we believe that it fails to take into account the reality of the situation. The jury must have believed that Hinds shared in the proceeds with Borsari as it convicted Hinds of the receipt of stolen goods. It thus found that Hinds was a thief. That being so, Borsari undoubtedly had a duty to report Hinds’ crimes. In
Robey v. Indiana,
In its opinion below, the Appellate Division relied upon the Commentary to the repealed crime of “official oppression” to bolster its conclusion that Borsari could not be guilty of official misconduct. We are not so sure, however, that the Commentary to repealed
N.J.S.A
26:30-1 “is equally applicable to
N.J.S.A
2C:30-2,”
State v. Hinds,
278
N.J.Super.
1, 11,
Moreover, as noted above, our law is based on New York law. In New York, a police officer who receives stolen goods while off duty may still be found guilty of official misconduct.
People v. Ventura,
Of course, not every offense committed by a public official involves official misconduct.
See Craig v. Texas,
31
Tex.Crim.
29, 19
S.W.
504 (App.1892) (holding that drunkenness in office did not involve official misconduct);
Hall v. Texas,
Ill
The subsidiary question is whether Hinds may be found guilty as an accomplice to the crime of official misconduct. Although we denied Hinds’ cross-petition for certification on the issue of accomplice liability, 140
N.J.
276,
Yet, our decisions have held that a private person may be an accomplice to official misconduct.
See State v. Bryant,
257
N.J.Super.
63, 68,
A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by another person for whose conduct he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
[N.J.S.A 2C:2-6dJ
The
Bryant
court further noted that “[m]isconduct by public officials frequently is encouraged, aided and facilitated by persons outside government and, therefore, accomplice liability is consistent with the statutory aims of deterrence and punishment implicit in
N.J.S.A
2C:30-2.”
Bryant, supra,
257
N.J.Super.
at 68,
Defendant insists that
Bryant
is not applicable because it relates to the first prong of official misconduct, the unauthorized exercise of official function. Still, we think that the principles are similar. In
People v. Teitelbaum,
As for Borsari, to convict him of official misconduct, the jury must find that he was a public servant at the time of the alleged crime, and that he refrained from performing an act that he was required to perform as part of his office, with the purpose to benefit himself or another, or to injure or deprive another of a benefit. In its official misconduct charge to the jury below, the trial court focused the jury’s attention on the “joint criminal activity” of the two defendants and the fact that Borsari “protect[ed] himself and Hinds by seeing that the criminality of them would not be brought ... to the attention of others who would take some action to bring [Borsari and Hinds] to justice.” Such misconduct is sufficiently related to Borsari’s status to sustain his conviction of official misconduct.
See State v. Bullock, supra,
136
N.J.
at 153,
The judgment of the Appellate Division on the official misconduct count is reversed. The charge of official misconduct is
For reversal and rermmdment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
Opposed — None.
