{¶ 2} On January 26, 2007, Timothy Johnson was reported missing by Jeannie Heltsley, his aunt, who also reported that her nephew was last seen with appellant, his sister, six days earlier. On February 13, 2007, Lloyd Hunt, Johnson's uncle, met with police to *2 report appellant and her boyfriend, Adam Scott, were driving Johnson's van without proper insuranсe or permission. The next day, after Scott was asked to bring Johnson's van to the police station, appellant and her boyfriend drove the van to the police station where they met with Chief Deputy Terry Snowden and Detective Dean Miller. After a brief conversation, Deputy Snowden asked appellant if he could speak with her about her brother's disappearance, to which she agreed. After Deputy Snowden's questioning concluded, appellant then agrеed to take a Computerized Voice Stress Analysis (CVSA) test.
{¶ 3} During her CVSA test, appellant denied having any information regarding her brother's disappearance, a statement which the test indicated was false. After her test concluded, appellant agreed to wait in an adjoining room while her boyfriend also took a CVSA test. During his CVSA test, Scott told police that appellant told him she killed her brother and hid his body in a barrel. Once Scott's test concluded, the police approached appellant while she waited in the adjoining room and informed her that she failed her CVSA test. In response, appellant "blurted out" that she killed her brother and that Scott had "nothing to do with it." Appellant was then taken back into the CVSA testing room where, after being advised of her Miranda rights, she confessed to killing her brother and concealing his body in a barrel.
{¶ 4} Appellant moved to suppress the statements she made to the police. Following a suppression hearing, the trial сourt denied appellant's motion to suppress. A Preble County jury found appellant guilty of murder and she was sentenced to a minimum of 25 years in prison.
{¶ 5} Appellant now appeals the trial court's decision denying her motion to suppress, rаising two assignments of error.
{¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING THE *3
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S CONFESSION UNDER ARTICLE
{¶ 8} Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v.Long (1998),
{¶ 9} We note at the outset that the two issues of voluntariness of a confession and compliance with Miranda v. Arizona (1966),
{¶ 11} It is well-established that the "prosecution may not use statements, whether *4
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from a custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates the use of procеdural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." State v. Huysman, Warren App. No. CA2005-09-107,
{¶ 12} In determining whether an individual was in custody, a сourt must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. State v. Coleman, Butler App. No. CA2001-10-241,
{¶ 13} Further, a noncustodial situation is not converted into a custodiаl situation simply because questioning takes place in a police station. Fille,
{¶ 14} The testimony presented at the suppression hearing indicated the following:
{¶ 15} On February 14, 2007, at approximately 5:00 p.m., after being asked to bring Johnson's van to the police station, appellant and her boyfriend drove the van to the police *5 department where they met with Deputy Snowden and Detective Miller in the squad room.1 After a brief conversation, appellant agreed to speak with Deputy Snowden about her brother's disappearance and also agreed to take a CVSA test with Investigator David Lindloff.2 Appellant was then taken to Investigator Lindloff's office where she remained for approximately 50 minutes during the administration of the CVSA test. Although the door to Investigator Lindloff's office remained closed, appellant was not arrested or placed in handcuffs during the administration of the test.
{¶ 16} After she completed her CVSA test, in which she denied having any information regarding her brother's disappearance, a statement the test indicated as false, appellant agreed to wait in an adjoining room while her boyfriend also took a CVSA test. During his CVSA test, Scott told police that аppellant admitted to killing her brother and hiding his body in a barrel. After Scott's test concluded, Investigator Lindloff approached appellant and told her that she failed her CVSA test. In response, appellant "blurted out" a confession to her brother's murder by stating; "I killed him. [Scott] didn't have nothing to do with it." Appellant was then taken back into Investigator Lindloff's office where she again confessed to killing her brother after being advised of her Miranda rights.
{¶ 17} The trial court, in denying appellant's motion to suppress, determined that appellant was never handcuffed and free to leave at anytime before she confessed to killing her brother. As a result, the trial court concluded that appellant was not in custody and not deprived оf her freedom in any significant way prior to her initial confession. Based on our review of the record, we find that there is competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's finding. Therefore, because appellаnt was not in custody before she confessed to the *6 murder, a recitation of her Miranda warnings was not required.Fille at ¶ 21.
{¶ 19} Although we find that Miranda warnings were not required, appellant's confession must have been voluntarily made to be admissible.Fille at ¶ 22, citing Bram v. United States (1897),
{¶ 20} Coercive police activity thаt overbears the defendant's will or impairs his self-determination is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession was involuntary. Fille at ¶ 22, citing State v. Dailey
(1990),
{¶ 21} In this case, there is no evidence to indicate appellant was physically threatened, harmed, deprived of food, medical treatment, or sleep. The interviews were conducted at a time and day convenient for appellant after she was driven to the police station by her boyfriend. Moreover, as noted above, appellant was not even subjected to a custodial interrogation before she confessed to killing her brother. Instead, appellant simply *7 "blurted out" that she killed her brother after being told she failed a CVSA test. Further, the trial court found that there was "no evidence * * * that [appellant's] will was overborne by coercion, threats or promises" even after she was placed in custody. As a result, based on the totality of the circumstances, wе find appellant's confession was not involuntarily obtained.
{¶ 22} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress because she was not in custody and her confession was voluntarily given. Therefore, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 24} "THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL UNDER ARTICLE
{¶ 25} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that she was prеjudiced from counsel's deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington (1984),
{¶ 26} Appellant argues that if the motion to suppress should have been granted then *8 her trial counsel waived the error by failing to object to the admission of her confеssion at trial, thus resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 27} Crim. R. 12(C), which addresses pretrial motions, provides:
{¶ 28} "Prior to trial, any party may raise by motion any defense, objection, evidentiary issue, or request that is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue. The following must be raised before trial: * * *
{¶ 29} "(3) Motions to suppress evidence * * * on the ground that it was illegally obtained."
{¶ 30} A motion to suppress determines with finality the admissibility of evidence. State v. Smith (Nov. 8, 2000), Lorain App. No. 99CA007399,
{¶ 31} Judgment affirmed.
WALSH, P.J., and BRESSLER, J., concur.