51 W. Va. 283 | W. Va. | 1902
This is a writ of error to a judgment of tlie circuit court of Wetzel County, granted upon the petition of State Henry, a colored man, who has been convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to be hanged for the murder of one John Richardson, who was also colored. They had come to Wetzel County from North Carolina in March, 1900, to work for a construction company engaged in building the West Virginia Short Line Railroad. At that point, and at the time of the murder,
The first assignment of error is that the court did wrong in overruling a motion to quash the indictment. It is in the statutory form and sufficient.
The next complaint is that the court erred in permitting the State to introduce in evidence the hammer found in a field adjoining that in which the body was found or near the grave. Tlie testimony shows that this hammer was found a day or two after the body was found, that there had been some rain between the times of the killing and the finding of it and that the hammer, when found, had some hairs on it, and what appeared to be blood stains. It was also shown that the wounds were such as might have been inflicted with it. It was so manifestly proper to allow the jury to take that bammex into consideration that no time will he given to discussion of the question. No reason is given for tlie objection other than that the hammer was not
It is also urged that it was error to permit the witness, John Watts, to point out certain marks or stains on the coat and say, “There were very small splotches; that is I supposed they was blood, they looked to be blood, here is some of the small marks here now.” It was shown that this was the defendant’s coat, that he had worn it on the evening of the day of the murder; that it was found secreted in his shack and that there were marks upon it which may have been blood stains. “It is the constant practice upon trials for murder to admit evidence of the presence of blood spots upon clothing of'the prisoner or the deceased, or'át the scene of the tragery. Any witness, expert, or non-expert, may testify that the stains resembled blood. But the point of the objection is that the witness gave it as his opinion that it was blood ? Opinion, though not generally admissible, is very frequently so. While the dividing line between what is fact and what is opinion cannot be very clearly defined, a witness, though not an expert, may testify to his conclusion from facts observed, when the matter to which the testimony relates can not bo reproduced or described to the jury precisely as it appeared to the witness at the time. In such cases opinions are received in furtherance of justice. It is not practicable to bring into court's walls, floors, or ground stained with blood; not always practicable to produce beds or furniture. And the appearance' after a lapse of time is not as it was when fresh after the tragedy to the witness. * * * It is difficult to see, as commonly understood, what was the difference between the witness’s saying from mere inspection that a spot was blood and saying that in his opinion it was blood. It was treated as a statement of fact. We say a certain object is a certain thing; that a spot is an oil spot, a paint spot, or ink spot. Is the statement one of fact or opinion under the principles of evidence? Such evidence is admissible. Why not also a statement that a spot is a blood spot, or that it resembled blood, or that, in the opinion of the witness, it is blood?” State v. Welch, 36 W. Va. 690. This witness was testifying in June, 1901. He had ,seen
On cross-examination, Jerry McCissom, a witness, was asked the following question: “Did you have any information that he left Willie Wilson after dark? Going up in that direction?” The witness answered, “No sir, the last recollection that I have, he left him at the commissary, going down towards tire saloon.” This, the court struck out as improper. The answer is certified by the court in two ways. In the certificate of evidence the witness is quoted as saying “Wilson said he left him at the commissary,” etc., -but in the bill • of exceptions it is as given above. The bill of exceptions was no doubt made up from a transcript of the stenographer’s notes, and the words “Wilson said” omitted by mistake. Viewing iV so, the evidence was hearsay and improper. Viewing it as correct in the.bill of exceptions, striking it out did not tend to support his explanation nor to contradict either McCissom or Wilson for Wilson -said he saw Eichardson last at tire commissary, when Parks and Hunter were there, and all agree that they all started down to-the saloon. The question related to when deceased left Wilson. McCissom denied over and over that he' had information that Eichardson started up the road to catch the light. The statement ruled out does not conflict for it is that he went down the road. However, it is reasonably certain that the language
Another objection is to the action of the court in overruling a motion to strike out the evidence relating to blood stains upon the garments and shoes of the defendant, and upon the hammer. In support of this it is claimed that there is no evidence to show that the stains were blood and that if there be sufficient evidence to show that they were from blood there is not sufficient evidence from which the juiy could say that it was human blood. “Witnesses not medical men may give their opinion as to whether certain spots were blood-spots. The testimony of the chemist who has analyzed blood, and that of the observer who has merely recognized it, belong to the same legal grade of evidence; and though the one may be entitled to much greater weight than the other, with the jury, the exclusion of either would bo illegal.” Wills on Cir. Ev. 193. People v. Gonzalez, 35 N. Y. 49. In Gaines v. Commonwealth, 14 Wright 319, the following charge given to the jury was held to be correct: “We cannot instruct you that because no analysis had been made of the substance which the witnesses supposed to be blood, no chemical test, no microscopic examination, that you are therefore to reject the evidence as insufficient to show that it was blood. We feel it to be our duty to refer the question to you, and leave it for jura to say whether the commonwealth has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that the spots seen by the witnesses were blood.” In Greenfield v. People, 85 N. Y. 75, it was held that a non-expert may testify that spots which he had seen were blood spots. The witness testified that a short time after the commission of the crime he had seen spatters or spots upon stones, and after saying he could testify as a matter of fact what the spots were, he was asked so to state. The court informed him that his opinion was not requested and he would only.be allowed to answer as a fact what the substance was. He then answered that it was blood. In the court of appeals, Miller, Judge, said of the competency of this evidence: “In regard to the second ground, we think that the witnesses were competent to testify upon the subject whether the spots described were blood, without deciding the question whether an opinion of the witnesses would have been competent. Under the circumstances, it is sufficient to say that the testimony was only received after the witnesses had shown some knowledge on the
Error is also assigned in this case, that the court refused to strike out evidence showing that the shovel was found in defendant’s shack, it having afterwards appeared Try the evidence of the State’s witnesses, that it was used in carrying the body of the deceased to his own shack which was part of the same building and in which the defendant roomed. It is difficult to see how this could have prejudiced the prisoner, for' it amounts to the disclosure of the mere history of the shovel. It was found in the field near the dead body, on it the body was carried to the shack, and somebodjq possibly McCissom, put it in the prisoner’s room, and it was afterwards taken from there and held for use on the trial.. Had the State shown this in the order in which it is given here instead of showing, first, that it was found in the field and then in the prisoner’s room, it would certainly be unobjectionable. Does it not amount to the same tiling, its full history having been given? The explanation was shown by the State by evidence which is as credible as that by which the fact of the shovel having been found in the room was shown. There might he something in the objection had the •shovel been the only thing found in the shack which tended to show connection of the prisoner with the crime. Under these circumstances, it must be held if there was error in overruling the motion, it was clearly harmless.
The prisoner was asked on cross-examination'if he had not
A further assignment of error is, that the court permitted the witness, Willie Wilson, to read to the jury a part of a letter which the prisoner had written to his mother, stating what he claimed Wilsou had testified on some former occasion, concerning the light which prisoner claims Richardson followed. It was, in substance, what the prisoner said himself concerning that matter. The letter was a request to prisoner’s mother to tell Wilson to be sure and write that just as he had written it, saying that was what Wilson had sworn at the trial. At the bottom of it there was a request to Wilson himself to write it in ink and “send it back to me,” and signed “Anna Henry, State Henry.” Before it was read Wilson testified that it was in the handwriting of State Henry. This may have been competent under the principles laid down in Greenl. Ev. 195a; People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 31; and State v. Brown, 76 N. C. 222, as tending to show weakness oí .the defendant’s case in his own estimation, being in the nature of an admission in that sense, but it is unnecessary so to decide, for the court, on objection, refused to allow the letter to be introduced, which amounts virtually to an exclusion of its contents.
The following instruction which the court refused to give at the request of the defendant is the subject of another assignment of error: “The jury is instructed that if they believe from the evidence that blood was found on the clothing of the accused, this fact within itself, is not conclusive that it is human blood, and this fact taken alone, is not conclusive that the
The next complaint is that the court erred in permitting the jury to view the scene of the murder, without afterwards instructing them on its own motion that they should not consider as evidence any of the objects or locations pointed out to them 'upon the grounds. It is' proper to say in reference to this that the record does not show that any view was taken, except by some of the questions propounded to the witnesses, nor that the court did or did not instruct the jury. The presumption that the proceedings of the court were regular, when error is not affirmatively shown by bill of exception or otherwise, except as ,to those things which are held to be essential to a legal conviction, such as indictment, pleading, impaneling of a jury, the oath of the jury, trial by jury, verdict and judgment, is conclusive on the question of the proper allowance of the view. This question is fully dismissed in State v. Beatty, decided at this term of Court. See also Shrewsbury v. Miller, 10 W. Va. 115; Richardson v. Donahoo, 16 W. Va. 687, (pt. 14 Syl.); Griffith v. Corrothers, 42 W. Va. 59. Yiew cannot be had except‘under section 30 of chapter 116 of the Code, which provides that the jury may be taken to view the premises, at the request of either party, but if there was a view it is conclusively presumed here, in the absence of anything appearing in the record to the contrary, that either the State or the prisoner requested it. As to the duty of the court to instruct the jury upon its own motion that they should not take into consideration as evidence any
Objection is also made to the form of the verdict which reads: “We, the jury, find the defendant, State Henry, guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in the within indictment.” The argument is that all murder is presumed to be murder in the second degree unless the State elevate it to murder in the first degree by establishing the characteristics of that crime, and that there is no such thing as an indictment for murder in the first degree or second degree. Citing Schnelle’s Case, 24 W. Va. 267; Cain's Case, 20 W. Va. 681. The words “as charged in the within indictment” are unnecessary and may he considered mere surplusage, but, if not so considered, they cannot affect the validity of the verdict. While there is no such thing as an indictment purporting on its face to be an indictment for murder of the first degree only or murder of the second degree only, an indictment in the statutory form will support a conviction of murder in either degree. In legal effect it is an indictment for manslaughter, for second degree murder and for first degree murder and on it a conviction of any one of these crimes will be upheld, if regular, and sustained by
It now remains to inquire only whether the evidence was •sufficient to support the verdict. From the statement of the case it is apparent that the conduct of the prisoner, as shown by the evidence of the State, is decidedly incriminating. The argument found in the brief as well as the oral argument at the bar is based almost wholly upon the evidence introduced by the prisoner to overthrow the evidence of the State tending to establish the acts from which the inference of guilt is so plainly deducible. This argument, on its face, impliedly admits the sufficiency of the evidence of the State to sustain the verdict, if this explanatory testimony in behalf of the prisoner were not in the record. This is a virtual admission that this Court is powerless to interfere with the verdict. On this question the rule is that, where the evidence, and not the facts proved, is certified in the bill .of exceptions, the appellate court will not reverse the judgment, unless, after rejecting all the conflicting oral evidence of the exceptor and giving full faith and credit to that of the adverse party, the decision of the trial court still appears to be wrong. State v. Baker, 33 W. Va. 319. State v. Davis, 31 W. Va. 390; State v. Flannagan, 26 W. Va. 116; State v. Chambers, 22 W. Va. 779; State v. Thompson, 21 W. Va. 741. It is not intended by referring to the virtual admission of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to intimate that counsel for the prisoner in a capital case, may admit his guilt or waive the question of sufficiency, but only to show that the case made by the State is so complete and perfect that there is not a discrepancy nor a missing link in its chain .of:circumstantial evidence. Nothing is left except to assail, and attempt to take by storm, some of the State’s positions. In the absence of the testimony for the prisoner there is clear and unequivocal evidence that he was the last man in whose company the deceased was seen. When last seen they were going in the direction of the place where the dead body was found. What is the
There- is no error and the judgment may be affirmed.
Affirmed.