State v. . Hight
63 S.E. 1043
N.C.
1909
Check Treatment
Connor, J.,

after stating the case: It is undoubtedly true, as a general rule, that evidence of the commission of other crimes is not admissible to prove defendant guilty of that for which he is on trial. To this general rule there are certain clearly-defined exceptions. The exception upon which his Honor based *819 the admission of evidence tending to show tlie loss of other watches and property of the prosecutor from the store in which defendant was employed, and which was traced to his possession, is that where the intent with which the property is taken is an essential element to be shown, such evidence is competent. Judge Ashe, with his usual clearness, states and -applies the exception in State v. Murphy, 84 N. C., 742. He says: “Where, in the investigation of an offense, it becomes necessary to prove the quo animo, the intent, design or guilty knowledge, etc., in such cases it has been held admissible to prove other offenses of like character, as, for instance, in indictments for passing counterfeit money, the fact that the defendant, about the same time, had passed other counterfeit money of like kind, has been uniformly held to be admissible to show the scienter or guilty knowledge.” The opinion cites Rex v. Davis, 6 Car. and P., 117, where, on a trial for receiving stolen goods, for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge of the defendant, evidence was admitted that other goods found at the same time were stolen, although they were the subject of an indictment then pending. The case is strikingly illustrative of the principle applicable in this ease. State v. Weaver, 104 N. C., 761; State v. Jeffries, 117 N. C., 729. The cases relied upon by defendant (State v. Frazier, 118 N. C., 1257; State v. Graham, 121 N. C., 627, and State v. Battle, 126 N. C., 1038) do not come within the excep-' tion. If defendant had taken only the Moss watch, and pawned it, the jury may well have had a reasonable doubt whether he did so with a guilty intent; but when it is shown that during the two years of his employment he repeatedly took other property of his employers’, under his control as clerk, and disposed of it, applying the proceeds, or the amount borrowed, to his own use, it is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that he took and converted the Moss watch to his own use with a criminal iiftent. The time within which the other articles were taken, and the circumstances under which they weije found, tend to show a systematic course of criminal.conduct, of which the taking of the Moss watch was a part. We concur with his Honor *820 that the evidence was competent for the purpose for which he instructed the jury to consider it. Upon an examination of the entire record we find

No Error.