State v. HernandezState v. Hernandez
Rendered on May 11, 2010
Richard C. Pfeiffer, Jr., City Attorney; Lara N. Baker, City Prosecutor, and Melanie R. Tobias, for appellee.
Felice Howard, for appellant.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court
KLATT, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Angelique Hernandez, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Muniсipal Court denying her motion for acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial, after her conviction for a violation of
{¶2} On May 4, 2009, Franklin County Sheriff‘s Officer Paul Chuck stopped his cruiser at the intersection of Cleveland Avenue and Morse Road. Chuck‘s cruiser was on Cleveland Avenue facing north. He observed appellant‘s car, two cars behind his cruiser,
{¶3} At trial, Chuck testified to the version of events just described. The trial court found appellant not guilty of driving left of center but guilty of the marked lanes violation. The trial court sentenced appellant accordingly.
{¶4} After her trial, appellant filed a motion for acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Appellant сlaimed that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove all the elements of a marked lanes violation. The trial court denied both motions.
{¶5} Appellant appeals and assigns the following error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT‘S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL OR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN HER CONVICTION FOR DRIVING OUTSIDE OF THE MARKED LANES.
{¶6} Appellant sought a new trial pursuant to
(A) Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, * * * the following rules apply:
(1) A vehicle or trackless trolley shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall not be moved from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.
{¶8} Appellant claims in her assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial because the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove all the elements of a marked lanes violation. She argues that the state did not present any evidence to prove that she failed to drive within one lane as nearly as practicable and that she changed lanes without first ascertaining that such movement could be made with safety. The state claims, alternatively, that it must only present evidence that appellant did not stay entirely within her lane of traffic to prove a marked lanes violation. The state claims that it presented such evidence in this case. The state argues that after it presented evidеnce establishing a marked lanes violation, it was appellant‘s burden to present evidence to prove an affirmative defense under the statute; namely, that it was impracticable to stay in her lane and that she changed lanes only after ascertaining that suсh movement could be made safely.
{¶9} In considering what type of evidence is sufficient to prove a marked lanes violation, this court has previously concluded that “a driver‘s simply crossing a lane line is
{¶10} In 2008, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539. In Mays, the court dealt with the constitutionality of a traffic stop based on a marked lanes violation. Specifically, an officer stopped Mays after observing him twice drive over the white edge line marking the berm of the road. The officer observed no other traffic violations. Mays argued that the traffic stop was improper because his conduct did not constitute a marked lanes violаtion and that there was no reason to believe that he failed to ascertain the safety of such movement prior to making the movement or that he did not stay within his lane as nearly as practicable. The court rejected both arguments.
{¶11} In rejecting Mays’ first argument, the court noted that an officer‘s decision to stop a vehicle for a traffic violation must be prompted by a reasonable and articulable
{¶12} The court went further to reject Mays’ second argument. The court noted that
{¶13} The state argues that Mays overruled this court‘s interpretation of
{¶14} First, Mays does not use the term “affirmative defense” to define the circumstances when a driver may leave a lane of travel without violating the statute. Instead, the court used the phrase “a possible defense.” Id. at ¶17. Thus, Mays does not
{¶15} Second, we note that the question presented to the Mays court was whеther or not an officer who twice observed a driver cross over a white edge line marker could make a constitutionally valid stop of the driver based only on those observations. Id. at ¶1. Mays did not discuss the elements of a marked lanes violation or what evidence is sufficient to prove such a violation.2 These are two distinct analyses, as an officer must only have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a violation has occurred to conduct a traffic stop; whether a violation actually occurred is not relevant. See id. at ¶17 (noting that possible defenses to an offense are irrelevant in reasonable and articulable suspicion analysis); State v. Stokes, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-960, 2008-Ohio-5222, ¶21 (noting that the question of whether or not officer had reasonable suspicion to stop someone is not concerned with whethеr defendant actually violated statute); State v. Binegar (Aug. 13, 2001), 4th Dist. No. 00CA21 (noting that the state need not show that driver actually violated statute to justify traffic stop, the officer only needed to have reasonable suspicion); State v. Davis, 11th Dist. No. 2005-P-0077, 2006-Ohio-3424, ¶16 (arguments challenging whether sufficient evidence supported traffic violation irrelevant when
{¶16} Third, the impracticability and safety issues in the statute are not consistent with the definition of an affirmative defense as that term is defined in
{¶17} The impracticability and safety issues in the statute are not necessarily within the peculiar knowledge of a driver. For example, if it is impracticable for a driver to remain in a lane because of an object on the road, that knowledge would be apparent to an officer also driving on the road. Similarly, if there wаs nothing on the road in front of the driver, that fact could be established by persons other than the accused. Additionally, an officer could observe a driver change lanes without using a turn signal or without checking for the presence of other vehicles. If an officer obsеrved a driver change lanes in a manner that caused or almost caused an accident, the officer would have circumstantial evidence or knowledge that the driver changed lanes without first ascertaining whether such movement could be made safely. Thus, we cоnclude that the issues of impracticability and safety are not affirmative defenses to a marked lanes violation.
{¶18} Finally, we also reject the state‘s claim that these issues are affirmative defenses because to interpret the statute as the state argues wоuld lead to absurd results. Under the state‘s interpretation of
{¶19} For all these reasons, we conclude that Mays did not overrule or otherwise impact this court‘s interpretation of
{¶20} Applying East to the present case, we agree with appellant that the state did not present any evidence tending to demonstrate that she did not drive within one lane as nearly as practicable and that she changed lanes without ascertaining that such movement could be made with safety. Absent such evidence, the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove a marked lanes violation. East. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying appellant‘s motion for new trial. Appellant‘s lone assignment of error is sustained.
{¶21} Because the state presented insufficient evidence to find appellant guilty, we must reverse the trial court‘s decision denying appellant‘s motion for new trial, vacate the judgment of conviction entered by the Franklin County Municipal Court, and enter a judgment of acquittal. State v. Byerly (Aug. 21, 1998), 11th Dist. No. 97-P-0034
{¶22} Lastly, we sua sponte certify a conflict between our holding in this case and the Second District Court of Appeаls’ opinion in Rochowiak. Section 3(B)(4), Article IV, Ohio Constitution vests in the courts of appeals of this state the power to certify the record of a case to the Supreme Court of Ohio for review and final determination “[w]henever the judges * * * find that a judgment upon which they have agreеd is in conflict with a judgment pronounced upon the same question by any other court of appeals of the state[.]”
{¶23} Specifically, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Ohio:
In a prosecution for a violation of
R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) , must the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver did not drive within one lane as nearly as practicable and changed lanes without first ascertaining that such movement could be made with safety.
Judgment denying motion for new trial reversed; judgment of conviction vacated; judgment of acquittal entered; and conflict certified.
BRYANT and McGRATH, JJ., concur.